Changing Religiosity, Changing Politics? The Influence of 'Belonging' and 'Believing' on Political Attitudes in Switzerland

Starting from theories of secularization and of religious individualization, we propose a two-dimensional typology of religiosity and test its impact on political attitudes. Unlike classic conceptions of religiosity used in political studies, our typology simultaneously accounts for an individual's sense of belonging to the church (institutional dimension) and his/her personal religious beliefs (spiritual dimension). Our analysis, based on data from the World Values Survey in Switzerland (1989-2007), shows two main results. First, next to evidence of religious decline, we also find evidence of religious change with an increase in the number of people who "believe without belonging." Second, non-religious individuals and individuals who believe without belonging are significantly more permissive on issues of cultural liberalism than followers of institutionalized forms of religiosity.

The de facto independence of regulatory agencies and its consequences for policy making and regulatory outcomes

This dissertation focuses on the practice of regulatory governance, throughout the study of the functioning of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), with special attention to their de facto independence. The research goals are grounded on a "neo-positivist" (or "reconstructed positivist") position (Hawkesworth 1992; Radaelli 2000b; Sabatier 2000). This perspective starts from the ontological assumption that even if subjective perceptions are constitutive elements of political phenomena, a real world exists beyond any social construction and can, however imperfectly, become the object of scientific inquiry. Epistemologically, it follows that hypothetical-deductive theories with explanatory aims can be tested by employing a proper methodology and set of analytical techniques. It is thus possible to make scientific inferences and general conclusions to a certain extent, according to a Bayesian conception of knowledge, in order to update the prior scientific beliefs in the truth of the related hypotheses (Howson 1998), while acknowledging the fact that the conditions of truth are at least partially subjective and historically determined (Foucault 1988; Kuhn 1970). At the same time, a sceptical position is adopted towards the supposed disjunction between facts and values and the possibility of discovering abstract universal laws in social science. It has been observed that the current version of capitalism corresponds to the golden age of regulation, and that since the 1980s no government activity in OECD countries has grown faster than regulatory functions (Jacobs 1999). Following an apparent paradox, the ongoing dynamics of liberalisation, privatisation, decartelisation, internationalisation, and regional integration hardly led to the crumbling of the state, but instead promoted a wave of regulatory growth in the face of new risks and new opportunities (Vogel 1996). Accordingly, a new order of regulatory capitalism is rising, implying a new division of labour between state and society and entailing the expansion and intensification of regulation (Levi-Faur 2005). The previous order, relying on public ownership and public intervention and/or on sectoral self-regulation by private actors, is being replaced by a more formalised, expert-based, open, and independently regulated model of governance. Independent regulation agencies (IRAs), that is, formally independent administrative agencies with regulatory powers that benefit from public authority delegated from political decision makers, represent the main institutional feature of regulatory governance (Gilardi 2008). IRAs constitute a relatively new technology of regulation in western Europe, at least for certain domains, but they are increasingly widespread across countries and sectors. For instance, independent regulators have been set up for regulating very diverse issues, such as general competition, banking and finance, telecommunications, civil aviation, railway services, food safety, the pharmaceutical industry, electricity, environmental protection, and personal data privacy. Two attributes of IRAs deserve a special mention. On the one hand, they are formally separated from democratic institutions and elected politicians, thus raising normative and empirical concerns about their accountability and legitimacy. On the other hand, some hard questions about their role as political actors are still unaddressed, though, together with regulatory competencies, IRAs often accumulate executive, (quasi-)legislative, and adjudicatory functions, as well as about their performance.

Proposition d'un concept de contrôle de gestion pour la division "infrastructure routière" de l'Office fédéral des routes (OFROU)

La présente étude propose une méthodologie aboutissant à la conception d'un système de contrôle de gestion pour la division « infrastructure routière » ou « I » de l'Office fédéral des routes (OFROU). La première partie de ce travail situe l'OFROU dans son contexte de réformes et identifie les raisons qui justifient l'implantation d'un système de contrôle de gestion à l'OFROU. La deuxième partie pose les jalons permettant d'établir un contrôle de gestion dans sa division « I ». Elle cherche d'abord à donner une définition du contrôle de gestion dans le secteur public, puis présente un état des lieux du système de gestion existant. Finalement, les systèmes de contrôle de gestion de deux autres offices GMEB, MétéoSuisse et armasuisse immobilier, sont analysés afin d'en tirer des éléments pertinents pouvant servir à la conception du contrôle de gestion à l'OFROU. La troisième propose un contrôle de gestion pour la division « I ». Le travail montre que la réalisation d'un concept de contrôle de gestion pour la division « I » n'est pas évidente. Cette dernière, qui est en train de se mettre en place, manque encore d'expérience pour identifier clairement les éléments clé à insérer dans le système. On observe un grand embarras entre le stade du savoir et celui du savoir faire concret. La méthodologie et l'analyse présentées dans ce travail pourraient contribuer à développer un savoir faire interne aboutissant rapidement à la mise sur pied d'un système de contrôle de gestion pour la division « I ». Die vorliegende Studie schlägt eine Methodik zur Erarbeitung eines Management-Kontrollsystems für die Abteilung « Strasseninfrastruktur » oder « I » des Bundesamts für Strassen (ASTRA) vor. Der erste Teil dieser Arbeit stellt das ASTRA im Spannungsfeld dieser Reformen. Ihre Konsequenzen lassen die Einführung eines Management-Kontrollsystems im ASTRA folgerichtig erscheinen. Im zweiten Teil geht es darum, Wegmarken zu setzen, die die Einführung einer Managementkontrolle in der Abteilung « I » in die richtigen Bahnen lenken. Es wird versucht, eine Begriffsbestimmung der Managementkontrolle im öffentlichen Sektor sowie eine Bestandesaufnahme der bestehenden Systeme vorzunehmen. Schliesslich werden die Management-Kontrollsysteme zweier anderer FLAG-Ämter, MeteoSchweiz und armasuisse immobilier, auf mögliche Nutzen für den Aufbau der Managementkontrolle des ASTRA analysiert. Der dritte Teil beinhaltet einen Vorschlag, wie die Management-Kontrolle für die Abteilung « I » aussehen könnte. Die Arbeit zeigt, dass die Erarbeitung eines Management-Kontrollkonzepts für die Abteilung « I » keine einfache Aufgabe ist. Es fehlt an Erfahrung, um die Schlüsselbausteine des Systems erkennen zu können. Zwischen dem Stadium des Wissens und dem des konkreten Know-hows klafft ein empfindlicher Graben. Methodik und Analyse, wie sie in der vorliegenden Arbeit beschrieben werden, könnten zum Aufbau eines internen Know-hows beitragen, das die rasche Verwirklichung eines Management-Kontrollsystems für die Abteilung « I » erlauben könnte.