Contextual effects on subjective national identity and nationalist vote in Catalonia

The important inflow of foreign population to western countries has boosted the study of acculturation processes among scholars in the last decades. By using the case of Catalonia, a receiver region of international and national migration since the fifties, this paper seeks to intersect a classic acculturation model and a newly reemerging literature in political science on contextual determinants on individual behavior. Does the context matters for understanding individual’s subjective national identity and, therefore, its voting behavior? Multilevel models show that environment matters. Percentage of Spain-born population in the town is statistically significant to account for variance in the subjective national identity and nationalist vote, even after controlling for age, sex, origin, language and left – right orientation and other contextual factors. This conclusion invites researchers not to underestimate the direct effect of the environment on individual outcomes such as feelings of belonging and vote orientation in contexts of rival identities.

Compositional data analysis of vote shares in the 2001 Australian Federal election

First application of compositional data analysis techniques to Australian election data

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Weighted approval voting

To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects all alternatives for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this voting procedure.

Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?

In this paper we analyze the effects of both tactical and programmatic politics on the inter-regional allocation of infrastructure investment. We use a panel of data for the Spanish electoral districts during the period 1964-2004 to estimate an equation where investment depends both on economic and political variables. The results show that tactical politics do matter since, after controlling for economic traits, the districts with more ‘Political power’ still receive more investment. These districts are those where the incumbents’ Vote margin of victory/ defeat in the past election is low, where the Marginal seat price is low, where there is Partisan alignment between the executives at the central and regional layers of government, and where there are Pivotal regional parties which are influential in the formation of the central executive. However, the results also show that programmatic politics matter, since inter-regional redistribution (measured as the elasticity of investment to per capita income) is shown to increase with the arrival of the Democracy and EU Funds, with Left governments, and to decrease the higher is the correlation between a measure of ‘Political power’ and per capita income.

Lobbying of Firms by Voters

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program. When votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible.

Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies

This paper addresses the puzzle of why legislation, even highly inefficient legislation, may pass with overwhelming majorities. We model a egislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by romising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because a ote in favor maintains the chance for membership in the minimum winning coalition in the future. The model thus generates situations in which egislators approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that enefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust: some institutional arrangements, such as super-majority rules or sequential voting, imit but do not eliminate the agenda setter's power to exploit the legislature, and other institutions such as secret voting do not limit his power.

Els catalans de sentiment nacional espanyol i el seu suport a la sobirania : Condicions i Drets.

L'objecte d'aquest treball final del Màster d'Anàlisi Política de la UOC (2008) és fer una reflexió basada en casos de diversos països de característiques similars a Catalunya, seguida de propostes estratègiques i de decisions a prendre sobre les condicions i seguretats que podrien fer decantar la població catalana de sentiment nacional espanyol cap a un vot favorable a la independència en un referèndum sobiranista.

Disseny i implementació de la base de dades : Sistema de votació ciutadana a nivell Europeu a través d'Internet

La Comunitat Europea ha encarregat el disseny i implementació d'una base de dades per a un futur sistema de votacions ciutadanes per Internet. Aquest projecte realitza una proposta del disseny de la base de dades segons els requeriments especificats, i la seva implementació en un sistema de gestió de bases de dades, que en aquest cas és l'ORACLE.

Disseny i implementació de la base de dades d'un sistema de votació ciutadana a nivell europeu a través d'Internet

Disseny d'una base de dades (BD), que els hi serveixi de magatzem d'informació per a la futura aplicació de votacions ciutadanes a través d'Internet, que volen implementar.

Marcador Social Web JEE

Lloc Web de participació col·laborativa, en la qual els usuaris poden enviar notícies publicades en altres llocs webs (diaris digitals, blocs, etc.), Així com votar i comentar les notícies publicades per altres usuaris, promovent notícies a la portada de la web.

Conditional compositional biplots: theory and application

The biplot has proved to be a powerful descriptive and analytical tool in many areasof applications of statistics. For compositional data the necessary theoreticaladaptation has been provided, with illustrative applications, by Aitchison (1990) andAitchison and Greenacre (2002). These papers were restricted to the interpretation ofsimple compositional data sets. In many situations the problem has to be described insome form of conditional modelling. For example, in a clinical trial where interest isin how patients’ steroid metabolite compositions may change as a result of differenttreatment regimes, interest is in relating the compositions after treatment to thecompositions before treatment and the nature of the treatments applied. To study thisthrough a biplot technique requires the development of some form of conditionalcompositional biplot. This is the purpose of this paper. We choose as a motivatingapplication an analysis of the 1992 US President ial Election, where interest may be inhow the three-part composition, the percentage division among the three candidates -Bush, Clinton and Perot - of the presidential vote in each state, depends on the ethniccomposition and on the urban-rural composition of the state. The methodology ofconditional compositional biplots is first developed and a detailed interpretation of the1992 US Presidential Election provided. We use a second application involving theconditional variability of tektite mineral compositions with respect to major oxidecompositions to demonstrate some hazards of simplistic interpretation of biplots.Finally we conjecture on further possible applications of conditional compositionalbiplots

An Inquiry into the use of illegal electoral practices and effects of political violence

This article investigates whether vote-buying and the instigation of violence in the disputed 2007 Kenyan elections were strategically motivated, and whether those affected by electoral violence changed their views towards ethno-politics and the use of violence. To answer these questions, a panel survey conducted before and after the elections is combined with external indicators of electoral violence. We find that political parties targeted vote-buying towards specific groups to weaken the support of their political rivals and to mobilize their own supporters. Furthermore, parties instigated violence strategically in areas where they were less likely to win. Although the victims of violence would prefer that parties are no longer allowed to organize in ethnic or religious lines, they are more likely to identify in ethnic terms, support the use of violence and avoid relying on the police to resolve disputes. The overall findings suggest an increased risk of electoral-violence reoccurring.

Electoral competition through issue selection

Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters' true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during the political campaign. This phenomenon, known as priming, should allow parties to pay less attention to the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (i) invest to attract voters with "better" policy proposals and (ii) choose a communication campaign to focus voter attention on specific issues. We identify novel feedbacks between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can backfire by constraining parties to invest more resources in all issues, including the ones they would otherwise intend to mute. We also identify under which conditions parties prefer to focus on their "historical issues" or to engage in issue stealing. Typically, the latter happens when priming effects are strong, and historical reputations differentiates parties less.