« The Aesthetics of Song in Calvinist Piety in the Early Reformation (1536-1545) »

Contrary to common belief, aesthetics had an important function in ritual forms implemented by Reformed Calvinist Churches. The impact of aesthetics on Reformed piety rested less on images, considered to be a source of distraction, than on music. By reconsidering the evolution of Calvin's thoughts on the relationship between music and religious services between 1536 and 1543, this study reveals how Calvin came to consider that, by singing psalms, Christians in their devotion could conciliate both a cognitive process guided by the meaning of the words and an affective response triggered by the tune. For Calvin, the spiritual elevation to which religious services should lead was to emerge from the conjunction of these two impetuses.

Altruism across disciplines: one word, multiple meanings

Altruism is a deep and complex phenomenon that is analysed by scholars of various disciplines, including psychology, philosophy, biology, evolutionary anthropology and experimental economics. Much confusion arises in current literature because the term altruism covers variable concepts and processes across disciplines. Here we investigate the sense given to altruism when used in different fields and argumentative contexts. We argue that four distinct but related concepts need to be distinguished: (a) psychological altruism, the genuine motivation to improve others' interests and welfare; (b) reproductive altruism, which involves increasing others' chances of survival and reproduction at the actor's expense; (c) behavioural altruism, which involves bearing some cost in the interest of others; and (d) preference altruism, which is a preference for others' interests. We show how this conceptual clarification permits the identification of overstated claims that stem from an imprecise use of terminology. Distinguishing these four types of altruism will help to solve rhetorical conflicts that currently undermine the interdisciplinary debate about human altruism.

La psychologie d'Aristote chez Freud : essai de psychologie comparée

VEsquisse (1895) ainsi que le chapitre VII de L'interprétation du rêve (1900) de Freud offrent un modèle psychologique - sous-jacent à toute la psychanalyse élaborée par la suite - qui présente des analogies frap¬pantes avec les conceptions aristotéliciennes sur la psyché, principalement développées dans le De l'âme et les Petits traités d'histoire naturelle. Ceci peut se comprendre entre autres par le fait que les seuls cours uni¬versitaires de psychologie et de philosophie que Freud fréquenta, parallèlement à ses études de médecine, furent ceux du théologien, psychologue et philosophe Franz Brentano, grand spécialiste d'Aristote, dont l'impact de l'enseignement sur le jeune Freud est aujourd'hui mieux connu grâce à son échange épistolaire, au début de ses études, avec son ancien ami de gymnase Eduard Silberstein. En effet, plus d'un élément du paradigme psychologique aristotélicien, qui chez cet auteur s'ancre dans la biologie, semblent trouver écho chez Freud : ainsi, la génération de diverses sortes de représentation au sein de l'appareil psychique par l'investissement des traces mnésiques, chez Freud, fait penser à la production ât phantâsmata dans l'âme, par le travail de la phantasîa sur les mouvements résiduels de la perception sensorielle, chez Aristote. De là, ce sont autant le fonctionnement mnésique, que l'explication des phénomènes du rêve et de l'hallucination, que la compréhension du désir dans sa capacité de mettre en mouvement le vivant animé (c'est-à-dire un être doté d'une âme) qui vont représenter les points d'articulation de cette comparaison. -- The Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895) as well as Chapter VII of Freud's Interpretation of Dreams (1900) offer a psychological model - underlying the entire psychoanalysis developed hereafter - which is strikingly similar to Aristotelian conceptions of the psyche in On the Soul and Little Physical Treatises. One explanation may be that the only lectures in psychology and philosophy that Freud attended at university, alongside lectures in medicine, were given by the theologist, psychologist, and philosopher Franz Brentano, who had a deep knowledge of Aristotle. Because of young Freud's correspondence with his high school friend Eduard Silberstein at the beginning of his studies, the influence of Brentano's teachings on Freud is now better known. Indeed, much of the Aristotelian psychological paradigm - rooted in biology - seems to echo in Freud's writings. Thus, the production of various sorts of representations within the psychic apparatus by means of the investment in memory traces in Freud's model evokes the phantâsmata generated in the soul by the action of phantasîa on the residual movements of the sensory perception in Aristotle's psychology. From there, this comparison will hinge as much on the operation of memory as on the explanation of the phenomena of dreams and hallucinations, as on the understanding of desire in its ability to set the animated living being (i.e. a being with a soul) in motion.

Eager for fairness or revenge: psychological altruism in economics

To understand the human capacity for psychological altruism, one requires a proper understanding of how people actually think and feel. This paper addresses the possible relevance of recent findings in experimental economics and neuroeconomics to the philosophical controversy over altruism and egoism. After briefly sketching and contextualizing the controversy, we survey and discuss the results of various studies on behaviourally altruistic helping and punishing behaviour, which provide stimulating clues for the debate over psychological altruism. On closer analysis, these studies prove less relevant than originally expected because the data obtained admit competing interpretations such as people seeking fairness versus people seeking revenge. However, this mitigated conclusion does not preclude the possibility of more fruitful research in the area in the future. Throughout our analysis, we provide hints for the direction of future research on the question.

The Role of the Subjectivist Position in the Probabilization of Forensic Science

This paper is concerned with the contribution of forensic science to the legal process by helping reduce uncertainty. Although it is now widely accepted that uncertainty should be handled by probability because it is a safeguard against incoherent proceedings, there remain diverging and conflicting views on how probability ought to be interpreted. This is exemplified by the proposals in scientific literature that call for procedures of probability computation that are referred to as "objective," suggesting that scientists ought to use them in their reporting to recipients of expert information. I find such proposals objectionable. They need to be viewed cautiously, essentially because ensuing probabilistic statements can be perceived as making forensic science prescriptive. A motivating example from the context of forensic DNA analysis will be chosen to illustrate this. As a main point, it shall be argued that such constraining suggestions can be avoided by interpreting probability as a measure of personal belief, that is, subjective probability. Invoking references to foundational literature from mathematical statistics and philosophy of science, the discussion will explore the consequences of this interdisciplinary viewpoint for the practice of forensic expert reporting. It will be emphasized that-as an operational interpretation of probability-the subjectivist perspective enables forensic science to add value to the legal process, in particular by avoiding inferential impasses to which other interpretations of probability may lead. Moreover, understanding probability from a subjective perspective can encourage participants in the legal process to take on more responsibility in matters regarding the coherent handling of uncertainty. This would assure more balanced interactions at the interface between science and the law. This, in turn, provides support for ongoing developments that can be called the "probabilization" of forensic science.

Economic Methodology: A Historical Introduction.

Ever since the inception of economics over two hundred years ago, the tools at the discipline's disposal have grown more and more more sophisticated. This book provides a historical introduction to the methodology of economics through the eyes of economists. The story begins with John Stuart Mill's seminal essay from 1836 on the definition and method of political economy, which is then followed by an examination of how the actual practices of economists changed over time to such an extent that they not only altered their methods of enquiry, but also their self-perception as economists. Beginning as intellectuals and journalists operating to a large extent in the public sphere, they then transformed into experts who developed their tools of research increasingly behind the scenes. No longer did they try to influence policy agendas through public discourse; rather they targeted policymakers directly and with instruments that showed them as independent and objective policy advisors, the tools of the trade changing all the while. In order to shed light on this evolution of economic methodology, this book takes carefully selected snapshots from the discipline's history. It tracks the process of development through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, analysing the growth of empirical and mathematical modelling. It also looks at the emergence of the experiment in economics, in addition to the similarities and differences between modelling and experimentation. This book will be relevant reading for students and academics in the fields of economic methodology, history of economics, and history and philosophy of the social sciences.