The Security Council and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force: Legal, Normative, and Social Aspects.

Tal i com estableix la Carta de les Nacions Unides, el Consell de Seguretat determina l’existència d’una amenaça a la pau, un trencament de la pau o un acte d’agressió i decideix les mesures que han de fer-se servir per restaurar la pau i seguretat internacionals, també l’ús de la força. L’objectiu d’aquest article és explorar la legitimitat d’aquest ús de la força. Amb aquest objectiu, el text parteix d’una definició centrada en les seves dimensions legal, normativa i social. En segon lloc, s’analitzarà com aquestes dimensions estan representades als debats del Consell de Seguretat de la guerra d’Irak de 2003, un dels usos de la força més controvertits i que més debat ha generat als darrers anys. Finalment, l’anàlisi proposat permet treure algunes conclusions sobre les bases canviants de la legitimitat de l’ús de la força.

Cultural relativism in the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council

This Working Paper aims to offer an up-to-date list of cultural relativist players and arguments with respect to human rights, constituted by China, Viet Nam, Myanmar, Iran, Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, Malaysia and Cuba. This working paper argues that Indonesia, Iraq, Colombia and Mexico are not in the same cultural relativist group of states maintained by renowned scholars, notably Cristina Cerna and Dianne Otto. As such, apart from this form of cultural relativism based on the respect for the self-determination of indigenous peoples and communities, this working paper exposes two different categories of radical cultural relativism based on revolutionary discourse and/or radical Islamism, as well as targets the credibility on the latter two based on the information facilitated by the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council (HRC) Universal Periodic Review (UPR).

Sovereign Risk, Anonymous Markets, and the Effects of Globalization

The goal of this paper is to study the e¤ects of globalization on the workings of financial markets. We adopt a "technological" view of globalization, which consists of an exogenous reduction in the cost of shipping goods across di¤erent regions of the world. We model financial markets where agents anonymously trade securities issued by every other agent in the world. In the absence of frictions, we show how globalization creates trade opportunities among residents of different regions of the world, thereby raising welfare. In the presence of sovereign risk, however, there emerge two crucial interactions between trade among residents within a region and trade among residents of di¤erent regions. First, the more residents within a region trade with each other, the more they can trade with residents of other regions. Second, the possibility of trade with residents of other regions sometimes leads a government to not enforce payments by its residents, destroying trade opportunities among residents within the region. The net effect on welfare of this process of creation and destruction of trade opportunities is ambiguous. We argue that there are no policies governments can take to avoid the negative effects of globalization on trade among domestic residents. In a dynamic extension, we analyze how our results are a¤ected by reputational considerations.

Sovereign risk and secondary markets

Conventional wisdom views the problem of sovereign risk as one of insufficient penalties.Foreign creditors can only be repaid if the government enforces foreign debts. And this will onlyhappen if foreign creditors can effectively use the threat of imposing penalties to the country.Guided by this assessment of the problem, policy prescriptions to reduce sovereign risk havefocused on providing incentives for governments to enforce foreign debts. For instance, countriesmight want to favor increased trade ties and other forms of foreign dependence that make themvulnerable to foreign retaliation thereby increasing the costs of default penalties.

Serial defaults, serial profits: Returns to sovereign lending in Habsburg Spain, 1566-1600

Philip II of Spain accumulated debts equivalent to 60% of GDP. He also defaulted four times onhis short-term loans, thus becoming the first serial defaulter in history. Contrary to a commonview in the literature, we show that lending to the king was profitable even under worst-casescenario assumptions. Lenders maintained long-term relationships with the crown. Lossessustained during defaults were more than compensated by profits in normal times. Defaultswere not catastrophic events. In effect, short-term lending acted as an insurance mechanism,allowing the king to reduce his payments in harsh times in exchange for paying a premium intranquil periods. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects

In 2007, countries in the Euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and lowspreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising theirdeficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and,surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocatedfrom the private to the public sectors, reducing investment and deepening the recessions evenfurther. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debtcan be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discriminationand crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereigndebt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This providesincentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowingis limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productiveinvestment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead toself-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countriesin the Eurozone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level.

Principis deontològics dels professionals de la informació i la documentació: el codi de l'European Council of Information Associations (ECIA)

Qualsevol professió té, o hauria de tenir, un codi de regles ètiques que els seus membres normalment respecten i que fan servir com a guia en el cas que hagin de prendre decisions moralment difícils. Durant la reunió celebrada el novembre de 1998 a Lisboa, les associacions membres de l'ECIA van acordar adoptar un codi ètic que fos vàlid per als professionals de tots els països de la Unió Europea. Aquest codi no pot ser més que un enunciat de principis generals i deixa en mans de cada associació la facultat de desenvolupar-lo per tal que respongui a necessitats especials o nacionals. Un primer projecte fou presentat i discutit a la reunió de l'ECIA de març de 1999. La present revisió incorpora les modificacions proposades aleshores, elements provinents de codis d'altres organitzacions que foren presentats en la reunió a la consideració de l'autor, així com alguns aclariments.