Environmental influence on the phenotype of ant workers revealed by common garden experiment

Many organism traits vary along environmental gradients. Common garden experiments provide powerful means to disentangle the role of intrinsic factors, such as genetic or maternal effects, from extrinsic environmental factors in shaping phenotypic variation. Here, we investigate body size and lipid content variation in workers of the socially polymorphic ant Formica selysi along several independent elevation gradients in Switzerland. We compare field-collected workers and workers sampled as eggs from the same colonies but reared in common laboratory conditions. Overall, field-collected workers from high elevation are larger than those from low elevation, but the trend varies substantially among valleys. The same pattern is recovered when the eggs are reared in a common garden, which indicates that body size variation along elevation gradients and valleys is partly explained by genetic or maternal effects. However, both body size and lipid content exhibit significantly greater variation in field-collected workers than in laboratory-reared workers. Hence, much of the phenotypic variation results from a plastic response to the environment, rather than from genetic differences. Eggs from different elevations also show no significant difference in development time in the common garden. Overall, selection on individual worker phenotypes is unlikely to drive the altitudinal distribution of single- and multiple-queen colonies in this system, as phenotypic variation tends to be plastic and can be decoupled from social structure. This study provides insights into the interplay between individual phenotypic variation and social organization and how the two jointly respond to differing environmental conditions.

A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game

We apply the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (Q J Econ 119(3):861-898, 2004)-where players have different levels of reasoning-to Huck et al. (Games Econ Behav 38:240-264, 2002) discrete version of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ Behav 2:29-46, 1990) action commitment game-a duopoly with endogenous timing of entry. We show that, for an empirically reasonable average number of thinking steps, the model rules out Stackelberg equilibria, generates Cournot outcomes including delay, and outcomes where the first mover commits to a quantity higher than Cournot but lower than Stackelberg leader. We show that a cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses can explain the most important features of the experimental data on the action commitment game in (2002). In order to gauge the success of the model in fitting the data, we compare it to a noisy Nash model. We find that the cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses fits the data better than the noisy Nash model.