Cooperation among selfish individuals in insect societies

Kin selection is the key to understanding the evolution of cooperation in insect societies. However, kin selection also predicts potential kin conflict, and understanding how these conflicts are resolved is a major goal of current research on social insects

Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

Cooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans.

Choosy moral punishers.

The punishment of social misconduct is a powerful mechanism for stabilizing high levels of cooperation among unrelated individuals. It is regularly assumed that humans have a universal disposition to punish social norm violators, which is sometimes labelled "universal structure of human morality" or "pure aversion to social betrayal". Here we present evidence that, contrary to this hypothesis, the propensity to punish a moral norm violator varies among participants with different career trajectories. In anonymous real-life conditions, future teachers punished a talented but immoral young violinist: they voted against her in an important music competition when they had been informed of her previous blatant misconduct toward fellow violin students. In contrast, future police officers and high school students did not punish. This variation among socio-professional categories indicates that the punishment of norm violators is not entirely explained by an aversion to social betrayal. We suggest that context specificity plays an important role in normative behaviour; people seem inclined to enforce social norms only in situations that are familiar, relevant for their social category, and possibly strategically advantageous.

Decades of population genetic research reveal the need for harmonization of molecular markers: the grey wolf Canis lupus as a case study

Following protection measures implemented since the 1970s, large carnivores are currently increasing in number and returning to areas from which they were absent for decades or even centuries. Monitoring programmes for these species rely extensively on non-invasive sampling and genotyping. However, attempts to connect results of such studies at larger spatial or temporal scales often suffer from the incompatibility of genetic markers implemented by researchers in different laboratories. This is particularly critical for long-distance dispersers, revealing the need for harmonized monitoring schemes that would enable the understanding of gene flow and dispersal dynamics. Based on a review of genetic studies on grey wolves Canis lupus from Europe, we provide an overview of the genetic markers currently in use, and identify opportunities and hurdles for studies based on continent-scale datasets. Our results highlight an urgent need for harmonization of methods to enable transnational research based on data that have already been collected, and to allow these data to be linked to material collected in the future. We suggest timely standardization of newly developed genotyping approaches, and propose that action is directed towards the establishment of shared single nucleotide polymorphism panels, next-generation sequencing of microsatellites, a common reference sample collection and an online database for data exchange. Enhanced cooperation among genetic researchers dealing with large carnivores in consortia would facilitate streamlining of methods, their faster and wider adoption, and production of results at the large spatial scales that ultimately matter for the conservation of these charismatic species.

The basilar artery international cooperation study (BASICS).

Basilar artery occlusion is a rare cause of stroke with a high case fatality rate and an often poor clinical outcome among survivors. Our limited knowledge on the outcome in patients with basilar artery occlusion comes from small case series of selected patients.STUDY AIM: The main purpose of the registry is to collect preliminary data that will help direct the design of a future clinical treatment trial. The target number of patients included is 500.DESIGN: BASICS is a prospective, observational, multi-center, international registry of consecutive patients presenting with a symptomatic and radiologically confirmed basilar artery occlusion.STUDY OUTCOMES: From November 2002 until December 2006 data have been collected on 400 patients, from 42 centers in 12 countries. Most patients were treated with IA therapy (55%), followed by antithrombotics (29%) and IV thrombolysis (6%). The overall mortality was 45%.

The Inter-municipal Cooperation in Switzerland and the Trend towards Amalgamation

In Switzerland, the ongoing reforms of fiscal federalism put municipalities under increased fiscal stress. A majority of the municipalities had responded by increasing the cooperation with neighbouring municipalities over the last few years. Simultaneously, many discuss or are directly involved in a possible amalgamation project. Accordingly, the paper aimed at describing how cooperation has presently developed between Swiss municipalities, in order to illustrate the existing trend towards amalgamation. Current surveys helped us estimate the growing importance of inter-municipal arrangements together with the surge of amalgamations. A further goal was to investigate if cantonal financial incentives to municipal amalgamation essentially benefit the cantonal community, following the fiscal equivalence principle, or if they rather benefit amalgamating municipalities. In reality, equivalence does not exist. However, this may possibly be the condition to reduce inequality among amalgamating municipalities.

Eusociality and cooperation

The evolution of eusociality, here defined as the emergence of societies with reproductive division of labour and cooperative brood care, was first seen as a challenge to Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. Why should individuals permanently forgo direct reproduction to help other individuals to reproduce? Kin selection, the indirect transmission of genes through relatives, is the key process explaining the evolution of permanently nonreproductive helpers. However, in some taxa helpers delay reproduction until a breeding opportunity becomes available. Overall, eusociality evolved when ecological conditions promote stable associations of related individuals that benefit from jointly exploiting and defending common resources. High levels of cooperation and robust mechanisms of division of labour are found in many animal societies. However, conflicts among individuals are still frequent when group members that are not genetically identical compete over reproduction or resource allocation.

Evolutionary games on complex networks : the emergence and maintenance of cooperation

Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la théorie des jeux réside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles différents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des décisions qui influenceront toutes le résultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont été inventés afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrés dans d'importantes situations socio-économiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'êtres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expériences ont montré que les individus ont parfois tendance à coopérer dans des situations pour lesquelles la théorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mécanismes ont été invoqués pour tenter d'expliquer l'émergence de ce comportement coopératif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la répétition des interactions, la réputation ou encore l'appartenance à des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent été mentionnés. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montré que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopération même si le jeu est joué de manière anonyme et sans répétitions. L'étude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, étaient basés sur des structures régulières telles que des grilles à deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montré qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation géographique stricte, la coopération peut malgré tout émerger, pour autant que les schémas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de réseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux précurseurs de sociologues des années soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernières années qu'une grande partie des réseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et même quelques réseaux technologiques, possèdent des propriétés particulières, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes réguliers ou aléatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en général une distribution du degré relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossièrement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un réseau où tout individu se trouve relativement près de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une propriété également présente dans les graphes aléatoires mais absente des grilles régulières. Par contre, les réseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes aléatoires, une certaine structure de localité, mesurée par exemple par une quantité appelée le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le même esprit, plusieurs situations réelles de conflit en économie et sociologie ne sont pas bien décrites ni par des positions géographiquement fixes des individus en grilles régulières, ni par des graphes aléatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure même d'un réseau peut passablement influencer des phénomènes dynamiques tels que la manière qu'a une maladie de se répandre à travers une population, ou encore la façon dont des idées ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernière décennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement déplacée des graphes aléatoires et réguliers vers de meilleurs modèles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de découvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais réseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'êtres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopération supérieurs à ce qui est prescrit par la théorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par étudier un véritable réseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en évidence la manière dont il diffère de réseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je décris sa structure de communautés en tenant compte de l'intensité d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'évolution temporelle du réseau depuis son origine jusqu'à son état en 2006, date à laquelle l'étude a été effectuée, en suggérant également une vue effective du réseau par opposition à une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la théorie évolutionnaire des jeux avec des réseaux comprenant plusieurs modèles et le réseau de collaboration susmentionné, afin de déterminer les propriétés structurelles utiles à la promotion de la coopération et les mécanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en évidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber à la défection, les coopérateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'hétérogénéité des réseaux sociaux en termes de degré ainsi que la structure de communautés sous-jacente de ces mêmes réseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopération et sa stabilité dépendent non seulement du jeu joué, mais aussi des règles de la dynamique évolutionnaire utilisées et du calcul du bénéfice d'un individu.

Eusociality and cooperation.

The evolution of eusociality, here defined as the emergence of societies with reproductive division of labour and cooperative brood care, was first seen as a challenge to Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. Why should individuals permanently forgo direct reproduction to help other individuals to reproduce? Kin selection, the indirect transmission of genes through relatives, is the key process explaining the evolution of permanently nonreproductive helpers. However, in some taxa helpers delay reproduction until a breeding opportunity becomes available. Overall, eusociality evolved when ecological conditions promote stable associations of related individuals that benefit from jointly exploiting and defending common resources. High levels of cooperation and robust mechanisms of division of labour are found in many animal societies. However, conflicts among individuals are still frequent when group members that are not genetically identical compete over reproduction or resource allocation.

The rewards of cooperation: The effects of membership in European regulatory networks

Networks famously epitomize the shift from 'government' to 'governance' as governing structures for exercising control and coordination besides hierarchies and markets. Their distinctive features are their horizontality, the interdependence among member actors and an interactive decision-making style. Networks are expected to increase the problem-solving capacity of political systems in a context of growing social complexity, where political authority is increasingly fragmented across territorial and functional levels. However, very little attention has been given so far to another crucial implication of network governance - that is, the effects of networks on their members. To explore this important question, this article examines the effects of membership in European regulatory networks on two crucial attributes of member agencies, which are in charge of regulating finance, energy, telecommunications and competition: organisational growth and their regulatory powers. Panel analysis applied to data on 118 agencies during a ten-year period and semi-structured interviews provide mixed support regarding the expectation of organisational growth while strongly confirming the positive effect of networks on the increase of the regulatory powers attributed to member agencies.

The role of reputation, punishment and their interplay in human cooperation

The problem of how cooperation can evolve between individuals or entities with conflicting interests is central to biology as many of the major evolutionary transitions, from the first replicating molecules to human societies, have required solving this problem. There are many routes to cooperation but humans seem to be distinct from other species as they have more complex and diverse mechanisms, often due to their higher cognitive skills, allowing them to reap the benefits from living in groups. Among those mechanisms, the use of reputation or past experience with others as well as sanctioning mechanisms both seem to be of major importance. They have often been considered separately but the interaction between the two might provide new insights as to how punishment could have appeared as a means to enforce cooperation in early humans. In this thesis, I firstly use theoretical approaches from evolutionary game theory to investigate the evolution of punishment and cooperation through a reputation system based on punitive actions, and compare the efficacy of this system, in terms of cooperation achieved, with one based on cooperative actions. On the other hand, I use empirical approaches from economics to test, in real life, predictions from theoretical models but also to explore further conditions such as environmental variation, constrained memory, or even the scale of competition between individuals. Both approaches have allowed contributing to the understanding of how these factors affect reputation and punishment use, and ultimately how cooperation is achieved.

Associations of short-term particle and noise exposures with markers of cardiovascular and respiratory health among highway maintenance workers

BACKGROUND: Highway maintenance workers are constantly and simultaneously exposed to traffic-related particle and noise emissions, and both have been linked to increased cardiovascular morbidity and mortality in population-based epidemiology studies. OBJECTIVES: We aimed to investigate short-term health effects related to particle and noise exposure. METHODS: We monitored 18 maintenance workers, during as many as five 24-hour periods from a total of 50 observation days. We measured their exposure to fine particulate matter (PM2.5), ultrafine particles, noise, and the cardiopulmonary health endpoints: blood pressure, pro-inflammatory and pro-thrombotic markers in the blood, lung function and fractional exhaled nitric oxide (FeNO) measured approximately 15 hours post-work. Heart rate variability was assessed during a sleep period approximately 10 hours post-work. RESULTS: PM2.5 exposure was significantly associated with C-reactive protein and serum amyloid A, and negatively associated with tumor necrosis factor α. None of the particle metrics were significantly associated with von Willebrand factor or tissue factor expression. PM2.5 and work noise were associated with markers of increased heart rate variability, and with increased HF and LF power. Systolic and diastolic blood pressure on the following morning were significantly associated with noise exposure after work, and non-significantly associated with PM2.5. We observed no significant associations between any of the exposures and lung function or FeNO. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest that exposure to particles and noise during highway maintenance work might pose a cardiovascular health risk. Actions to reduce these exposures could lead to better health for this population of workers.

Long-Term Trends of HIV Type 1 Drug Resistance Prevalence among Antiretroviral Treatment-Experienced Patients in Switzerland.

Background. Accurate quantification of the prevalence of human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1) drug resistance in patients who are receiving antiretroviral therapy (ART) is difficult, and results from previous studies vary. We attempted to assess the prevalence and dynamics of resistance in a highly representative patient cohort from Switzerland. Methods. On the basis of genotypic resistance test results and clinical data, we grouped patients according to their risk of harboring resistant viruses. Estimates of resistance prevalence were calculated on the basis of either the proportion of individuals with a virologic failure or confirmed drug resistance (lower estimate) or the frequency-weighted average of risk group-specific probabilities for the presence of drug resistance mutations (upper estimate). Results. Lower and upper estimates of drug resistance prevalence in 8064 ART-exposed patients were 50% and 57% in 1999 and 37% and 45% in 2007, respectively. This decrease was driven by 2 mechanisms: loss to follow-up or death of high-risk patients exposed to mono- or dual-nucleoside reverse-transcriptase inhibitor therapy (lower estimates range from 72% to 75%) and continued enrollment of low-risk patients who were taking combination ART containing boosted protease inhibitors or nonnucleoside reverse-transcriptase inhibitors as first-line therapy (lower estimates range from 7% to 12%). A subset of 4184 participants (52%) had 1 study visit per year during 2002-2007. In this subset, lower and upper estimates increased from 45% to 49% and from 52% to 55%, respectively. Yearly increases in prevalence were becoming smaller in later years. Conclusions. Contrary to earlier predictions, in situations of free access to drugs, close monitoring, and rapid introduction of new potent therapies, the emergence of drug-resistant viruses can be minimized at the population level. Moreover, this study demonstrates the necessity of interpreting time trends in the context of evolving cohort populations.

Substance use among sportive adolescents in the French-speaking part of Switzerland

[Contents] Introduction. Objectives. Methodology. Results. Characteristics of the sample. Substance use (Psychoactive substances, Performance-enhancing substances). Profile of sportive adolescents using substances. Mixed substance use. Other factors related to substance use. Inactivity. Conclusions. References. Annexes. Annex 1. Questionnaire. Annex 2. Sample weighting procedure. Annex 3. Sports type.