The slow transformation of Swiss federal administrative elites

This article sets out to study the profile of Swiss administrative elites at federal level by showing how their profile has evolved in the light of what has come to be known as the wave of New Public Management (NPM), which has benefited from a very fertile ground in Switzerland. These elites correspond to a specific institutional order, in relation to specific organizational structures and workings, and have specific characteristics in terms of career paths and academic background. However, the administrative reforms that have been rolled out since the 1980s have transformed the institutional order within which executives of the federal administration evolve. This article analyses the extent to which these transformations have had an impact on the characteristics of these elites, through indicators such as academic capital, social capital, and career path within and outside the administration. The results show a slow but significant transformation in the profiles of these elites towards an increasing managerialization, reflecting that of the context in which they evolve.Points for practitioners The relationship between politics and the administration is naturally shaped by individuals but is closely dependent on the profiles of the players. They are currently undergoing a transformation in the wake of administrative reforms, and also of the changing profiles of both the political and administrative players. Gaining an insight into the slow transformation of the profiles of administrative elites therefore sheds light on the political-administrative nexus. The gradual managerialization of the administrative elite highlighted in this article also allows for a better understanding of which professional experiences, qualifications and skills are valued today within the senior civil service in Switzerland.

Modeling and mitigation of supply-demand mismatches

In this thesis, I develop analytical models to price the value of supply chain investments under demand uncer¬tainty. This thesis includes three self-contained papers. In the first paper, we investigate the value of lead-time reduction under the risk of sudden and abnormal changes in demand forecasts. We first consider the risk of a complete and permanent loss of demand. We then provide a more general jump-diffusion model, where we add a compound Poisson process to a constant-volatility demand process to explore the impact of sudden changes in demand forecasts on the value of lead-time reduction. We use an Edgeworth series expansion to divide the lead-time cost into that arising from constant instantaneous volatility, and that arising from the risk of jumps. We show that the value of lead-time reduction increases substantially in the intensity and/or the magnitude of jumps. In the second paper, we analyze the value of quantity flexibility in the presence of supply-chain dis- intermediation problems. We use the multiplicative martingale model and the "contracts as reference points" theory to capture both positive and negative effects of quantity flexibility for the downstream level in a supply chain. We show that lead-time reduction reduces both supply-chain disintermediation problems and supply- demand mismatches. We furthermore analyze the impact of the supplier's cost structure on the profitability of quantity-flexibility contracts. When the supplier's initial investment cost is relatively low, supply-chain disin¬termediation risk becomes less important, and hence the contract becomes more profitable for the retailer. We also find that the supply-chain efficiency increases substantially with the supplier's ability to disintermediate the chain when the initial investment cost is relatively high. In the third paper, we investigate the value of dual sourcing for the products with heavy-tailed demand distributions. We apply extreme-value theory and analyze the effects of tail heaviness of demand distribution on the optimal dual-sourcing strategy. We find that the effects of tail heaviness depend on the characteristics of demand and profit parameters. When both the profit margin of the product and the cost differential between the suppliers are relatively high, it is optimal to buffer the mismatch risk by increasing both the inventory level and the responsive capacity as demand uncertainty increases. In that case, however, both the optimal inventory level and the optimal responsive capacity decrease as the tail of demand becomes heavier. When the profit margin of the product is relatively high, and the cost differential between the suppliers is relatively low, it is optimal to buffer the mismatch risk by increasing the responsive capacity and reducing the inventory level as the demand uncertainty increases. In that case, how¬ever, it is optimal to buffer with more inventory and less capacity as the tail of demand becomes heavier. We also show that the optimal responsive capacity is higher for the products with heavier tails when the fill rate is extremely high.

Three essays in incomplete contracts

General Introduction These three chapters, while fairly independent from each other, study economic situations in incomplete contract settings. They are the product of both the academic freedom my advisors granted me, and in this sense reflect my personal interests, and of their interested feedback. The content of each chapter can be summarized as follows: Chapter 1: Inefficient durable-goods monopolies In this chapter we study the efficiency of an infinite-horizon durable-goods monopoly model with a fmite number of buyers. We find that, while all pure-strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) are efficient, there also exist previously unstudied inefficient MPE where high valuation buyers randomize their purchase decision while trying to benefit from low prices which are offered once a critical mass has purchased. Real time delay, an unusual monopoly distortion, is the result of this attrition behavior. We conclude that neither technological constraints nor concern for reputation are necessary to explain inefficiency in monopolized durable-goods markets. Chapter 2: Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice? In this chapter we study the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find anon-monotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low, and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. We explain this result by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in hold-up and a change in bargaining erosion. Chapter 3: Contract bargaining with multiple agents In this chapter we study a bargaining game between a principal and N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal. We show, using the Potential, that equilibria payoffs coincide with the Shapley value of the underlying coalitional game with an appropriately defined characteristic function, which under common assumptions coincides with the principal's equilibrium profit in the offer game. Since the problem accounts for differences in information and agents' conjectures, the outcome can be either efficient (e.g. public contracting) or inefficient (e.g. passive beliefs).

The Swiss reform of the allocation of tasks : The conventions-programs as a new partnership model for vertical cooperation ?

This research examines the impacts of the Swiss reform of the allocation of tasks which was accepted in 2004 and implemented in 2008 to "re-assign" the responsibilities between the federal government and the cantons. The public tasks were redistributed, according to the leading and fundamental principle of subsidiarity. Seven tasks came under exclusive federal responsibility; ten came under the control of the cantons; and twenty-two "common tasks" were allocated to both the Confederation and the cantons. For these common tasks it wasn't possible to separate the management and the implementation. In order to deal with nineteen of them, the reform introduced the conventions-programs (CPs), which are public law contracts signed by the Confederation with each canton. These CPs are generally valid for periods of four years (2008-11, 2012-15 and 2016-19, respectively). The third period is currently being prepared. By using the principal-agent theory I examine how contracts can improve political relations between a principal (Confederation) and an agent (canton). I also provide a first qualitative analysis by examining the impacts of these contracts on the vertical cooperation and on the implication of different actors by focusing my study on five CPs - protection of cultural heritage and conservation of historic monuments, encouragement of the integration of foreigners, economic development, protection against noise and protection of the nature and landscape - applied in five cantons, which represents twenty-five cases studies.

Conservation banking and the economization of nature : an institutional analysis

During the last decade, conservation banking mechanisms have emerged in the environmental discourse as new market instruments to promote biodiversity conservation. Compensation was already provided for in environmental law in many countries, as the last step of the mitigation hierarchy. The institutional arrangements developed in this context have been redefined and reshaped as market-based instruments (MBIs). As such, they are discursively disentangled from the complex legal-economic nexus they are part of. Monetary transactions are given prominence and tend to be presented as stand alone agreements, whereas they take place in the context of prescriptive regulations. The pro-market narrative featuring conservation banking systems as market-like arrangements as well as their denunciation as instances of nature commodification tend to obscure their actual characteristics. The purpose of this paper is to describe the latter, adopting an explicitly analytical stance on these complex institutional arrangements and their performative dimensions. Beyond the discourse supporting them and notwithstanding the diversity of national policies and regulatory frameworks for compensation, the constitutive force of these mechanisms probably lies in their ability to redefine control, power and the distribution of costs and in their impacts in terms of land use rather than in their efficiency.

Management Control for Corporate Sustainability Execution: The Role of Employee Compensation

The research described in this thesis examines the characteristics, the benefits and the challenges associated with the implementation of management accounting systems in the field of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Applied to the CSR context, management accounting relates to the identification, elaboration and communication of information about an organization's interactions with the society and the environment. Based on this information, firms are able to make decisions to achieve social and environmental objectives and provide evidence justifying the benefits and the costs of such actions. The study begins by focusing on green management and exploring the characteristics of Environmental Management Accounting (EMA) systems within firms. The first chapter informs the reader about the growing body of EMA research and reveals unexplored relevant aspects that need to be further investigated. The work also emphasizes the importance of developing new theoretical hypotheses and appropriate research designs to empirically tackle new aspects of EMA and gain understanding on the use of these practices. Subsequently, given the acknowledged importance of control systems in influencing the behaviour of individuals within organizations, the remaining two chapters of the dissertation focus on the functioning of CSR-linked incentives assigned to employees in the form of compensation plans. The second chapter examines the determinants influencing corporate provision of incentives for the attainment of environmental targets. Empirical analysis of a sample of international firms reveals that companies are likely to use green incentives as mechanisms to increase the efficacy in contracting with their employees as well as to respond to social influences. Finally, the third chapter investigates the effectiveness of contracting associated with the use of CSR-linked executive compensation. Empirical analysis of a sample of US-based companies shows that corporate choice to tie senior executives' pay to CSR targets promotes the firm's CSR performance. Cette thèse examine les caractéristiques, avantages et défis associés à l'utilisation des systèmes de contrôle de gestion dans le domaine de la Responsabilité Sociale des Entreprises (RSE). Dans le contexte de la RSE, les activités du contrôle de gestion impliquent l'identification, l'élaboration et la communication d'informations qui concernent les interactions des organisations avec la société et l'environnement. Avec ces informations les entreprises sont en mesure de prendre des décisions visant à atteindre les objectifs sociaux et environnementaux de l'organisation et de documenter les bénéfices et coûts de ces actions. Dès le début, la thèse se concentre sur les caractéristiques des systèmes de contrôle de gestion environnementale au sein des entreprises. Le premier chapitre passe en revue la littérature existante et révèle des aspects inexplorés. Pour ce faire, le travail suggère le développement de nouvelles théories ainsi que l'utilisation de méthodes appropriées. Ces dernières doivent permettre d'aborder empiriquement de nouveaux aspects des systèmes de contrôle environnemental et faciliter la compréhension sur l'utilisation de ces pratiques. Considérant l'importance des systèmes de contrôle pour influencer le comportement des individus au sein des organisations, la suite du travail se concentre sur le fonctionnement des contrats de rémunération des employées liées aux résultats de la RSE. Plus particulièrement, le deuxième chapitre examine les facteurs qui influencent la décision des entreprises d'assigner des objectifs environnementaux aux employées. L'analyse empirique d'un échantillon d'entreprises internationales montre que les entreprises sont susceptibles d'utiliser des mécanismes incitatifs écologiques pour augmenter l'efficacité des contrats ainsi que pour répondre aux influences sociales. Finalement, le troisième chapitre analyse l'efficacité des contrats de rémunération des dirigeants liés aux résultats de la RSE. L'analyse empirique d'un échantillon de sociétés américaines indique que le choix de l'entreprise de lier la rémunération des dirigeants à des objectifs de la RSE favorise la performance RSE de l'organisation.

Are Public Private Partnerships that Rigid ? And Why ? : Evidence from Toll Road Concession Contracts

Transport concession contracts are commonly said to be standardized and too rigid. They would not allow public authorities to adapt them to evolving context and circumstances. This paper aims at challenging this view and, more particularly, the view that contractual rigidity for transport concessions is exogenous. Using a transaction cost framework, we disentangle between three main determinants of contractual rigidity: traffic uncertainty; connivance between contracting parties; quality of the institutional environment. Using an original database of toll road concession contracts, we observe a great variety of provisions for toll adjustment. We find that these exogenous determinants significantly influence contractual choices.