Quantifying the level of eusociality

The evolution of animal societies in which some individuals forego direct reproduction to help others to reproduce poses an evolutionary paradox. Societies where all individuals reproduce equally and societies where a single individual completely monopolizes reproduction represent the end points of a continuum of variance in the reproductive output among group members. This led Sherman et al. (1995) to propose that cooperative breeding and eusociality (a term originally applied only to insects) are not discrete phenomena. Rather they form a continuum whose main difference is the extent to which individuals forego their own reproductive opportunity to help other members of the group. Here we present a new index: the eusociality index. It quantifies the decrease in direct reproduction of group members as a resut of altruistic acts directed to other members of the group (i.e. a measure of the level of eusociality). The rationale for this index lies in the fundamental duality of the reproductive process, in which organisms supply two distinct elements: (i) genetic material (genes); and (ii) power (energy). In non-eusocial animals, all individuals transmit genes and power in the same ratio (notwithstanding individual variance in offspring size and parental investment). By contrast, amongst eusocial animals some individuals contribute proportionally more to gene transfer, and others more to energy, resulting in high interindividual variation in the ratio of gene to power transfer.

How institutions shaped the last major evolutionary transition to large-scale human societies.

What drove the transition from small-scale human societies centred on kinship and personal exchange, to large-scale societies comprising cooperation and division of labour among untold numbers of unrelated individuals? We propose that the unique human capacity to negotiate institutional rules that coordinate social actions was a key driver of this transition. By creating institutions, humans have been able to move from the default 'Hobbesian' rules of the 'game of life', determined by physical/environmental constraints, into self-created rules of social organization where cooperation can be individually advantageous even in large groups of unrelated individuals. Examples include rules of food sharing in hunter-gatherers, rules for the usage of irrigation systems in agriculturalists, property rights and systems for sharing reputation between mediaeval traders. Successful institutions create rules of interaction that are self-enforcing, providing direct benefits both to individuals that follow them, and to individuals that sanction rule breakers. Forming institutions requires shared intentionality, language and other cognitive abilities largely absent in other primates. We explain how cooperative breeding likely selected for these abilities early in the Homo lineage. This allowed anatomically modern humans to create institutions that transformed the self-reliance of our primate ancestors into the division of labour of large-scale human social organization.