Another Kind of Knowledge: Aristotle's Phronêsis from an Epistemological Point of View

In my thesis, I defend the idea that Aristotle's notion of phronêsis (practical wisdom) is best understood as a kind of practical knowledge. I interpret phronêsis as the knowledge we display when we make the correct decision to act. In a particular situation that demands a specific response, we have practical knowledge of what to do when we make the best decision possible. This interpretation of phronêsis involves that it is possible to evaluate our decisions epistemically, that is, to evaluate whether we really know what to do or not. Aristotle provides a tool for the evaluation of our decisions, which is a definite kind of argument and which the tradition has called the 'practical syllogism'. The practical syllogism stands as the explanation of our decisions or actions. We invoke it when we want to explain or justify why we act as we do. My claim is that the components of the practical syllogism enable one to evaluate not only the moral character of our actions, but also the epistemic strength of our decisions. Correspondingly, a decision is morally right, i.e. virtuous, if the agent considers the right moral principle to apply, and if he is aware of the relevant circumstances of the situation (moral evaluation). Moreover, a decision displays practical knowledge if the agent meets three conditions (epistemic evaluation): he must desire the moral principle for its own sake; he must have experience in spotting the relevant circumstances of the situation; and he must be able to closely connect these circumstances with the moral principle. This interpretation of phronêsis differs from other more traditional interpretations in the emphasis it puts on phronêsis as knowledge. Other interpretations focus more on the moral dimension on phronêsis, without taking its epistemic value seriously. By contrast, I raise seriously the question of what it takes to genuinely know what one should do in a particular situation. -- Dans ma thèse, je défends l'idée que la notion aristotélicienne de phronêsis (sagesse pratique) doit être interprétée comme connaissance pratique. Je comprends la phronêsis comme étant la connaissance que nous avons lorsque nous prenons une bonne décision. Dans une situation particulière qui demande une réponse précise, nous avons une connaissance pratique lorsque nous prenons la meilleure décision possible. Cette interprétation de la phronêsis implique qu'il est possible d'évaluer nos décisions de manière épistémique, c'est-à-dire, d'évaluer si nous savons vraiment ce qu'il faut faire ou non. Ma position est qu'Aristote fournit un outil pour évaluer épistémiquement nos décisions, qui consiste en un certain type d'argument et que la tradition a appelé le 'syllogisme pratique'. Le syllogisme pratique correspond à l'explication de nos décisions ou de nos actions. Nous invoquons un syllogisme pratique lorsque nous voulons expliquer ou justifier pourquoi nous agissons comme nous le faisons. Les éléments du syllogisme pratique permettent d'évaluer non seulement le caractère moral de nos actions, mais aussi la force épistémique de nos décisions. Par conséquent, une décision est moralement correcte, i.e. vertueuse, si l'agent considère le bon principe moral, et s'il est attentif aux circonstances pertinentes de la situation (évaluation morale). En outre, une décision inclut la connaissance pratique si l'agent remplit trois conditions (évaluation épistémique) : il doit désirer le principe moral pour lui-même, il doit avoir de l'expérience pour déceler les circonstances pertinentes, et il doit pouvoir lier intimement ces circonstances avec le principe moral. Cette interprétation de la phronêsis diffère d'autres interprétations plus traditionnelles par l'emphase mise sur la phronêsis en tant que connaissance. D'autres interprétations se concentrent plus sur la dimension morale de la phronêsis, sans se préoccuper sérieusement de sa valeur épistémique. Au contraire, je pose sérieusement la question des conditions nécessaires pour réellement savoir ce qu'il faut faire dans une situation donnée.

Study of criteria influencing the success rate of DNA swabs in operational conditions: a contribution to an evidence-based approach to crime scene investigation and triage

DNA is nowadays swabbed routinely to investigate serious and volume crimes, but research remains scarce when it comes to determining the criteria that may impact the success rate of DNA swabs taken on different surfaces and situations. To investigate these criteria in fully operational conditions, DNA analysis results of 4772 swabs taken by the forensic unit of a police department in Western Switzerland over a 2.5-year period (2012-2014) in volume crime cases were considered. A representative and random sample of 1236 swab analyses was extensively examined and codified, describing several criteria such as whether the swabbing was performed at the scene or in the lab, the zone of the scene where it was performed, the kind of object or surface that was swabbed, whether the target specimen was a touch surface or a biological fluid, and whether the swab targeted a single surface or combined different surfaces. The impact of each criterion and of their combination was assessed in regard to the success rate of DNA analysis, measured through the quality of the resulting profile, and whether the profile resulted in a hit in the national database or not. Results show that some situations - such as swabs taken on door and window handles for instance - have a higher success rate than average swabs. Conversely, other situations lead to a marked decrease in the success rate, which should discourage further analyses of such swabs. Results also confirm that targeting a DNA swab on a single surface is preferable to swabbing different surfaces with the intent to aggregate cells deposited by the offender. Such results assist in predicting the chance that the analysis of a swab taken in a given situation will lead to a positive result. The study could therefore inform an evidence-based approach to decision-making at the crime scene (what to swab or not) and at the triage step (what to analyse or not), contributing thus to save resource and increase the efficiency of forensic science efforts.

Premières évidences de la validité de l'échelle de désengagement moral pour des actes discriminatoires (Initial evidence of the validity of a scale on moral disengagement in discriminatory behavior)

De nombreuses études ont mis en évidence le fait que les individus étaient prêts à commettre des actes discriminatoires pour autant qu'ils puissent les justifier (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Nous proposons de contribuer à la compréhension de ce phénomène grâce au concept de désengagement moral pour des actes discriminatoires (DMD). Nous définissons le désengagement moral comme le fait de justifier ses propres actes immoraux de manière à les rendre acceptable. Ce concept trouve ses origines dans les travaux de Bandura et al. (1996) portant sur les comportements agressifs chez des enfants. Il se compose de huit mécanismes (p.ex. le déplacement de responsabilité). Notre recherche dépasse le cadre théorique développé par Bandura et al. pour inscrire le désengagement moral dans le champ de la discrimination intergroupe. De plus, en conceptualisant le désengagement moral comme une différence individuelle, nous proposons également de présenter les premières étapes du développement d'une échelle permettant de mesurer le DMD. L'échelle de DMD a été développée en trois étapes en suivant la procédure proposée par Hinkin (1998). Tout d'abord, une liste de 72 items a été générée suivant une méthode déductive. Puis, suite à une étude (n = 13) portant sur la cohérence des items vis-à-vis du concept et de ses mécanismes, cette liste a été réduite à 40 items (5 par mécanisme). Enfin, 118 étudiants universitaires ont participé à une étude dans le but de mener des analyses factorielles (exploratoire et confirmatoire), ainsi que de tester les validités convergente, divergente et prédictive de l'échelle. La première partie de cette étude se composait de différentes échelles (p.ex. mesure de personnalité, préjugés anti-immigrés, etc.). La seconde partie de l'étude était une expérience portant sur l'évaluation d'idées de méthodes de sélection (discriminatoire versus méritocratique) des étudiants suisses et étrangers à l'université, ayant pour but de réduire la surpopulation dans les salles de cours. Les résultats obtenus sont prometteurs pour le développement de l'échelle, autant du point de vue de sa structure (p.ex. α = .82) que de sa validité. Par exemple, plus le niveau de DMD des participants était élevé, plus ils étaient favorables à une méthode de sélection discriminatoire des étudiants à l'université. L'ensemble des résultats sera présenté durant la conférence. Nous discuterons également des potentielles contributions de cette échelle pour de futurs projets de recherche. Référence : Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G. V., & Pastorelli, C. (1996). Mechanisms of moral disengagement of the exercise of moral agency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71 (2), 364-374. Crandall, C. S., & Eshleman, A. (2003). The Justification-suppression model of the expression and experience of prejudice. Psychological Bulletin, 129 (3), 414-446. Hinkin, T. R. (1998). A brief tutorial on the development of measures for use un survey questionnaires. Organizational Research Methods, 1 (1), 104.121.

Moral disengagement: Towards a context-general category-based measure of the concept

Bandura (1986) developed the concept of moral disengagement to explain how individuals can engage in detrimental behavior while experiencing low levels of negative feelings such as guilt-feelings. Most of the research conducted on moral disengagement investigated this concept as a global concept (e.g., Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Moore, Detert, Klebe Treviño, Baker, & Mayer, 2012) while Bandura (1986, 1990) initially developed eight distinct mechanisms of moral disengagement grouped into four categories representing the various means through which moral disengagement can operate. In our work, we propose to develop measures of this concept based on its categories, namely rightness of actions, rejection of personal responsibility, distortion of negative consequences, and negative perception of the victims, and which is not specific a particular area of research. Through our measures, we aim at better understanding the cognitive process leading individuals to behave unethically by investigating which category plays a role in explaining unethical behavior depending on the situations in which individuals are. To this purpose, we conducted five studies to develop the measures and to test its predictive validity. Particularly, we assessed the ability of the newly developed measures to predict two types of unethical behaviors, i.e. discriminatory behavior and cheating behavior. Confirmatory Factor analyses demonstrated a good fit of the model and findings generally supported our predictions.

Précarité et problèmes cutanés [Skin problems associated with poor living conditions].

Les personnes vivant dans une situation de précarité sont susceptibles de développer un large éventail de problèmes médicaux et les atteintes cutanées sont très fréquentes. Nous présentons quatre situations cliniques de problèmes cutanés fréquemment retrouvés au sein des populations précaires. Leurs diagnostic et prise en charge précoces sont essentiels pour en prévenir l'ultérieure dissémination dans des contextes de promiscuité. People living in poor conditions are at high risk of developing different medical diseases of which dermatological diseases are very common. We present 4 clinical cases of skin diseases, which are the most prevalent amongst the majority of socially and economically vulnerable patients. Early diagnosis and appropriate treatment are of paramount importance, in order to avoid their spread in close- knit communities where these patients often live.

Transition of young people with chronic conditions: a cross-sectional study of patient perceptions before and after transfer from pediatric to adult health care.

UNLABELLED: The aim of this study was to compare perceived barriers to and the most preferred age for successful transition to adult health care between young people with chronic disorders who had not yet transferred from pediatric to adult health care (pre-transfer) and those who had already transferred (post-transfer). In a cross-sectional study, we compared 283 pre-transfer with 89 post-transfer young people, using a 28-item questionnaire that focused on perceived barriers to transition and beliefs about the most preferred age to transfer. Feeling at ease with the pediatrician was the most important barrier to successful transition in both groups, but was rated significantly higher in the pre-transfer compared to the post-transfer group (OR = 2.03, 95 %CI 1.12-3.71). Anxiety and lack of information were the next most important barriers, rated equally highly by the two groups (OR = 0.67, 95 %CI 0.35-1.28 and OR = 0.71, 95 %CI 0.36-1.38, respectively). More than 80 % of the respondents in both groups reported that 16-19 years was the most preferred age to transfer; more than half of all the respondents reported 18-19 years and older as the most preferred age. CONCLUSION: Better transition planning through the provision of regular and more detailed information about adult health-care providers and the transition process could reduce anxiety and contribute to a more positive attitude to overcome perceived barriers to transition from young people's perspective. Young people's preferences about transferring to adult health care provide a challenge to those children's hospitals that transfer to adult health care at a younger age.

NLRC5 shields T lymphocytes from NK-cell-mediated elimination under inflammatory conditions.

NLRC5 is a transcriptional regulator of MHC class I (MHCI), which maintains high MHCI expression particularly in T cells. Recent evidence highlights an important NK-T-cell crosstalk, raising the question on whether NLRC5 specifically modulates this interaction. Here we show that NK cells from Nlrc5-deficient mice exhibit moderate alterations in inhibitory receptor expression and responsiveness. Interestingly, NLRC5 expression in T cells is required to protect them from NK-cell-mediated elimination upon inflammation. Using T-cell-specific Nlrc5-deficient mice, we show that NK cells surprisingly break tolerance even towards 'self' Nlrc5-deficient T cells under inflammatory conditions. Furthermore, during chronic LCMV infection, the total CD8(+) T-cell population is severely decreased in these mice, a phenotype reverted by NK-cell depletion. These findings strongly suggest that endogenous T cells with low MHCI expression become NK-cell targets, having thus important implications for T-cell responses in naturally or therapeutically induced inflammatory conditions.

No Evidence for moral reward and punishment in an anonymous context.

Human social interactions are regulated by moral norms that define individual obligations and rights. These norms are enforced by punishment of transgressors and reward of followers. Yet, the generality and strength of this drive to punish or reward is unclear, especially when people are not personally involved in the situation and when the actual impact of their sanction is only indirect, i.e., when it diminishes or promotes the social status of the punished or rewarded individual. In a real-life study, we investigated if people are inclined to anonymously punish or reward a person for her past deeds in a different social context. Participants from three socio-professional categories voted anonymously for early career violinists in an important violin competition. We found that participants did not punish an immoral violin candidate, nor did they reward another hyper-moral candidate. On the contrary, one socio-professional category sanctioned hyper-morality. Hence, salient moral information about past behavior did not elicit punishment or reward in an impersonal situation where the impact of the sanction was indirect. We conclude that contextual features play an important role in human motivation to enforce moral norms.