The political ecology of ecosystem services

The dominance of ''ecosystem services'' as a guiding concept for environmental management - where it appears as a neutral, obvious, taken-for-granted concept - hides the fact that there are choices implicit in its framing and in its application. In other words, it is a highly political concept, and its utility depends on the arena in which it is used and what it is used for. Following a political ecology framework, and based on a literature review, bibliometric analyses, and brief examples from two tropical rainforest countries, this review investigates four moments in the construction and application of the ecosystem services idea: socio-historical (the emergence of the discourse), ontological (what knowledge does the concept allow?), scientific (difficulties in its practical application), and political (who wins, who loses?). We show how the concept is a boundary object with widespread appeal, trace the discursive and institutional context within which it gained traction, and argue that choices of scale, definition, and method in measuring ecosystem services frustrate its straightforward application. As a result, it is used in diverse ways by dif- ferent interests to justify different kinds of interventions that at times might be totally opposed. In Madagascar, the ecosystem services idea is mainly used to justify forest conservation in ways open to cri- tique for its neoliberalization of nature or disempowerment of communities. In contrast, in the Brazilian Amazon, the discourse of ecosystem services has served the agendas of traditional populations and family farm lobbies. Ecosystem services, as an idea and tool, are mobilized by diverse actors in real-life situa- tions that lead to complex, regionally particular and fundamentally political outcomes.

Le réalisme des relations : étude des réponses apportées au problème de la différence entre la relation et son fondement (1250-1350)

La question de savoir si la relation est différente réellement de son fondement se rencontre fréquemment dans les textes médiévaux à partir du milieu du treizième siècle. Elle se pose avant tout dans un cadre aristotélicien de discussion des catégories et revient à se demander si la catégorie de relation ajoute véritablement une chose supplémentaire, la relation, dans la réalité. Cette question s'inscrit dans une représentation réaliste des relations : pour la plupart des auteurs du treizième et du quatorzième siècle, le fait que des choses soient réellement reliées entre elles ne fait pas de doute. Deux hommes de même taille sont bel et bien égaux, c'est-à-dire réellement reliés entre eux par une relation d'égalité. La difficulté est alors de comprendre comment ces choses sont reliées entre elles, ou encore, ce qu'est exactement cette relation dont il est alors question. Faut-il dire que l'égalité dans chacun des hommes de même taille est une nouvelle chose qui s'ajoute à la substance de chacun d'eux et aux accidents de taille, appartenant à la catégorie de quantité, sur lesquels ces relations d'égalité sont fondées ? Ou faut-il dire que l'égalité est réelle d'une autre manière, c'est-à-dire sans pour autant ajouter une nouvelle chose à ce à quoi elle advient ? Ce problème, qui se rencontre déjà dans les tensions existant entre les différents exposés qu'Aristote a consacrés à cette catégorie, a reçu de multiples réponses. Celles-ci nous éclairent sur la manière dont le réel est appréhendé au Moyen-Âge et sur les débats ontologiques de l'époque. Le travail ici résumé entreprend de délimiter précisément ces réponses et propose une manière de les classer. -- Realism about relations: study of the answers given to the problem of the difference between a relation and its foundation (1250-1350) Summary Whether relation is really distinct from its foundation or not is a question that can easily be found in medieval texts from the mid-thirteenth century onwards. It comes from an aristotelian background, the discussion about the categories, and asks if the category of relation really posits another thing, i.e. a relation, in reality. It results from a realist perspective on relations. In fact, most thirteenth and fourteenth century thinkers held without doubt that things outside the mind are really connected between them. Two men sharing the same height are really equal, that is, really linked to each other by a relation of equality. What is then left to understand is how these things are linked between them, or the exact nature of the aforementioned relation. Should we say that the equality in each of the equally sized men is a new thing that adds to the substance of each of them and to the accidents of height, belonging tho the category of quantity, on which these relations are founded? Or should we say that equality is real in another way, that is, without adding a new thing to the subject acquiring it? We can already find this issue in Aristotle himself, emerging from disagreeing texts devoted to this category. It received various answers that enable us to understand better how reality was defined in the Middle Age and some of the ontological debates of the time. The work that is here summed up attempts to precisely delineate these various answers and to provide a way of classifying them.