81 resultados para standard-setting organization
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory in repeated contracts with moral hazard in financial intermediation. We use the database we have built containing the contracts signed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD between 1991 and 2003. Our framework is a standard setting of repeated moral hazard. After having controlled for the adverse selection component, we are able to prove that client reputation is the discrimination device according to which the bank fixes the amount of credit for the established clients. Our results unambiguously isolate the effect of memory in the bank's lending decisions.
Resumo:
Accounting regulation is a highly topical issue for listed companies in Europe. From 1 January 2005 all companies listed in the EU member states are required to produce financial reports compliant with international accounting standards. Financial reports will be comparable with each other only if full compliance with the international standards can be ensured. Historically, however, an enduring weakness of the international standard-setting regime has been its inability to enforce compliance with its standards. There is a danger that implementation and compliance will be variable across the adopting countries, and that deeply ingrained national reporting practices will persist. The purpose of this paper is to examine some distinctive elements of Spanish financial reporting practices. Spanish financial reporting by major companies demonstrates a tendency towards quite overt manipulation of the earnings figures. The research reported in the paper firstly identifies four common earnings manipulation practices, and then proceeds to examine their incidence in the financial statements of the IBEX-35 companies over a three year period.
Resumo:
Background Mesial temporal lobe epilepsy (MTLE) is the most common type of focal epilepsy in adults and can be successfully cured by surgery. One of the main complications of this surgery however is a decline in language abilities. The magnitude of this decline is related to the degree of language lateralization to the left hemisphere. Most fMRI paradigms used to determine language dominance in epileptic populations have used active language tasks. Sometimes, these paradigms are too complex and may result in patient underperformance. Only a few studies have used purely passive tasks, such as listening to standard speech. Methods In the present study we characterized language lateralization in patients with MTLE using a rapid and passive semantic language task. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to study 23 patients [12 with Left (LMTLE), 11 with Right mesial temporal lobe epilepsy (RMTLE)] and 19 healthy right-handed controls using a 6 minute long semantic task in which subjects passively listened to groups of sentences (SEN) and pseudo sentences (PSEN). A lateralization index (LI) was computed using a priori regions of interest of the temporal lobe. Results The LI for the significant contrasts produced activations for all participants in both temporal lobes. 81.8% of RMTLE patients and 79% of healthy individuals had a bilateral language representation for this particular task. However, 50% of LMTLE patients presented an atypical right hemispheric dominance in the LI. More importantly, the degree of right lateralization in LMTLE patients was correlated with the age of epilepsy onset. Conclusions The simple, rapid, non-collaboration dependent, passive task described in this study, produces a robust activation in the temporal lobe in both patients and controls and is capable of illustrating a pattern of atypical language organization for LMTLE patients. Furthermore, we observed that the atypical right-lateralization patterns in LMTLE patients was associated to earlier age at epilepsy onset. These results are in line with the idea that early onset of epileptic activity is associated to larger neuroplastic changes.
Resumo:
The filling length of an edge-circuit η in the Cayley 2-complex of a finite presentation of a group is the minimal integer length L such that there is a combinatorial null-homotopy of η down to a base point through loops of length at most L. We introduce similar notions in which the full-homotopy is not required to fix a base point, and in which the contracting loop is allowed to bifurcate. We exhibit a group in which the resulting filling invariants exhibit dramatically different behaviour to the standard notion of filling length. We also define the corresponding filling invariants for Riemannian manifolds and translate our results to this setting.
Resumo:
We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.
Resumo:
We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.
Resumo:
Aquest projecte es basa en la implantació del mòdul Oracle Service del producte de CRM d'Oracle. Aquest mòdul ens proporciona la funcionalitat necessària per gestionar tot allò relacionat amb el Servei d’Atenció a l'Usuari. Mirarem d'oferir una visió àmplia basada en el concepte de CRM i en les seves claus d’èxit, així com en la importància de l'organització i de la reestructuració empresarial que se'n deriva. Utilitzarem l'estratègia d’implantació ràpida que proporciona Oracle i descriurem la manera de parametritzar el mòdul Oracle Service amb la finalitat de portar l’estandard a la solució desitjada pel client de manera ràpida i eficaç.
Resumo:
Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada a la Universität Karlsruhe entre gener i maig del 2007. Les biblioteques d’estructures de dades defineixen interfícies i implementen algorismes i estructures de dades fonamentals. Un exemple n’és la Satandard Template Library (STL ), que forma part del llenguatge de programació C++. En el marc d’una tesi, s’està treballant per obtenir implementacions més eficients i/o versàtils d’alguns components de la STL. Per a fer-ho s’utilitzen tècniques de la enginyeria d’algorismes. En particular, s’integra el coneixement de la comunitat algorítmica i es té en consideració la tecnologia existent. L’acció durant l’estada s’ha emmarcat en el desenvolupament la Multi Core STL (MCSTL ). La MCSTL és una implementació paral•lela de la STL per a màquines multi-core. Les màquines multi-core són actualment l’únic tipus de màquina disponible al mercat. Per tant, tot i que el paral•lelisme obtingut no sigui òptim, és preferible a tenir els processadors esperant, ja que , la tendència és que el nombre de processadors per computador augmenti.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the delegation of contracting capacity in a moral hazard environment with sequential production in a project which involves a principal and two agents. The agent in charge of the nal production can obtain soft information about the other agent's effort choice by investing in monitoring. I investigate the circumstances under which it is optimal for the principal to use a centralized organization in which she designs the contracts with both agents or to use a decentralized organization in which she contracts only one agent, and delegates the power to contract the other agent. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized organization can be superior to a centralized organization. This is because the principal is better off under monitoring and the incentives for an agent to invest in monitoring can be higher in a decentralized organization. The circumstances under which this is true are related to the monitoring costs and the importance of each agent for production. The results explain the recent application of the design-build method in public procurement. Journal of Economic Literature Classi cation Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Decentralization of Contracting, Monitoring, Moral Hazard.
Resumo:
Treball de recerca realitzat per un alumne d'ensenyament secundari i guardonat amb un Premi CIRIT per fomentar l'esperit científic del Jovent l'any 2009. Aquest treball es planteja com un repte la necessitat de connexió a una xarxa de subministrament elèctric i d'aigua. L'objectiu del treball ha estat comprovar si, tan tècnicament com econòmica, es pot aconseguir l'autosuficiència d'una casa de muntanya del Vallès Oriental tot aprofitant els recursos que ens ofereix el medi, però sense haver de renunciar al nivell de vida al qual ens hem acostumat durant els darrers anys. Després d'una recollida de dades i valoració del consum energètic mínim que volem imposar, hem dissenyat una instal·lació capaç d'aprofitar les energies renovables de l'entorn i de satisfer les nostres necessitats. La instal·lació inclou plaques fotovoltaiques, col·lectors solars, cisternes per a la recollida d'aigua, bombes, etc. Finalment, s'inclou un pressupost d'aquesta instal·lació, que indica que els diners que caldria invertir són massa. Es demostra, doncs, que l'autosuficiència d'aquesta casa és tècnicament viable, però econòmicament inviable (o gens rendible).
Application of standard and refined heat balance integral methods to one-dimensional Stefan problems
Resumo:
The work in this paper concerns the study of conventional and refined heat balance integral methods for a number of phase change problems. These include standard test problems, both with one and two phase changes, which have exact solutions to enable us to test the accuracy of the approximate solutions. We also consider situations where no analytical solution is available and compare these to numerical solutions. It is popular to use a quadratic profile as an approximation of the temperature, but we show that a cubic profile, seldom considered in the literature, is far more accurate in most circumstances. In addition, the refined integral method can give greater improvement still and we develop a variation on this method which turns out to be optimal in some cases. We assess which integral method is better for various problems, showing that it is largely dependent on the specified boundary conditions.
Resumo:
In this paper we match the static disequilibrium unemployment model without frictions in the labor market and monopolistic competition with an infinite horizon model of growth. We compare the wages set at the firm, sector and national (centralized) levels, their unemployment rates and growth of the economic variables, for the Cobb-Douglas production function, in order to see under wich conditions the inverse U hypothesis between unemployment and centralization of wage bargain is confirmed. We also analyze, in the three wage setting systems, the effect of an increase in the monopoly power on employment and growth.
Resumo:
This paper addresses the puzzle of why legislation, even highly inefficient legislation, may pass with overwhelming majorities. We model a egislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by romising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because a ote in favor maintains the chance for membership in the minimum winning coalition in the future. The model thus generates situations in which egislators approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that enefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust: some institutional arrangements, such as super-majority rules or sequential voting, imit but do not eliminate the agenda setter's power to exploit the legislature, and other institutions such as secret voting do not limit his power.
Resumo:
In a recent paper Tishler and Milstein (2009) fi…nd that increased competition may increase aggregate R&D spending while market output decreases. Therefore, they obtain the surprising result that R&D spending is excessive when competition becomes intense. Their result is based on the standard linear demand function for differentiated products introduced by Bowley (1924) where decreased product differentiation is interpreted as more competitive pressure. In this paper I show that at an aggregate level this interpretation is problematic because equilibrium effects are dominated by a demand reduction effect. A slight modifi…cation of the standard demand function eliminates this effect. For the Tishler and Milstein (2009) setting it is shown that then increased competition increases both R&D spending and aggregate market output. Therefore, at least for consumers, more intense competition increases welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…fication Numbers: D43, L1, O3. Keywords: Oligopoly markets, Product differentiation, Competitive pressure.