Assessing the impact of DRGs on patient care and professional practice in Switzerland (IDoC) : a potential model for monitoring and evaluating healthcare reform.

QUESTIONS UNDER STUDY: The starting point of the interdisciplinary project "Assessing the impact of diagnosis related groups (DRGs) on patient care and professional practice" (IDoC) was the lack of a systematic ethical assessment for the introduction of cost containment measures in healthcare. Our aim was to contribute to the methodological and empirical basis of such an assessment. METHODS: Five sub-groups conducted separate but related research within the fields of biomedical ethics, law, nursing sciences and health services, applying a number of complementary methodological approaches. The individual research projects were framed within an overall ethical matrix. Workshops and bilateral meetings were held to identify and elaborate joint research themes. RESULTS: Four common, ethically relevant themes emerged in the results of the studies across sub-groups: (1.) the quality and safety of patient care, (2.) the state of professional practice of physicians and nurses, (3.) changes in incentives structure, (4.) vulnerable groups and access to healthcare services. Furthermore, much-needed data for future comparative research has been collected and some early insights into the potential impact of DRGs are outlined. CONCLUSIONS: Based on the joint results we developed preliminary recommendations related to conceptual analysis, methodological refinement, monitoring and implementation.

Derivation and validation of a prognostic model for pulmonary embolism.

RATIONALE: An objective and simple prognostic model for patients with pulmonary embolism could be helpful in guiding initial intensity of treatment. OBJECTIVES: To develop a clinical prediction rule that accurately classifies patients with pulmonary embolism into categories of increasing risk of mortality and other adverse medical outcomes. METHODS: We randomly allocated 15,531 inpatient discharges with pulmonary embolism from 186 Pennsylvania hospitals to derivation (67%) and internal validation (33%) samples. We derived our prediction rule using logistic regression with 30-day mortality as the primary outcome, and patient demographic and clinical data routinely available at presentation as potential predictor variables. We externally validated the rule in 221 inpatients with pulmonary embolism from Switzerland and France. MEASUREMENTS: We compared mortality and nonfatal adverse medical outcomes across the derivation and two validation samples. MAIN RESULTS: The prediction rule is based on 11 simple patient characteristics that were independently associated with mortality and stratifies patients with pulmonary embolism into five severity classes, with 30-day mortality rates of 0-1.6% in class I, 1.7-3.5% in class II, 3.2-7.1% in class III, 4.0-11.4% in class IV, and 10.0-24.5% in class V across the derivation and validation samples. Inpatient death and nonfatal complications were <or= 1.1% among patients in class I and <or= 1.9% among patients in class II. CONCLUSIONS: Our rule accurately classifies patients with pulmonary embolism into classes of increasing risk of mortality and other adverse medical outcomes. Further validation of the rule is important before its implementation as a decision aid to guide the initial management of patients with pulmonary embolism.

An assurance-based model to holistically assess the information security posture

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY : Evaluating Information Security Posture within an organization is becoming a very complex task. Currently, the evaluation and assessment of Information Security are commonly performed using frameworks, methodologies and standards which often consider the various aspects of security independently. Unfortunately this is ineffective because it does not take into consideration the necessity of having a global and systemic multidimensional approach to Information Security evaluation. At the same time the overall security level is globally considered to be only as strong as its weakest link. This thesis proposes a model aiming to holistically assess all dimensions of security in order to minimize the likelihood that a given threat will exploit the weakest link. A formalized structure taking into account all security elements is presented; this is based on a methodological evaluation framework in which Information Security is evaluated from a global perspective. This dissertation is divided into three parts. Part One: Information Security Evaluation issues consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction to the purpose of this research purpose and the Model that will be proposed. In this chapter we raise some questions with respect to "traditional evaluation methods" as well as identifying the principal elements to be addressed in this direction. Then we introduce the baseline attributes of our model and set out the expected result of evaluations according to our model. Chapter 2 is focused on the definition of Information Security to be used as a reference point for our evaluation model. The inherent concepts of the contents of a holistic and baseline Information Security Program are defined. Based on this, the most common roots-of-trust in Information Security are identified. Chapter 3 focuses on an analysis of the difference and the relationship between the concepts of Information Risk and Security Management. Comparing these two concepts allows us to identify the most relevant elements to be included within our evaluation model, while clearing situating these two notions within a defined framework is of the utmost importance for the results that will be obtained from the evaluation process. Chapter 4 sets out our evaluation model and the way it addresses issues relating to the evaluation of Information Security. Within this Chapter the underlying concepts of assurance and trust are discussed. Based on these two concepts, the structure of the model is developed in order to provide an assurance related platform as well as three evaluation attributes: "assurance structure", "quality issues", and "requirements achievement". Issues relating to each of these evaluation attributes are analysed with reference to sources such as methodologies, standards and published research papers. Then the operation of the model is discussed. Assurance levels, quality levels and maturity levels are defined in order to perform the evaluation according to the model. Part Two: Implementation of the Information Security Assurance Assessment Model (ISAAM) according to the Information Security Domains consists of four chapters. This is the section where our evaluation model is put into a welldefined context with respect to the four pre-defined Information Security dimensions: the Organizational dimension, Functional dimension, Human dimension, and Legal dimension. Each Information Security dimension is discussed in a separate chapter. For each dimension, the following two-phase evaluation path is followed. The first phase concerns the identification of the elements which will constitute the basis of the evaluation: ? Identification of the key elements within the dimension; ? Identification of the Focus Areas for each dimension, consisting of the security issues identified for each dimension; ? Identification of the Specific Factors for each dimension, consisting of the security measures or control addressing the security issues identified for each dimension. The second phase concerns the evaluation of each Information Security dimension by: ? The implementation of the evaluation model, based on the elements identified for each dimension within the first phase, by identifying the security tasks, processes, procedures, and actions that should have been performed by the organization to reach the desired level of protection; ? The maturity model for each dimension as a basis for reliance on security. For each dimension we propose a generic maturity model that could be used by every organization in order to define its own security requirements. Part three of this dissertation contains the Final Remarks, Supporting Resources and Annexes. With reference to the objectives of our thesis, the Final Remarks briefly analyse whether these objectives were achieved and suggest directions for future related research. Supporting resources comprise the bibliographic resources that were used to elaborate and justify our approach. Annexes include all the relevant topics identified within the literature to illustrate certain aspects of our approach. Our Information Security evaluation model is based on and integrates different Information Security best practices, standards, methodologies and research expertise which can be combined in order to define an reliable categorization of Information Security. After the definition of terms and requirements, an evaluation process should be performed in order to obtain evidence that the Information Security within the organization in question is adequately managed. We have specifically integrated into our model the most useful elements of these sources of information in order to provide a generic model able to be implemented in all kinds of organizations. The value added by our evaluation model is that it is easy to implement and operate and answers concrete needs in terms of reliance upon an efficient and dynamic evaluation tool through a coherent evaluation system. On that basis, our model could be implemented internally within organizations, allowing them to govern better their Information Security. RÉSUMÉ : Contexte général de la thèse L'évaluation de la sécurité en général, et plus particulièrement, celle de la sécurité de l'information, est devenue pour les organisations non seulement une mission cruciale à réaliser, mais aussi de plus en plus complexe. A l'heure actuelle, cette évaluation se base principalement sur des méthodologies, des bonnes pratiques, des normes ou des standards qui appréhendent séparément les différents aspects qui composent la sécurité de l'information. Nous pensons que cette manière d'évaluer la sécurité est inefficiente, car elle ne tient pas compte de l'interaction des différentes dimensions et composantes de la sécurité entre elles, bien qu'il soit admis depuis longtemps que le niveau de sécurité globale d'une organisation est toujours celui du maillon le plus faible de la chaîne sécuritaire. Nous avons identifié le besoin d'une approche globale, intégrée, systémique et multidimensionnelle de l'évaluation de la sécurité de l'information. En effet, et c'est le point de départ de notre thèse, nous démontrons que seule une prise en compte globale de la sécurité permettra de répondre aux exigences de sécurité optimale ainsi qu'aux besoins de protection spécifiques d'une organisation. Ainsi, notre thèse propose un nouveau paradigme d'évaluation de la sécurité afin de satisfaire aux besoins d'efficacité et d'efficience d'une organisation donnée. Nous proposons alors un modèle qui vise à évaluer d'une manière holistique toutes les dimensions de la sécurité, afin de minimiser la probabilité qu'une menace potentielle puisse exploiter des vulnérabilités et engendrer des dommages directs ou indirects. Ce modèle se base sur une structure formalisée qui prend en compte tous les éléments d'un système ou programme de sécurité. Ainsi, nous proposons un cadre méthodologique d'évaluation qui considère la sécurité de l'information à partir d'une perspective globale. Structure de la thèse et thèmes abordés Notre document est structuré en trois parties. La première intitulée : « La problématique de l'évaluation de la sécurité de l'information » est composée de quatre chapitres. Le chapitre 1 introduit l'objet de la recherche ainsi que les concepts de base du modèle d'évaluation proposé. La maniéré traditionnelle de l'évaluation de la sécurité fait l'objet d'une analyse critique pour identifier les éléments principaux et invariants à prendre en compte dans notre approche holistique. Les éléments de base de notre modèle d'évaluation ainsi que son fonctionnement attendu sont ensuite présentés pour pouvoir tracer les résultats attendus de ce modèle. Le chapitre 2 se focalise sur la définition de la notion de Sécurité de l'Information. Il ne s'agit pas d'une redéfinition de la notion de la sécurité, mais d'une mise en perspectives des dimensions, critères, indicateurs à utiliser comme base de référence, afin de déterminer l'objet de l'évaluation qui sera utilisé tout au long de notre travail. Les concepts inhérents de ce qui constitue le caractère holistique de la sécurité ainsi que les éléments constitutifs d'un niveau de référence de sécurité sont définis en conséquence. Ceci permet d'identifier ceux que nous avons dénommés « les racines de confiance ». Le chapitre 3 présente et analyse la différence et les relations qui existent entre les processus de la Gestion des Risques et de la Gestion de la Sécurité, afin d'identifier les éléments constitutifs du cadre de protection à inclure dans notre modèle d'évaluation. Le chapitre 4 est consacré à la présentation de notre modèle d'évaluation Information Security Assurance Assessment Model (ISAAM) et la manière dont il répond aux exigences de l'évaluation telle que nous les avons préalablement présentées. Dans ce chapitre les concepts sous-jacents relatifs aux notions d'assurance et de confiance sont analysés. En se basant sur ces deux concepts, la structure du modèle d'évaluation est développée pour obtenir une plateforme qui offre un certain niveau de garantie en s'appuyant sur trois attributs d'évaluation, à savoir : « la structure de confiance », « la qualité du processus », et « la réalisation des exigences et des objectifs ». Les problématiques liées à chacun de ces attributs d'évaluation sont analysées en se basant sur l'état de l'art de la recherche et de la littérature, sur les différentes méthodes existantes ainsi que sur les normes et les standards les plus courants dans le domaine de la sécurité. Sur cette base, trois différents niveaux d'évaluation sont construits, à savoir : le niveau d'assurance, le niveau de qualité et le niveau de maturité qui constituent la base de l'évaluation de l'état global de la sécurité d'une organisation. La deuxième partie: « L'application du Modèle d'évaluation de l'assurance de la sécurité de l'information par domaine de sécurité » est elle aussi composée de quatre chapitres. Le modèle d'évaluation déjà construit et analysé est, dans cette partie, mis dans un contexte spécifique selon les quatre dimensions prédéfinies de sécurité qui sont: la dimension Organisationnelle, la dimension Fonctionnelle, la dimension Humaine, et la dimension Légale. Chacune de ces dimensions et son évaluation spécifique fait l'objet d'un chapitre distinct. Pour chacune des dimensions, une évaluation en deux phases est construite comme suit. La première phase concerne l'identification des éléments qui constituent la base de l'évaluation: ? Identification des éléments clés de l'évaluation ; ? Identification des « Focus Area » pour chaque dimension qui représentent les problématiques se trouvant dans la dimension ; ? Identification des « Specific Factors » pour chaque Focus Area qui représentent les mesures de sécurité et de contrôle qui contribuent à résoudre ou à diminuer les impacts des risques. La deuxième phase concerne l'évaluation de chaque dimension précédemment présentées. Elle est constituée d'une part, de l'implémentation du modèle général d'évaluation à la dimension concernée en : ? Se basant sur les éléments spécifiés lors de la première phase ; ? Identifiant les taches sécuritaires spécifiques, les processus, les procédures qui auraient dû être effectués pour atteindre le niveau de protection souhaité. D'autre part, l'évaluation de chaque dimension est complétée par la proposition d'un modèle de maturité spécifique à chaque dimension, qui est à considérer comme une base de référence pour le niveau global de sécurité. Pour chaque dimension nous proposons un modèle de maturité générique qui peut être utilisé par chaque organisation, afin de spécifier ses propres exigences en matière de sécurité. Cela constitue une innovation dans le domaine de l'évaluation, que nous justifions pour chaque dimension et dont nous mettons systématiquement en avant la plus value apportée. La troisième partie de notre document est relative à la validation globale de notre proposition et contient en guise de conclusion, une mise en perspective critique de notre travail et des remarques finales. Cette dernière partie est complétée par une bibliographie et des annexes. Notre modèle d'évaluation de la sécurité intègre et se base sur de nombreuses sources d'expertise, telles que les bonnes pratiques, les normes, les standards, les méthodes et l'expertise de la recherche scientifique du domaine. Notre proposition constructive répond à un véritable problème non encore résolu, auquel doivent faire face toutes les organisations, indépendamment de la taille et du profil. Cela permettrait à ces dernières de spécifier leurs exigences particulières en matière du niveau de sécurité à satisfaire, d'instancier un processus d'évaluation spécifique à leurs besoins afin qu'elles puissent s'assurer que leur sécurité de l'information soit gérée d'une manière appropriée, offrant ainsi un certain niveau de confiance dans le degré de protection fourni. Nous avons intégré dans notre modèle le meilleur du savoir faire, de l'expérience et de l'expertise disponible actuellement au niveau international, dans le but de fournir un modèle d'évaluation simple, générique et applicable à un grand nombre d'organisations publiques ou privées. La valeur ajoutée de notre modèle d'évaluation réside précisément dans le fait qu'il est suffisamment générique et facile à implémenter tout en apportant des réponses sur les besoins concrets des organisations. Ainsi notre proposition constitue un outil d'évaluation fiable, efficient et dynamique découlant d'une approche d'évaluation cohérente. De ce fait, notre système d'évaluation peut être implémenté à l'interne par l'entreprise elle-même, sans recourir à des ressources supplémentaires et lui donne également ainsi la possibilité de mieux gouverner sa sécurité de l'information.

Forensic intelligence framework-Part I: induction of a transversal model by comparing illicit drugs and false identity documents monitoring

Forensic intelligence is a distinct dimension of forensic science. Forensic intelligence processes have mostly been developed to address either a specific type of trace or a specific problem. Even though these empirical developments have led to successes, they are trace-specific in nature and contribute to the generation of silos which hamper the establishment of a more general and transversal model. Forensic intelligence has shown some important perspectives but more general developments are required to address persistent challenges. This will ensure the progress of the discipline as well as its widespread implementation in the future. This paper demonstrates that the description of forensic intelligence processes, their architectures, and the methods for building them can, at a certain level, be abstracted from the type of traces considered. A comparative analysis is made between two forensic intelligence approaches developed independently in Australia and in Europe regarding the monitoring of apparently very different kind of problems: illicit drugs and false identity documents. An inductive effort is pursued to identify similarities and to outline a general model. Besides breaking barriers between apparently separate fields of study in forensic science and intelligence, this transversal model would assist in defining forensic intelligence, its role and place in policing, and in identifying its contributions and limitations. The model will facilitate the paradigm shift from the current case-by-case reactive attitude towards a proactive approach by serving as a guideline for the use of forensic case data in an intelligence-led perspective. A follow-up article will specifically address issues related to comparison processes, decision points and organisational issues regarding forensic intelligence (part II).

The Swiss reform of the allocation of tasks : The conventions-programs as a new partnership model for vertical cooperation ?

This research examines the impacts of the Swiss reform of the allocation of tasks which was accepted in 2004 and implemented in 2008 to "re-assign" the responsibilities between the federal government and the cantons. The public tasks were redistributed, according to the leading and fundamental principle of subsidiarity. Seven tasks came under exclusive federal responsibility; ten came under the control of the cantons; and twenty-two "common tasks" were allocated to both the Confederation and the cantons. For these common tasks it wasn't possible to separate the management and the implementation. In order to deal with nineteen of them, the reform introduced the conventions-programs (CPs), which are public law contracts signed by the Confederation with each canton. These CPs are generally valid for periods of four years (2008-11, 2012-15 and 2016-19, respectively). The third period is currently being prepared. By using the principal-agent theory I examine how contracts can improve political relations between a principal (Confederation) and an agent (canton). I also provide a first qualitative analysis by examining the impacts of these contracts on the vertical cooperation and on the implication of different actors by focusing my study on five CPs - protection of cultural heritage and conservation of historic monuments, encouragement of the integration of foreigners, economic development, protection against noise and protection of the nature and landscape - applied in five cantons, which represents twenty-five cases studies.

Image quality in CT: From physical measurements to model observers.

Evaluation of image quality (IQ) in Computed Tomography (CT) is important to ensure that diagnostic questions are correctly answered, whilst keeping radiation dose to the patient as low as is reasonably possible. The assessment of individual aspects of IQ is already a key component of routine quality control of medical x-ray devices. These values together with standard dose indicators can be used to give rise to 'figures of merit' (FOM) to characterise the dose efficiency of the CT scanners operating in certain modes. The demand for clinically relevant IQ characterisation has naturally increased with the development of CT technology (detectors efficiency, image reconstruction and processing), resulting in the adaptation and evolution of assessment methods. The purpose of this review is to present the spectrum of various methods that have been used to characterise image quality in CT: from objective measurements of physical parameters to clinically task-based approaches (i.e. model observer (MO) approach) including pure human observer approach. When combined together with a dose indicator, a generalised dose efficiency index can be explored in a framework of system and patient dose optimisation. We will focus on the IQ methodologies that are required for dealing with standard reconstruction, but also for iterative reconstruction algorithms. With this concept the previously used FOM will be presented with a proposal to update them in order to make them relevant and up to date with technological progress. The MO that objectively assesses IQ for clinically relevant tasks represents the most promising method in terms of radiologist sensitivity performance and therefore of most relevance in the clinical environment.

The new final Clinical Skills examination in human medicine in Switzerland: Essential steps of exam development, implementation and evaluation, and central insights from the perspective of the national Working Group.

OBJECTIVE: Since 2011, the new national final examination in human medicine has been implemented in Switzerland, with a structured clinical-practical part in the OSCE format. From the perspective of the national Working Group, the current article describes the essential steps in the development, implementation and evaluation of the Federal Licensing Examination Clinical Skills (FLE CS) as well as the applied quality assurance measures. Finally, central insights gained from the last years are presented. METHODS: Based on the principles of action research, the FLE CS is in a constant state of further development. On the foundation of systematically documented experiences from previous years, in the Working Group, unresolved questions are discussed and resulting solution approaches are substantiated (planning), implemented in the examination (implementation) and subsequently evaluated (reflection). The presented results are the product of this iterative procedure. RESULTS: The FLE CS is created by experts from all faculties and subject areas in a multistage process. The examination is administered in German and French on a decentralised basis and consists of twelve interdisciplinary stations per candidate. As important quality assurance measures, the national Review Board (content validation) and the meetings of the standardised patient trainers (standardisation) have proven worthwhile. The statistical analyses show good measurement reliability and support the construct validity of the examination. Among the central insights of the past years, it has been established that the consistent implementation of the principles of action research contributes to the successful further development of the examination. CONCLUSION: The centrally coordinated, collaborative-iterative process, incorporating experts from all faculties, makes a fundamental contribution to the quality of the FLE CS. The processes and insights presented here can be useful for others planning a similar undertaking.