Optimisation des doses en tomographie computérisée pédiatrique [Patient dose optimization in pediatric computerized tomography]

The development of CT applications might become a public health problem if no effort is made on the justification and the optimisation of the examinations. This paper presents some hints to assure that the risk-benefit compromise remains in favour of the patient, especially when one deals with the examinations of young patients. In this context a particular attention has to be made on the justification of the examination. When performing the acquisition one needs to optimise the extension of the volume investigated together with the number of acquisition sequences used. Finally, the use of automatic exposure systems, now available on all the units, and the use of the Diagnostic Reference Levels (DRL) should allow help radiologists to control the exposure of their patients.

Seeking good peer review in geomorphology

This paper provides an extended guide to reviewing for ESPL in particular and geomorphology in general. After a brief consideration of both how we choose reviewers and why we hope that reviewers will accept, I consider what makes a fair and constructive review. I note that we aim to publish papers with the rigour (r) necessary to sustain an original and significant contribution (q). I note that judging q is increasingly difficult because of the ever-growing size of the discipline (the Q). This is the sense in which we rarely have a full appreciation of Q, and our reviews are inevitably going to contain some bias. It is this bias that cannot be avoided (cf. Nicholas and Gordon, 2011) and makes the job of ESPL's Editors of critical importance. With this in mind, I identify six elements of a good review: (1) an introductory statement that explains your assessment of your competences in relation to the manuscript (r and Q); (2) a summative view of the originality and significance of the manuscript (q) in relation to Q: (3) a summative view of the methodological rigour of the manuscript (r); (4) identification and justification of any major concerns; (5) identification of any minor issues to be corrected if you think the manuscript merits eventual publication; and (6) note of any typographical or presentation issues to be addressed although this latter activity is also an editorial responsibility. In addition, I note the importance of a constructive review, grounded in what is written in the manuscript, justified where appropriate and avoiding reference to personal views as far as is possible. I conclude with a discussion of whether or not you should sign your review openly and the importance of reviewer confidentiality. Copyright (C) 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Whose DNA is this? How relevant a question? (a note for forensic scientists).

This communication seeks to draw the attention of researchers and practitioners dealing with forensic DNA profiling analyses to the following question: is a scientist's report, offering support to a hypothesis according to which a particular individual is the source of DNA detected during the analysis of a stain, relevant from the point of view of a Court of Justice? This question relates to skeptical views previously voiced by commentators mainly in the judicial area, but is avoided by a large majority of forensic scientists. Notwithstanding, the pivotal role of this question has recently been evoked during the international conference "The hidden side of DNA profiles. Artifacts, errors and uncertain evidence" held in Rome (April 27th to 28th, 2012). Indeed, despite the fact that this conference brought together some of the world's leading forensic DNA specialists, it appeared clearly that a huge gap still exists between questions lawyers are actually interested in, and the answers that scientists deliver to Courts in written reports or during oral testimony. Participants in the justice system, namely lawyers and jurors on the one hand and forensic geneticists on the other, unfortunately talk considerably different languages. It thus is fundamental to address this issue of communication about results of forensic DNA analyses, and open a dialogue with practicing non-scientists at large who need to make meaningful use of scientific results to approach and help solve judicial cases. This paper intends to emphasize the actuality of this topic and suggest beneficial ways ahead towards a more reasoned use of forensic DNA in criminal proceedings.

Intelligence-led crime scene processing. Part I : Forensic intelligence.

Forensic science is generally defined as the application of science to address questions related to the law. Too often, this view restricts the contribution of science to one single process which eventually aims at bringing individuals to court while minimising risk of miscarriage of justice. In order to go beyond this paradigm, we propose to refocus the attention towards traces themselves, as remnants of a criminal activity, and their information content. We postulate that traces contribute effectively to a wide variety of other informational processes that support decision making inmany situations. In particular, they inform actors of new policing strategies who place the treatment of information and intelligence at the centre of their systems. This contribution of forensic science to these security oriented models is still not well identified and captured. In order to create the best condition for the development of forensic intelligence, we suggest a framework that connects forensic science to intelligence-led policing (part I). Crime scene attendance and processing can be envisaged within this view. This approach gives indications abouthowto structure knowledge used by crime scene examiners in their effective practice (part II).

General Equilibrium Analysis. A Century after Walras

2010 marks the hundredth anniversary of the death of Léon Walras, the brilliant originator and first formaliser of general equilibrium theory - one of the pillars of modern economic theory. In advancing much derided practical solutions Walras also displayed more concern for the problems of living in a second best world than is common in modern pure theories of the invisible hand, efficient market hypothesis, DSGE macroeconomics or the thinking of some contemporary free market admirers all based on general equilibrium theory. This book brings contributions from the likes of Kenneth Arrow, Alan Kirman, Richard Posner, Amartya Sen and Robert Solow to share their thoughts and reflections on the theoretical heritage of Léon Walras. Some authors reminisce on the part they played in the development of modern general economics theory; others reflect on the crucial part played by general equilibrium in the development of macroeconomics, microeconomics, growth theory, welfare economics and the theory of justice; others still complain about the wrong path economic theory took under the influence of post 1945 developments in general equilibrium theory.

Les Neurosciences au Tribunal: de la responsabilité à la dangerosité

In recent years, an explosion of interest in neuroscience has led to the development of "Neuro-law," a new multidisciplinary field of knowledge whose aim is to examine the impact and role of neuroscientific findings in legal proceedings. Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being used in US and European courts in criminal trials, as part of psychiatric testimony, nourishing the debate about the legal implications of brain research in psychiatric-legal settings. During these proceedings, the role of forensic psychiatrists is crucial. In most criminal justice systems, their mission consists in accomplishing two basic tasks: assessing the degree of responsibility of the offender and evaluating their future dangerousness. In the first part of our research, we aim to examine the impact of Neuroscientific evidence in the assessment of criminal responsibility, a key concept of law. An initial jurisprudential research leads to conclude that there are significant difficulties and limitations in using neuroscience for the assessment of criminal responsibility. In the current socio-legal context, responsibility assessments are progressively being weakened, whereas dangerousness assessments gain increasing importance in the field of forensic psychiatry. In the second part of our research we concentrate on the impact of using neuroscience for the assessment of dangerousness. We argue that in the current policy era of zero tolerance, judges, confronted with the pressure to ensure public security, may tend to interpret neuroscientific knowledge and data as an objective and reliable way of evaluating one's dangerousness and risk of reoffending, rather than their responsibility. This tendency could be encouraged by a utilitarian approach to punishment, advanced by some recent neuroscientific research which puts into question the existence of free will and responsibility and argues for a rejection of the retributive theory of punishment. Although this shift away from punishment aimed at retribution in favor of a consequentialist approach to criminal law is advanced by some authors as a more progressive and humane approach, we believe that it could lead to the instrumentalisation of neuroscience in the interest of public safety, which can run against the proper exercise of justice and civil liberties of the offenders. By advancing a criminal law regime animated by the consequentialist aim of avoiding social harms through rehabilitation, neuroscience promotes a return to a therapeutical approach to crime which can have serious impact on the kind and the length of sentences imposed on the offenders; if neuroscientific data are interpreted as evidence of dangerousness, rather than responsibility, it is highly likely that judges impose heavier sentences, or/and security measures (in civil law systems), which can be indeterminate in length. Errors and epistemic traps of past criminological movements trying to explain the manifestation of a violent and deviant behavior on a biological and deterministic basis stress the need for caution concerning the use of modern neuroscientific methods in criminal proceedings.

Le visage au-delà de l'apparence. Levinas et l'autre rive de l'éthique

In this article I look at the significance of Emmanuel Levinas' thought for an ethics of care. I argue that the meaning Levinas gives to the term « face » is a central aspect related to this issue. The face is in this French philosopher's view an ambiguous phenomenon, an enigma, that bears high ethical significance : beyond its physical appearance, the face of the other escapes every affort at representation, it indicates the way in which the representation of the other exceeds any idea of the other in me, and it is precisely this irreducibility of alterity that lights up its ethical meaning. In Levinas' view, to be oneself is to be for the other, and the otherness of the other manifests itself in the face-to-face encounter. Accordingly, responsibility is the response to the injunction, the interpellation, of the other's face, preceding the claim of justice, and humaneness is conceived as entangled in the other's face. Against this background, I suggest that Levinas' philosophical insight constitutes a turning point from a traditional to a new conception of responsibility that may bear great significance to a renewed understanding of an hermeneutics and an ethics of care.