Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

Three essays on the psychology of investment and financial markets

Préface My thesis consists of three essays where I consider equilibrium asset prices and investment strategies when the market is likely to experience crashes and possibly sharp windfalls. Although each part is written as an independent and self contained article, the papers share a common behavioral approach in representing investors preferences regarding to extremal returns. Investors utility is defined over their relative performance rather than over their final wealth position, a method first proposed by Markowitz (1952b) and by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), that I extend to incorporate preferences over extremal outcomes. With the failure of the traditional expected utility models in reproducing the observed stylized features of financial markets, the Prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) offered the first significant alternative to the expected utility paradigm by considering that people focus on gains and losses rather than on final positions. Under this setting, Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2000) and McQueen and Vorkink (2004) were able to build a representative agent optimization model which solution reproduced some of the observed risk premium and excess volatility. The research in behavioral finance is relatively new and its potential still to explore. The three essays composing my thesis propose to use and extend this setting to study investors behavior and investment strategies in a market where crashes and sharp windfalls are likely to occur. In the first paper, the preferences of a representative agent, relative to time varying positive and negative extremal thresholds are modelled and estimated. A new utility function that conciliates between expected utility maximization and tail-related performance measures is proposed. The model estimation shows that the representative agent preferences reveals a significant level of crash aversion and lottery-pursuit. Assuming a single risky asset economy the proposed specification is able to reproduce some of the distributional features exhibited by financial return series. The second part proposes and illustrates a preference-based asset allocation model taking into account investors crash aversion. Using the skewed t distribution, optimal allocations are characterized as a resulting tradeoff between the distribution four moments. The specification highlights the preference for odd moments and the aversion for even moments. Qualitatively, optimal portfolios are analyzed in terms of firm characteristics and in a setting that reflects real-time asset allocation, a systematic over-performance is obtained compared to the aggregate stock market. Finally, in my third article, dynamic option-based investment strategies are derived and illustrated for investors presenting downside loss aversion. The problem is solved in closed form when the stock market exhibits stochastic volatility and jumps. The specification of downside loss averse utility functions allows corresponding terminal wealth profiles to be expressed as options on the stochastic discount factor contingent on the loss aversion level. Therefore dynamic strategies reduce to the replicating portfolio using exchange traded and well selected options, and the risky stock.

Three essays on bankruptcy risk

Abstract Market prices of corporate bond spreads and of credit default swap (CDS) rates do not match each other. In this paper, we argue that the liquidity premium, the cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) option and actual market segmentation explain the pricing differences. Using the European transaction data from Reuters and Bloomberg, we estimate the liquidity premium that is time- varying and firm-specific. We show that when time-dependent liquidity premiums are considered, corporate bond spreads and CDS rates behave in a much closer way than previous studies have shown. We find that high equity volatility drives pricing differences that can be explained by the CTD option.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

Three essays on leadership

ABSTRACT Samuel Bendahan, John Antonakis, Christian Zehnder, and François Pralong The relationship between power and immoral decisions has been discussed extensively by scientists and philosophers alike. Although the exercise of power is ubiquitous in social hierarchies, direct evidence on the impact of power on decision making is scarce. We use laboratory experiments to study whether more power leads to corruption. We manipulate power in the context of leader decision-making authority involving monetary stakes. Prior to the experiment, we also gathered extensive data on psychological and endocrinological individual differences. We find that an increase of power caused leaders to be more likely to engage in destructive, selfish behaviour, although the same subjects did not behave in this manner before their level of power was increased. We also show how individual differences affect the initial level of destructive behaviour and the corruption process. WHAT'S RIGHT FOR THE LEFT MAY NOT BE RIGHT FOR THE RIGHT: VALUE CONGRUENCE AND CHARISMA IN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP Samuel Bendahan ABSTRACT Value congruence between leaders and followers is important not only for follower commitment but also as part of the attributions followers make of leaders. I theorized that transformational leadership, which often is referred to as being value driven and having strong moral foundations, has differential effects depending on the values of the follower and whether these values are congruent with what the leader espouses. I designed an experiment to analyze how the political values of followers and leaders can influence followers' attributions regarding leaders. Within the context of political leadership, I found that transformational leaders were seen as more prototypical. Value congruence predicted prototypicality, which was strongly related to follower intentions to vote for the leader. Furthermore, followers with left-wing political values were more influenced by prototypical leaders than were followers with right-wing political values, presumably because of moral overtones of both left-wing ideology and transformational leadership. JUDGING LEADERSHIP POTENTIAL IN AN INTERVIEW: MODERATING EFFECT OF INTERVIEWER INTELLIGENCE ON INTERVIEWER COGNITIVE BUSYNESS, CANDIDATE PERFORMANCE-CUES EFFECTS, AND CANDIDATE ETHNICITY Samuel Bendahan, Philippe Jacquart, and John Antonakis ABSTRACT A large body of literature suggests that interviewers do not accurately rate candidates when using unstructured interviews and evaluation procedures that affect pre-interview expectations; however, the process by which these biases are produced is not well understood. We theorized several reasons for the sub-par performance of the unstructured interview. These factors, which we manipulated in the context of a videotaped interview of a candidate applying for a leadership position, include evaluator cognitive load, pre-interview performance cues regarding the candidate, and the ethnicity of the candidate. We also controlled for the intelligence of the evaluator. We found a significant four-way interaction between the manipulated factors and evaluators' cognitive abilities. The effects of the manipulated factors were all significantly less for evaluators who were high on general intelligence.

Essays in higher moment asset pricing and liquidity risk

This thesis focuses on theoretical asset pricing models and their empirical applications. I aim to investigate the following noteworthy problems: i) if the relationship between asset prices and investors' propensities to gamble and to fear disaster is time varying, ii) if the conflicting evidence for the firm and market level skewness can be explained by downside risk, Hi) if costly learning drives liquidity risk. Moreover, empirical tests support the above assumptions and provide novel findings in asset pricing, investment decisions, and firms' funding liquidity. The first chapter considers a partial equilibrium model where investors have heterogeneous propensities to gamble and fear disaster. Skewness preference represents the desire to gamble, while kurtosis aversion represents fear of extreme returns. Using US data from 1988 to 2012, my model demonstrates that in bad times, risk aversion is higher, more people fear disaster, and fewer people gamble, in contrast to good times. This leads to a new empirical finding: gambling preference has a greater impact on asset prices during market downturns than during booms. The second chapter consists of two essays. The first essay introduces a foramula based on conditional CAPM for decomposing the market skewness. We find that the major market upward and downward movements can be well preadicted by the asymmetric comovement of betas, which is characterized by an indicator called "Systematic Downside Risk" (SDR). We find that SDR can efafectively forecast future stock market movements and we obtain out-of-sample R-squares (compared with a strategy using historical mean) of more than 2.27% with monthly data. The second essay reconciles a well-known empirical fact: aggregating positively skewed firm returns leads to negatively skewed market return. We reconcile this fact through firms' greater response to negative maraket news than positive market news. We also propose several market return predictors, such as downside idiosyncratic skewness. The third chapter studies the funding liquidity risk based on a general equialibrium model which features two agents: one entrepreneur and one external investor. Only the investor needs to acquire information to estimate the unobservable fundamentals driving the economic outputs. The novelty is that information acquisition is more costly in bad times than in good times, i.e. counter-cyclical information cost, as supported by previous empirical evidence. Later we show that liquidity risks are principally driven by costly learning. Résumé Cette thèse présente des modèles théoriques dévaluation des actifs et leurs applications empiriques. Mon objectif est d'étudier les problèmes suivants: la relation entre l'évaluation des actifs et les tendances des investisseurs à parier et à crainadre le désastre varie selon le temps ; les indications contraires pour l'entreprise et l'asymétrie des niveaux de marché peuvent être expliquées par les risques de perte en cas de baisse; l'apprentissage coûteux augmente le risque de liquidité. En outre, des tests empiriques confirment les suppositions ci-dessus et fournissent de nouvelles découvertes en ce qui concerne l'évaluation des actifs, les décisions relatives aux investissements et la liquidité de financement des entreprises. Le premier chapitre examine un modèle d'équilibre où les investisseurs ont des tendances hétérogènes à parier et à craindre le désastre. La préférence asymétrique représente le désir de parier, alors que le kurtosis d'aversion représente la crainte du désastre. En utilisant les données des Etats-Unis de 1988 à 2012, mon modèle démontre que dans les mauvaises périodes, l'aversion du risque est plus grande, plus de gens craignent le désastre et moins de gens parient, conatrairement aux bonnes périodes. Ceci mène à une nouvelle découverte empirique: la préférence relative au pari a un plus grand impact sur les évaluations des actifs durant les ralentissements de marché que durant les booms économiques. Exploitant uniquement cette relation générera un revenu excédentaire annuel de 7,74% qui n'est pas expliqué par les modèles factoriels populaires. Le second chapitre comprend deux essais. Le premier essai introduit une foramule base sur le CAPM conditionnel pour décomposer l'asymétrie du marché. Nous avons découvert que les mouvements de hausses et de baisses majeures du marché peuvent être prédits par les mouvements communs des bêtas. Un inadicateur appelé Systematic Downside Risk, SDR (risque de ralentissement systématique) est créé pour caractériser cette asymétrie dans les mouvements communs des bêtas. Nous avons découvert que le risque de ralentissement systématique peut prévoir les prochains mouvements des marchés boursiers de manière efficace, et nous obtenons des carrés R hors échantillon (comparés avec une stratégie utilisant des moyens historiques) de plus de 2,272% avec des données mensuelles. Un investisseur qui évalue le marché en utilisant le risque de ralentissement systématique aurait obtenu une forte hausse du ratio de 0,206. Le second essai fait cadrer un fait empirique bien connu dans l'asymétrie des niveaux de march et d'entreprise, le total des revenus des entreprises positiveament asymétriques conduit à un revenu de marché négativement asymétrique. Nous décomposons l'asymétrie des revenus du marché au niveau de l'entreprise et faisons cadrer ce fait par une plus grande réaction des entreprises aux nouvelles négatives du marché qu'aux nouvelles positives du marché. Cette décomposition révélé plusieurs variables de revenus de marché efficaces tels que l'asymétrie caractéristique pondérée par la volatilité ainsi que l'asymétrie caractéristique de ralentissement. Le troisième chapitre fournit une nouvelle base théorique pour les problèmes de liquidité qui varient selon le temps au sein d'un environnement de marché incomplet. Nous proposons un modèle d'équilibre général avec deux agents: un entrepreneur et un investisseur externe. Seul l'investisseur a besoin de connaitre le véritable état de l'entreprise, par conséquent, les informations de paiement coutent de l'argent. La nouveauté est que l'acquisition de l'information coute plus cher durant les mauvaises périodes que durant les bonnes périodes, comme cela a été confirmé par de précédentes expériences. Lorsque la récession comamence, l'apprentissage coûteux fait augmenter les primes de liquidité causant un problème d'évaporation de liquidité, comme cela a été aussi confirmé par de précédentes expériences.

Three essays in international finance

Executive Summary The first essay of this dissertation investigates whether greater exchange rate uncertainty (i.e., variation over time in the exchange rate) fosters or depresses the foreign investment of multinational firms. In addition to the direct capital financing it supplies, foreign investment can be a source of valuable technology and know-how, which can have substantial positive effects on a host country's economic growth. Thus, it is critically important for policy makers and central bankers, among others, to understand how multinationals base their investment decisions on the characteristics of foreign exchange markets. In this essay, I first develop a theoretical framework to improve our knowledge regarding how the aggregate level of foreign investment responds to exchange rate uncertainty when an economy consists of many firms, each of which is making decisions. The analysis predicts a U-shaped effect of exchange rate uncertainty on the total level of foreign investment of the economy. That is, the effect is negative for low levels of uncertainty and positive for higher levels of uncertainty. This pattern emerges because the relationship between exchange rate volatility and 'the probability of investment is negative for firms with low productivity at home (i.e., firms that find it profitable to invest abroad) and the relationship is positive for firms with high productivity at home (i.e., firms that prefer exporting their product). This finding stands in sharp contrast to predictions in the existing literature that consider a single firm's decision to invest in a unique project. The main contribution of this research is to show that the aggregation over many firms produces a U-shaped pattern between exchange rate uncertainty and the probability of investment. Using data from industrialized countries for the period of 1982-2002, this essay offers a comprehensive empirical analysis that provides evidence in support of the theoretical prediction. In the second essay, I aim to explain the time variation in sovereign credit risk, which captures the risk that a government may be unable to repay its debt. The importance of correctly evaluating such a risk is illustrated by the central role of sovereign debt in previous international lending crises. In addition, sovereign debt is the largest asset class in emerging markets. In this essay, I provide a pricing formula for the evaluation of sovereign credit risk in which the decision to default on sovereign debt is made by the government. The pricing formula explains the variation across time in daily credit spreads - a widely used measure of credit risk - to a degree not offered by existing theoretical and empirical models. I use information on a country's stock market to compute the prevailing sovereign credit spread in that country. The pricing formula explains a substantial fraction of the time variation in daily credit spread changes for Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Russia for the 1998-2008 period, particularly during the recent subprime crisis. I also show that when a government incentive to default is allowed to depend on current economic conditions, one can best explain the level of credit spreads, especially during the recent period of financial distress. In the third essay, I show that the risk of sovereign default abroad can produce adverse consequences for the U.S. equity market through a decrease in returns and an increase in volatility. The risk of sovereign default, which is no longer limited to emerging economies, has recently become a major concern for financial markets. While sovereign debt plays an increasing role in today's financial environment, the effects of sovereign credit risk on the U.S. financial markets have been largely ignored in the literature. In this essay, I develop a theoretical framework that explores how the risk of sovereign default abroad helps explain the level and the volatility of U.S. equity returns. The intuition for this effect is that negative economic shocks deteriorate the fiscal situation of foreign governments, thereby increasing the risk of a sovereign default that would trigger a local contraction in economic growth. The increased risk of an economic slowdown abroad amplifies the direct effect of these shocks on the level and the volatility of equity returns in the U.S. through two channels. The first channel involves a decrease in the future earnings of U.S. exporters resulting from unfavorable adjustments to the exchange rate. The second channel involves investors' incentives to rebalance their portfolios toward safer assets, which depresses U.S. equity prices. An empirical estimation of the model with monthly data for the 1994-2008 period provides evidence that the risk of sovereign default abroad generates a strong leverage effect during economic downturns, which helps to substantially explain the level and the volatility of U.S. equity returns.

Essays in equilibrium asset pricing

This thesis consists of four essays in equilibrium asset pricing. The main topic is investors' heterogeneity: I investigates the equilibrium implications for the financial markets when investors have different attitudes toward risk. The first chapter studies why expected risk and remuneration on the aggregate market are negatively related, even if intuition and standard theory suggest a positive relation. I show that the negative trade-off can obtain in equilibrium if investors' beliefs about economic fundamentals are procyclically biased and the market Sharpe ratio is countercyclical. I verify that such conditions hold in the real markets and I find empirical support for the risk-return dynamics predicted by the model. The second chapter consists of two essays. The first essay studies how het¬erogeneity in risk preferences interacts with other sources of heterogeneity and how this affects asset prices in equilibrium. Using perceived macroeconomic un¬certainty as source of heterogeneity, the model helps to explain some patterns of financial returns, even if heterogeneity is small as suggested by survey data. The second essay determines conditions such that equilibrium prices have analytical solutions when investors have heterogeneous risk attitudes and macroeconomic fundamentals feature latent uncertainty. This approach provides additional in-sights to the previous literature where models require numerical solutions. The third chapter studies why equity claims (i.e. assets paying a single future dividend) feature premia and risk decreasing with the horizon, even if standard models imply the opposite shape. I show that labor relations helps to explain the puzzle. When workers have bargaining power to exploit partial income insurance within the firm, wages are smoother and dividends are riskier than in a standard economy. Distributional risk among workers and shareholders provides a rationale to the equity short-term risk, which leads to downward sloping term structures of premia and risk for equity claim. Résumé Cette thèse se compose de quatre essais dans l'évaluation des actifs d'équilibre. Le sujet principal est l'hétérogénéité des investisseurs: J'étudie les implications d'équilibre pour les marchés financiers où les investisseurs ont des attitudes différentes face au risque. Le première chapitre étudie pourquoi attendus risque et la rémunération sur le marché global sont liées négativement, même si l'intuition et la théorie standard suggèrent une relation positive. Je montre que le compromis négatif peut obtenir en équilibre si les croyances des investisseurs sur les fondamentaux économiques sont procyclique biaisées et le ratio de Sharpe du marché est anticyclique. Je vérifier que ces conditions sont réalisées dans les marchés réels et je trouve un appui empirique à la dynamique risque-rendement prédites par le modèle. Le deuxième chapitre se compose de deux essais. Le première essai étudie com¬ment hétérogénéité dans les préférences de risque inter agit avec d'autres sources d'hétérogénéité et comment cela affecte les prix des actifs en équilibre. Utili¬sation de l'incertitude macroéconomique perù comme source d'hétérogénéité, le modèle permet d'expliquer certaines tendances de rendements financiers, même si l'hétérogénéité est faible comme suggéré par les données d'enquête. Le deuxième essai détermine des conditions telles que les prix d'équilibre disposer de solutions analytiques lorsque les investisseurs ont des attitudes des risques hétérogènes et les fondamentaux macroéconomiques disposent d'incertitude latente. Cette approche fournit un éclairage supplémentaire à la littérature antérieure où les modèles nécessitent des solutions numériques. Le troisième chapitre étudie pourquoi les equity-claims (actifs que paient un seul dividende futur) ont les primes et le risque décroissante avec l'horizon, mme si les modèles standards impliquent la forme opposée. Je montre que les relations de travail contribue à expliquer l'énigme. Lorsque les travailleurs ont le pouvoir de négociation d'exploiter assurance revenu partiel dans l'entreprise, les salaires sont plus lisses et les dividendes sont plus risqués que dans une économie standard. Risque de répartition entre les travailleurs et les actionnaires fournit une justification à le risque à court terme, ce qui conduit à des term-structures en pente descendante des primes et des risques pour les equity-claims.

Three essays in Swiss corporate governance

This dissertation is a combination of three relatively independent chapters on the subject of corporate governance. Corporate governance is presently at the epicenter of the global financial crisis. The lack of regulation and the misalignment of objectives have greatly contributed to the major crisis we are now in. Most governance research has been conducted in the United States in a context of widely held corporations and great executive power. It does not reflect the variety of situations around the world and we question the validity of this model in other contexts. The aim of this dissertation is to look at other governance models, in particular the Swiss corporate governance not only from a practical point of view, but also from a multi-theoretical approach. Traditional corporate governance literature has focused on the Anglo-American model that mainly follows the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) in a shareholder-manager context, and overlooked other approaches. We focus on three different aspects of corporate governance using three different theories. First, we look at the ownership type of various corporations, using the agency theory in a context where issues between shareholders predominate over the typical shareholder-manager relationship. Second, we explore the adoption process of several governance mechanisms that, due to changes in legislation, has taken place in Switzerland since 2002. We use the institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), in a context where the environmental pressures are particularly high. Finally, we spotlight the board of directors as a key element of the governance of publicly listed corporations. Particularly, we focus on the independence of the board of directors, using a combination of the agency and resource dependence theories (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).