Measurement of the mechanical power of walking by satellite positioning system (GPS).

PURPOSE: This descriptive article illustrates the application of Global Positioning System (GPS) professional receivers in the field of locomotion studies. The technological challenge was to assess the external mechanical work in outdoor walking. METHODS: Five subjects walked five times during 5 min on an athletic track at different imposed stride frequency (from 70-130 steps x min(-1)). A differential GPS system (carrier phase analysis) measured the variation of the position of the trunk at 5 Hz. A portable indirect calorimeter recorded breath-by-breath energy expenditure. RESULTS: For a walking speed of 1.05 +/- 0.11 m x s(-1), the vertical lift of the trunk (43 +/- 14 mm) induced a power of 46.0 +/- 20.4 W. The average speed variation per step (0.15 +/- 0.03 m x s(-1)) produced a kinetic power of 16.9 +/- 7.2 W. As compared with commonly admitted values, the energy exchange (recovery) between the two energy components was low (39.1 +/- 10.0%), which induced an overestimated mechanical power (38.9 +/- 18.3 W or 0.60 W x kg(-1) body mass) and a high net mechanical efficiency (26.9 +/- 5.8%). CONCLUSION: We assumed that the cause of the overestimation was an unwanted oscillation of the GPS antenna. It is concluded that GPS (in phase mode) is now able to record small body movements during human locomotion, and constitutes a promising tool for gait analysis of outdoor unrestrained walking. However, the design of the receiver and the antenna must be adapted to human experiments and a thorough validation study remains to be conducted.

Literature report : a review of policy learning in five strands of political science research

This paper reviews the policy learning literature in political science. In recent years, the number of publications on learning in the political realm increased dramatically. Researchers have focused on how policymakers and administrators adapt policies based on learning processes or experiences. Thereby, learning has been discussed in very different ways. Authors have referred to learning in the context of ideas, understood as deeply held beliefs, and, as change and adaptation of policy instruments. Two other strands of literature have taken into consideration learning, namely the diffusion literature and research on transfer, which put forward learning to understand who learns from whom and what. Opposed to these views, political learning emphasizes the adaptation of new strategies by policymakers over the transfer of knowledge or broad ideas. In this approach, learning occurs due to the failure of existing policies, increasing problem pressure, scientific innovations, or a combination of these elements.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

The Strength of Promissory Representation : What Makes MPs Change their Positions ?

The paper analyses the positional congruence between pre-election statements in the Swiss voting assistance application "smartvote" and post-election behaviour in the Swiss lower house between 2003 and 2009. For this purpose, we selected 34 smartvote questions which subsequently came up in parliament. Unlike previous studies which assessed the program-to-policy linkage of governments or party groups the paper examines the question at the level of individual MPs which seems appropriate for political systems which follow the idea of power dispersion. While the average rate of political congruence is at some 85 percent, a multivariate analysis detects the underlying factors which push or curb a candidate's propensity to change his or her mind once elections are over. The results show that positional changes are more likely if (1) MPs are freshmen, (2) individual voting behaviour is invisible to the public, (3) the vote is not about a party's core issue, (4) the MP belongs to a party which is located in the political centre, and (5) if the pre-election statement is in disagreement with the majority position of the legislative party group. The last-mentioned factor is paramount: the farer away a candidate's pre-election profile from his or her party is located, the weaker turns out to be the electoral link of promissory representation.

The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe

This article studies the diffusion of the main institutional feature of regulatory capitalism, namely, independent regulatory agencies. While only a few such authorities existed in Europe in the early 1980s, by the end of the twentieth century they had spread impressively across countries and sectors. The analysis finds that three classes of factors (bottom-up, top-down, and horizontal) explain this trend. First, the establishment of independent regulatory agencies was an attempt to improve credible commitment capacity when liberalizing and privatizing utilities and to alleviate the political uncertainty problem, namely, the risk to a government that its policies will be changed when it loses power. Second, Europeanization favored the creation of independent regulators. Third, individual decisions were interdependent, as governments were influenced by the decisions of others in an emulation process where the symbolic properties of independent regulators mattered more than the functions they performed.

HIV-1 reverse transcriptase connection domain mutations: dynamics of emergence and implications for success of combination antiretroviral therapy.

BACKGROUND: Factors promoting the emergence of human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1) reverse transcriptase (RT) connection domain mutations and their effect on antiretroviral therapy (ART) are still largely undetermined. We investigated this matter by analyzing genotypic resistance tests covering 400 amino acid positions in the RT of HIV-1 subtype B viruses and corresponding treatment histories and laboratory measurements. METHODS: The emergence of connection domain mutations was studied in 334 patients receiving monotherapy or dual therapy with thymidine analogues at the time of the genotypic resistance test. Response to subsequent combination ART (cART) was analyzed using Cox regression for 291 patients receiving unboosted protease inhibitors. Response was defined by ever reaching an HIV RNA level <50 copies/mL during the first cART. RESULTS: The connection domain mutations N348I, R356K, R358K, A360V, and A371V were more frequently observed in ART-exposed than ART-naive patients, of which only N348I and A360V were nonpolymorphic (with a prevalence of <1.5% in untreated patients). N348I correlated with M184V and predominantly occurred in patients receiving lamivudine and zidovudine concomitantly. A360V was not associated with specific drug combinations and was found to emerge later than M184V or thymidine analogue mutations. Nonpolymorphic connection domain mutations were rarely detected in the absence of established drug resistance mutations in ART-exposed individuals (prevalence, <1%). None of the 5 connection domain mutations associated with treatment showed a statistically significant effect on response to cART. CONCLUSIONS: Despite their frequent emergence, connection domain mutations did not show large detrimental effects on response to cART. Currently, routine implementation of connection domain sequencing seems unnecessary for developed health care settings.

Quantization of energy and writhe in self-repelling knots

Probably the most natural energy functional to be considered for knotted strings is that given by electrostatic repulsion. In the absence of counter-charges, a charged, knotted string evolving along the energy gradient of electrostatic repulsion would progressively tighten its knotted domain into a point on a perfectly circular string. However, in the presence of charge screening self-repelling knotted strings can be stabilized. It is known that energy functionals in which repulsive forces between repelling charges grow inversely proportionally to the third or higher power of their relative distance stabilize self-repelling knots. Especially interesting is the case of the third power since the repulsive energy becomes scale invariant and does not change upon Mobius transformations (reflections in spheres) of knotted trajectories. We observe here that knots minimizing their repulsive Mobius energy show quantization of the energy and writhe (measure of chirality) within several tested families of knots.