Leader corruption depends on power and testosterone

We used incentivized experimental games to manipulate leader power-the number of followers and the discretion leaders had to enforce their will. Leaders had complete autonomy in deciding payouts to themselves and their followers. Although leaders could make prosocial decisions to benefit the public good they could also abuse their power by invoking antisocial decisions, which reduced the total payouts to the group but increased leader's earnings. In Study 1 (N = 478), we found that both amount of followers and discretionary choices independently predicted leader corruption. In Study 2 (N = 240), we examined how power and individual differences (e.g., personality, hormones) affected leader corruption over time; power interacted with testosterone in predicting corruption, which was highest when leader power and baseline testosterone were both high. Honesty predicted initial level of leader antisocial decisions; however, honesty did not shield leaders from the corruptive effect of power.

A Dethroned King? The Limits of State Infrastructural Power in France

Since the 1980s in Western Europe, centralized states' control over subnational territories has been deeply affected by processes of Europeanization and regionalization. These changes have raised the issue of state territorial restructuring in a particular fashion: what capacity have formerly centralized states retained to steer and control subnational territories? The article draws on Mann's concept of infrastructural power, which refers to the state's capacity to exercise control and implement political decisions over the national territory. The article applies the two main operationalizations of the concept, namely the capability of the state to exercise control and the weight of the state in the subnational territories. Empirically, the article focuses on the French state in two policy sectors (education and housing). Although France is a most likely case, this article challenges this expectation, and shows the limits of the French state's infrastructural power over the subnational territories since the late 1980s.

When Preference Is Not Satisfied but the Individual Is: How Power Distance Affects Person-Job Fit

One aspect of person-job fit reflects congruence between personal preferences and job design; as congruence increases so should satisfaction. We hypothesized that power distance would moderate whether fit is related to satisfaction with degree of job formalization. We obtained measures of job-formalization, fit and satisfaction, as well as organizational commitment from employees (n = 772) in a multinational firm with subsidiaries in six countries. Confirming previous findings, individuals from low power-distance cultures were most satisfied with increasing fit. However, the extent to which individuals from high power-distance cultures were satisfied did not necessarily depend on increasing fit, but mostly on whether the degree of formalization received was congruent to cultural norms. Irrespective of culture, satisfaction with formalization predicted a broad measure of organizational commitment. Apart from our novel extension of fit theory, we show how moderation can be tested in the context of polynomial response surface regression and how specific hypotheses can be tested regarding different points on the response surface.