Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games

We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.

Improving the effort concept: a revision of the traditional approach in the context of controlled Dynamic Stochastic Environments

The objective of this paper is to re-evaluate the attitude to effort of a risk-averse decision-maker in an evolving environment. In the classic analysis, the space of efforts is generally discretized. More realistic, this new approach emploies a continuum of effort levels. The presence of multiple possible efforts and performance levels provides a better basis for explaining real economic phenomena. The traditional approach (see, Laffont, J. J. & Tirole, J., 1993, Salanie, B., 1997, Laffont, J.J. and Martimort, D, 2002, among others) does not take into account the potential effect of the system dynamics on the agent's behavior to effort over time. In the context of a Principal-agent relationship, not only the incentives of the Principal can determine the private agent to allocate a good effort, but also the evolution of the dynamic system. The incentives can be ineffective when the environment does not incite the agent to invest a good effort. This explains why, some effici

Simultaneous Nash bargaining with consistent beliefs

We propose and analyze a new solution concept, the R solution, for three-person, transferable utility, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two-party negotiations that would be the alternative to the grand coalition. These possibly probabilistic predictions are based on consistent beliefs. We analyze the properties of the R solution and compare it with the Shapley value and other concepts. The R solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the grand coalition can simply execute one of the three possible bilateral trades, the R solution is the most egalitarian selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known Industrial Organization models.

Open access press vs traditional university presses on Amazon

This study is a comparison AU Press with three other traditional (non-open access) Canadian university presses. The analysis is based on actual physical book sales on Amazon.com and Amazon.ca. Statistical methods include the sampling of the sales ranking of randomly selected books from each press. Results suggest that there is no significant difference in the ranking of printed books sold by AU Press in comparison with traditional university presses. However, AU Press, can demonstrate a significantly larger readership for its books as evidenced by thousands of downloads of the open electronic versions.

Revealing the dark side of traditional democracies in plurinational societies. The case of Catalonia and the Spanish “Estado de las Autonomías”

In this article, I firstly offer a synthesis of a brief set of analytical elements of the theory of democracy and federalism established in the recent debate which identify a number of flaws in the normative and institutional bases of plurinational democracies. It is necessary to overcome these flaws in order to achieve a true political and constitutional recognition and accommodation of the national pluralism of this kind of liberal democracies (section 1). Secondly, we will focus on the Spanish case of the “Estado de las Autonomías” taking into account the recent reform of the Catalan constitutional law (Estatut d’autonomia 2006) (section 2). A final section makes a number of concluding remarks relating the previously highlighted elements of the theory of democracy and federalism with the analysis of the Catalan case (section 3).

The development of intercultural awareness and changes of beliefs: the effects of studying abroad on learners of English as a second language

The present study examines the development of interculturality and changes of beliefs, by analyzing 106 compositions produced by 53 advanced level university students of translation studies at a university in Spain before and shortly after a stay-abroad (SA) period. The study draws on data collected at two different times: before (T1) and after the SA (T3). In addition, we compared the results with the writings produced by a control group of 10 native English speakers on SA too. Data were collected by means of a composition which tried to elicit the learners’ opinion about cultural habits maintenance. The results reveal significant changes between T1 and T3 in the degree of better attitudes and intercultural acquisition.

Neglected risks, financial innovation, and financial fragility

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.

Implementation, elimination of weakly dominated strategies and evolutionary dynamics

This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implementsocial choice functions in the traditional sense. Will agents actually playthe equilibrium assumed by the analysis? As an example, we study theconvergence and stability properties of Sj\"ostr\"om's (1994) mechanism, onthe assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibriumusing monotonic learning dynamics and also with fictitious play. Thismechanism implements most social choice functions in economic environmentsusing as a solution concept the iterated elimination of weakly dominatedstrategies (only one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies isneeded). There are, however, many sets of Nash equilibria whose payoffs maybe very different from those desired by the social choice function. Withmonotonic dynamics we show that many equilibria in all the sets ofequilibria we describe are the limit points of trajectories that havecompletely mixed initial conditions. The initial conditions that lead tothese equilibria need not be very close to the limiting point. Furthermore,even if the dynamics converge to the ``right'' set of equilibria, it stillcan converge to quite a poor outcome in welfare terms. With fictitious play,if the agents have completely mixed prior beliefs, beliefs and play convergeto the outcome the planner wants to implement.

Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?

We use subjects actions in modified dictator games to perform a within-subject classification ofindividuals into four different types of interdependent preferences: Selfish, Social Welfaremaximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects actions inthe same modified dictator games to test how much of the existent heterogeneity in others actions is known by subjects. We find that subjects with different interdependent preferences infact have different beliefs about others actions. In particular, Selfish individuals cannotconceive others being non-Selfish while Social Welfare maximizers are closest to the actualdistribution of others actions. We finally provide subjects with information on other subjects actions and re-classify individuals according to their (new) actions in the same modified dictatorgames. We find that social information does not affect Selfish individuals, but that individualswith interdependent preferences are more likely to change their behavior and tend to behavemore selfishly.

Neglected risks, financial innovation and financial fragility

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.

Portfolio choice beyond the traditional approach

This paper surveys asset allocation methods that extend the traditional approach. An important feature of the the traditional approach is that measures the risk and return tradeoff in terms of mean and variance of final wealth. However, there are also other important features that are not always made explicit in terms of investor s wealth, information, and horizon: The investor makes a single portfolio choice based only on the mean and variance of her final financial wealth and she knows the relevant parameters in that computation. First, the paper describes traditional portfolio choice based on four basic assumptions, while the rest of the sections extend those assumptions. Each section will describe the corresponding equilibrium implications in terms of portfolio advice and asset pricing.

Chemical variability in clays and pottery from a traditional cooking pot production village: Testing assumptions in Pereruela

This paper explores analytically the contemporary pottery-making community of Pereruela (north-west Spain) that produces cooking pots from a mixture of red clay and kaolin. Analyses by different techniques (XRF, NAA, XRD, SEM and petrography) showed an extremely high variability for cooking ware pottery produced in a single production centre, by the same technology and using local clays. The main source of chemical variation is related to the use of different red clays and the presence of non-normally distributed inclusions of monazite. These two factors induce a high chemical variability, not only in the output of a single production centre, but even in the paste of a single pot, to an extent to which chemical compositions from one"workshop", or even one"pot", could be classified as having different provenances. The implications for the chemical characterization and for provenance studies of archaeological ceramics are addressed.

Gènere i sexoafectivitat segons els adolescents dels usuaris dels centres oberts de la ciutat de Girona

L’objectiu d’aquest treball és conèixer la percepció que tenen els adolescents usuaris dels centres oberts de la ciutat de Girona sobre la sexualitat, l’afectivitat, quins rols de gènere se’n deriven i quines creences els sustenten. El disseny del treball ha estat qualitatiu, observacional, grups de discussió. Pel que fa als subjectes i al mètode, la població seleccionada ha estat de 33 adolescents i joves d’edats compreses entre els 12 i els 22 anys, usuaris de quatre centres oberts de Girona: el centre obert de Taialà, el Centre Obert de Font de la Pólvora (Onyar), el Centre Obert de Santa Eugènia i el Centre Obert del Barri Vell. Es van dur a terme grups de discussió d’una hora de duració sense descans amb d’entre 6 i 8 persones a partir d’un guió format per diversos mites i frases en relació a diversos temes (El festeig, la virginitat, la curiositat pel cos i per la sexualitat, els anticonceptius i les principals fonts d’informació) sobre les que havien de dir si estaven d’acord o no i qui creien que les deia (si un noi o una noia). Sobre els resultats del treball cal dir que s’ha observat la persistència d’algunes creences del model del amor romàntic en relació al rols de gènere com la definició de la dona vinculada a papers de cura i prevenció, una dona que té accés a la sexualitat però segueix estan catalogada per la vivència d’aquesta essent una persona “respectable” o una “puta”, que pren un rol més actiu en la iniciativa però no el l’assertivitat en les relacions; i un home, més impulsiu i sexual. En relació als comportaments sexuals destacar l’embaràs no desitjat com la principal preocupació de les relacions i el desconeixement/confusió entre els mètodes anticonceptius i de barrera disponibles a la xarxa de salut. Apareix la pornografia com a model emergent de relacions sexuals i models de relació entre homes i dones, en contraposició a altres fonts de informació i consulta tradicionals com els amics que segueixen essent la més significativa, la família, els serveis socials i educatius, i Internet. Com a conclusió cal dir que queda palesa la necessitat de incorporar una perspectiva de gènere en la formació curricular dels joves i el fet de seguir replantejant les millors estratègies d’intervenció per una concepció integradora de la sexualitat

Leverage and beliefs: Personal experience and risk taking in margin lending

What determines risk-bearing capacity and the amount of leverage in financial markets? Thispaper uses unique micro-data on collateralized lending contracts during a period of financialdistress to address this question. An investor syndicate speculating in English stocks wentbankrupt in 1772. Using hand-collected information from Dutch notarial archives, we examinechanges in lenders' behavior following exposure to potential (but not actual) losses. Before thedistress episode, financiers that lent to the ill-fated syndicate were indistinguishable from therest. Afterwards, they behaved differently: they lent with much higher haircuts. Only lendersexposed to the failed syndicate altered their behavior. The differential change is remarkable sincethe distress was public knowledge, and because none of the lenders suffered actual losses ? allfinanciers were repaid in full. Interest rates were also unaffected; the market balanced solelythrough changes in collateral requirements. Our findings are consistent with a heterogeneousbeliefs-interpretation of leverage. They also suggest that individual experience can modify thelevel of leverage in a market quickly.