More Money, Fewer Problems? Cross-Level Effects of Economic Deprivation on Political Representation

While equal political representation of all citizens is a fundamental democratic goal, it is hampered empirically in a multitude of ways. This study examines how the societal level of economic inequality affects the representation of relatively poor citizens by parties and governments. Using CSES survey data for citizens' policy preferences and expert placements of political parties, empirical evidence is found that in economically more unequal societies, the party system represents the preferences of relatively poor citizens worse than in more equal societies. This moderating effect of economic equality is also found for policy congruence between citizens and governments, albeit slightly less clear-cut.

The political ecology of ecosystem services

The dominance of ''ecosystem services'' as a guiding concept for environmental management - where it appears as a neutral, obvious, taken-for-granted concept - hides the fact that there are choices implicit in its framing and in its application. In other words, it is a highly political concept, and its utility depends on the arena in which it is used and what it is used for. Following a political ecology framework, and based on a literature review, bibliometric analyses, and brief examples from two tropical rainforest countries, this review investigates four moments in the construction and application of the ecosystem services idea: socio-historical (the emergence of the discourse), ontological (what knowledge does the concept allow?), scientific (difficulties in its practical application), and political (who wins, who loses?). We show how the concept is a boundary object with widespread appeal, trace the discursive and institutional context within which it gained traction, and argue that choices of scale, definition, and method in measuring ecosystem services frustrate its straightforward application. As a result, it is used in diverse ways by dif- ferent interests to justify different kinds of interventions that at times might be totally opposed. In Madagascar, the ecosystem services idea is mainly used to justify forest conservation in ways open to cri- tique for its neoliberalization of nature or disempowerment of communities. In contrast, in the Brazilian Amazon, the discourse of ecosystem services has served the agendas of traditional populations and family farm lobbies. Ecosystem services, as an idea and tool, are mobilized by diverse actors in real-life situa- tions that lead to complex, regionally particular and fundamentally political outcomes.

Corporate political activity and firm outcomes: A meta-analysis

Using meta-analytic methods on a sample of 74 studies, we explore the links between CPA and public policy outcomes, and between CPA and firm outcomes. We find that CPA has at best a weak effect and that it appears to be better at maintaining public policy than changing them.

Asset freezing, corporate political resources and the Tullock paradox

In 1967, Gordon Tullock asked why firms do not spend more on campaign contributions, despite the large rents that could be generated from political activities. We suggest in this paper that part of the puzzle could come from the fact that one important type of political activity has been neglected by the literature which focuses on campaign contributions or political connections. We call this neglected activity "asset freezing": situations in which firms delay lay-offs or invest in specific technologies to support local politicians' re-election objectives. In doing so, firms bear a potentially significant cost as they do not use a portion of their economic assets in the most efficient or productive way. The purpose of this paper is to provide a first theoretical exploration of this phenomenon. Building on the literature on corporate political resources, we argue that a firm's economic assets can be evaluated based on their degree of "political freezability," which depends on the flexibility of their use and on their value for policy-makers. We then develop a simple model in which financial contributions and freezing assets are alternative options for a firm willing to lawfully influence public policy-making, and derive some of our initial hypotheses more formally.

Political market and regulatory uncertainty: Insights and implications for integrated strategy

Managers can craft effective integrated strategy by properly assessing regulatory uncertainty. Leveraging the existing political markets literature, we predict regulatory uncertainty from the novel interaction of demand and supply side rivalries across a range of political markets. We argue for two primary drivers of regulatory uncertainty: ideology-motivated interests opposed to the firm and a lack of competition for power among political actors supplying public policy. We align three, previously disparate dimensions of nonmarket strategy - profile level, coalition breadth, and pivotal target - to levels of regulatory uncertainty. Through this framework, we demonstrate how and when firms employ different nonmarket strategies. To illustrate variation in nonmarket strategy across levels of regulatory uncertainty, we analyze several market entry decisions of foreign firms operating in the global telecommunications sector.

Three essays in behavioral and experimental economics

The present PhD dissertation consists of three papers, organized in chapters, in the field of behavioral economics. This discipline studies economic behavior of individuals subject to limitations, such as bounded self-interest and bounded willpower. The behavior studied in the present thesis ranges from the complex decision to register as an organ donor, decision¬making in the presence of uncertainty and the decision to give money to a charitable organization. The first chapter aims at testing the effectiveness of an active-decision (AD) mechanism on the decision to become an organ donor in Switzerland, using field experiments. We found that stimulating participants' reflection on the topic of organ donation had a negative effect on the decision to become an organ donor. Moreover, a non-binding commitment nudge reduces putting off the decision, but does not lead to donation rates higher than in the control group. The results suggest that AD may be far more limited than previously thought and raise doubts about the efficacy of engaging potential donors to reflect on the topic of organ donation. Beyond carrying for others, behavioral economics also recognizes that individuals do not evaluate outcomes in absolute terms but rather by comparing them to some reference levels, called reference points. Above the reference points, economic outcomes are perceived as gains, while below these levels the same outcomes are felt as losses. The last two chapters analyze the importance of reference points in the evaluation of economic outcomes. Using a laboratory experiment where subjects played two consecutive lotteries, Chapter 2 studies the speed of adjustment of the reference point. We find that varying the probability of winning the first lottery has no effect on subjects' risk behavior regarding the second lottery. This result indicates a very fast adjustment of the reference point to the latest information. Chapter 3 investigates whether reference points are relevant for charitable preferences. Using actual donation decisions of participants in a laboratory experiment, the results suggest that reference points are not crucial for shaping charitable giving. -- Cette thèse de doctorat consiste en trois articles, organisés en chapitres, dans le domaine de l'économie comportementale. Cette discipline étudie le comportement d'agents économiques sujets à des limitations, telles qu'un égoïsme limité et une volonté limitée. Le comportement étudié dans cette thèse va de la décision complexe de devenir donneur d'organes, la prise de décision en présence d'incertitude à la décision de donner de l'argent à une oeuvre caritative. Le premier chapitre vise à tester l'efficacité d'un mécanisme de « décision active » (active decision, AD) sur la décision de devenir donneur d'organes en Suisse, et ce en recourant à deux expériences hors-laboratoire. Les résultats montrent que stimuler la réflexion des participants sur le don d'organes a un effet négatif sur la décision de devenir donneur. De plus, un mécanisme qui encourage les participants à prendre une décision sur le champ réduit la tendance à procrastiner, mais ne mène pas à un taux de donneurs plus élevé par rapport à un groupe de contrôle. Les résultats suggèrent que le mécanisme AD est bien plus limité que ce qui a été supposé jusqu'à maintenant. De plus, ils suscitent le doute quant à l'efficacité de stimuler la réflexion de potentiels donneurs sur le sujet du don d'organes. En plus de se soucier des autres, l'économie comportementale admet également que les individus n'évaluent pas les résultats de façon absolue, mais en comparant ceux-ci à des niveaux de références, souvent appelés points de référence. Au-dessus de ces points de référence, les résultats sont perçus en tant que gains, tandis qu'en-dessous ces mêmes résultats sont considérés comme des pertes. Les deux derniers chapitres analysent l'importance des points de référence dans diverses situations. A l'aide d'une expérience en laboratoire dans laquelle les participants participent à deux loteries consécutives, le chapitre 2 étudie la vitesse d'ajustement du point de référence. Le résultat montre que varier la probabilité de gagner la première loterie n'a aucun effet sur le comportement en matière de risques concernant la deuxième loterie. Cela indique un ajustement très rapide du point de référence. Le chapitre 3 vise à déterminer si les points de référence ont un rôle majeur concernant les préférences caritatives. Les données relatives aux décisions de don des participants d'une expérience en laboratoire montrent que les points de référence n'influencent pas significativement le don caritatif.