Frequency and determinants of urgent requests to home care agencies for community-dwelling elderly.

We analyzed a one-year case series and performed a longitudinal (4 month) cohort analysis of urgent requests made to home care agencies by and for their > or = 65 years old clients in order to estimate the frequency of unscheduled services delivered by home care agencies and to identify risk factors. All 40 home care agencies located in a Swiss region were included in the study and we registered 3,816 urgent requests (75/1,000 > or = 65 years residents per year). Among home care users, the presence of a urinary catheter, incontinence and the need for assistance in bathing were predictors of unscheduled services. Resources should be planned in order to help home care teams to handle unexpected, disruptive clusters of urgent requests that may compromise their scheduled activities.

Legitimacy and Accountability of Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Critical Review

This article reviews the literature that deals with the problem of legitimizing regulatory governance, with a special attention to the question of the accountability of independent regulatory agencies. The discussion begins with the presentation of the traditional arguments concerning the democratic deficit of the regulatory state. The positive evaluation of regulatory performance by citizens is presented as an alternative source of legitimacy. It follows the discussion of the existing approaches to make agencies accountable, so as to ensure the procedural legitimacy of regulatory governance. Some insights concerning new forms of accountability are offered in the last section, namely with reference to the establishment and ongoing consolidation of formal and informal networks of regulators.

The media accountability of independent regulatory agencies

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) are increasingly attracting academic and societal attention, as they represent the institutional cornerstone of the regulatory state and play a key role in policy-making. Besides the expected benefits in terms of credibility and efficiency, these regulators are said to bring about a 'democratic deficit', following their statutory separation from democratic institutions. Consequently, a 'multi-pronged system of control' is required. This article focuses on a specific component of this system, that is, the media. The goal is to determine whether media coverage of IRAs meets the necessary prerequisites to be considered a potential 'accountability forum' for regulators. The results of a comparison of two contrasted cases - the British and Swiss competition commissions - mostly support the expectations, because they show that media coverage of IRAs corresponds to that of the most relevant policy issues and follows the regulatory cycle. Furthermore, a systematic bias in media coverage can be excluded.

The Same, but Different: Central Banks, Regulatory Agencies, and the Politics of Delegation to Independent Authorities

Independent regulatory agencies are the institutional foundations of the regulatory state that, during the past 15 years, has gained prominence throughout Europe. This article studies the rise of independent authorities in European countries by comparing regulatory agencies and central banks. Delegation to independent central banks and to independent regulatory agencies is similar in many respects. In both cases, agents are deliberately made independent from political principals through a specific institutional design. Moreover, it has been argued that delegation to both central banks and regulatory agencies is linked to the need for policy-makers to improve the credibility of policy commitments, to the wish of incumbent politicians to tie the hands of future majorities, and to the extent to which the institutional contexts safeguard policy stability. Through an analysis of the formal independence of central banks and regulatory agencies in Western Europe, this article identifies an empirical puzzle that casts doubts on the accuracy of current explanations. Veto players and the uncertainty of incumbent policy-makers in respect to their re-election prospects matter for delegation to both central banks and regulatory agencies, but in opposite ways. Making sense of these anomalies is necessary to achieve a better understanding of delegation to independent authorities.

The Political Communication of Independent Regulatory Agencies

Since independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) became key actors in European regulatory governance in the 1990s, a significant share of policy-making has been carried out by organizations that are neither democratically elected nor directly accountable to elected politicians. In this context, public communication plays an important role. On the one hand, regulatory agencies might try to use communication to raise their accountability and thereby to mitigate their democratic deficit. On the other hand, communication may be used with the intent to steer the behavior of the regulated industry when more coercive regulatory means are unfeasible or undesirable. However, empirical research focusing directly on how regulators communicate is virtually non-existent. To fill this gap, this paper examines the public communication of IRAs in four countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland) and three sectors (financial services, telecommunications, and broadcasting). The empirical analysis, based on qualitative interviews and a quantitative content analysis, indicates that the organization of the communication function follows a national pattern approach while a policy sector approach is helpful for understanding the use of communication as a soft tool of regulation.