A rationalist perspective on the autonomy of international sport governing bodies : towards a pragmatic autonomy in the steering of sports

International sport governing bodies (ISGBs) are built on the foundations of freedom of association and traditionally enjoy a large degree of autonomy in their decision-making. Their autonomy is increasingly confined, however, and their hierarchical self-governance is giving way to a more networked governance, in which different stakeholders exert power in different ways and in different contexts in a complex web of interrelationships. Taking a rationalist perspective on the autonomy of ISGBs, this article demonstrates that ISGBs are deploying strategies to safeguard their waning governing monopoly over international sport. Opting for an inductive approach, the authors present four possible conceptualizations of autonomy as applied to ISGBs, namely political autonomy, legal autonomy, financial autonomy and pyramidal autonomy. For each dimension, they describe the different strategies ISGBs wield in order to safeguard different dimensions of their autonomy. This article uses governance theories to hypothesize that the autonomy of ISGBs can be understood as 'pragmatic autonomy' since ISGBs only cede certain aspects of their autonomy under particular circumstances and when being subject to specific threats. Acting in a rationalist manner, they are able to keep control over governance developments in sport by using indirect and more subtle forms of governance.

Ownership Effects on Unrelated Diversification: An Institutions' Perspective

Purpose To show that differences in the extent to which firms engage in unrelated diversification can be attributed to differences in ownership structure. Methodology/approach We draw on longitudinal data and use a panel analysis specification to test our hypotheses. Findings We find that unrelated diversification destroys value; pressure-sensitive Anglo-American owners in a firm’s equity reduce unrelated diversification, whereas pressure-resistant domestic owners increase unrelated diversification; the greater the firm’s free cash flow, the greater the negative effect of pressure-sensitive Anglo-American owners on unrelated diversification. Research limitations/implications We contribute to corporate governance and strategy research by bringing in owners’ institutional origin as a shaper of owner preferences in particular with regards to unrelated diversification. Future research may expand our investigation to more than one home institutional context, and theorize on institutional origin effects beyond the dichotomy between Anglo-American and non-Anglo-American (not oriented toward shareholder value maximization) owners. Practical implications Policy makers, financial analysts, owners, and managers may want to reflect about the implications of ownership structure, as well as promoting or joining corporations with particular ownership configurations. Social implications A shareholder value-destroying strategy, such as unrelated diversification has adverse consequences for society at large, in terms of opportunity costs, that is, resources could be allocated to value-creating activities instead. Promoting an ownership configuration that creates value should contribute to social welfare. Originality/value Owners may not be exclusively driven by shareholder value maximization, but can be influenced by normative beliefs (biases) stemming from the institutional context they originate from.