Social security and democracy

Many political economic theories use and emphasize the process of votingin their explanation of the growth of Social Security, governmentspending, and other public policies. But is there an empirical connectionbetween democracy and Social Security program size or design? Using somenew international data sets to produce both country-panel econometricestimates as well as case studies of South American and southern Europeancountries, we find that Social Security policy varies according toeconomic and demographic factors, but that very different politicalhistories can result in the same Social Security policy. We find littlepartial effect of democracy on the size of Social Security budgets, onhow those budgets are allocated, or how economic and demographic factorsaffect Social Security. If there is any observed difference, democraciesspend a little less of their GDP on Social Security, grow their budgetsa bit more slowly, and cap their payroll tax more often, than doeconomically and demographically similar nondemocracies. Democracies andnondemocracies are equally likely to have benefit formulas inducingretirement and, conditional on GDP per capita, equally likely to induceretirement with a retirement test vs. an earnings test.

What is the european social model? an aproximation based on Spanish case

The public perception of the EU in Spain varies greatly. The most positive aspects of Spanish membership are associated with the consolidation of democracy, economic growth, the introduction of the euro, the growth in employment and structural and cohesion funds, the increase in the female participation rate, and the equal opportunities policies. The analysts are in favour of common objectives in the employment policy and multi-level government. The less positive aspects of the EU are the risks of losing social protection and loss of employment in some sectors due to mergers of multinationals and delocalization of companies towards Eastern Europe. The continuous demands for reform of the welfare state, the toughening of the conditions of access to social benefit and the reform of the labour market are also seen as problematic issues. Risks of competitive cuts and social dumping.

The Impact of democratization: a preliminary investigation on social policies and political violence in Latin America

The recent strides of democracy in Latin America have been associated to conflicting outcomes. The expectation that democracy would bring about peace and prosperity have been only partly satisfied. While political violence has been by and large eradicated from the sub-continent, poverty and social injustice still prevail and hold sway. Our study argues that democracy matters for inequality through the growing strength of center left and left parties and by making political leaders in general more responsive to the underprivileged. Furthermore, although the pension reforms recently enacted in the region generated overall regressive outcomes on income distribution, democratic countries still benefit from their political past: where democratic tradition was stronger, such outcomes have been milder. Democratic tradition and the specific ideological connotations of the parties in power, on the other hand, did not play an equally crucial role in securing lower levels of political violence: during the last wave of democratizations in Latin America, domestic peace was rather an outcome of political and social concessions to those in distress. In sum, together with other factors and especially economic ones, the reason why recent democratizations have provided domestic peace in most cases, but have been unable so far to solve the problem of poverty and inequality, is that democratic traditions in the subcontinent have been relatively weak and, more specifically, that this weakness has undermined the growth of left and progressive parties, acting as an obstacle to redistribution. Such weakness, on the other hand, has not prevented the drastic reduction of domestic political violence, since what mattered in this case was a combination of symbolic or material concessions and political agreements among powerful élites and counter-élites.

Ocio y participación social de las personas mayores. Evaluación de un programa de Animación Sociocultural y Desarrollo Comunitario en la ciudad de Granollers

En este artículo se presenta una investigación que evalúa un programa de ocio y participación social (“Implica-Acción”) dirigido a personas mayores de Granollers. Dicho programa se implementó durante 7 años (2001-2008) siendo evaluado su impacto a los dos años siguientes de su finalización. Utiliza como base de su actuación la metodología de la Animación Sociocultural desde la que se promueve un modelo de Desarrollo Comunitario basado en los principios de participación, corresponsabilidad y construcción de ciudadanía. El objetivo ha sido verificar cómo la aplicación de dicha metodología en un contexto determinado puede promover procesos de participación ciudadana y actividades de ocio desde la perspectiva de la democracia cultural, incrementando a su vez la iniciativa social en barrios, territorios y/o espacios comunitarios

Bowling for fascism: Social capital and the rise of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany, 1919-33

Social capital a dense network of associations facilitating cooperation within a community typically leads to positive political and economic outcomes, as demonstrated by a large literature following Putnam. A growing literature emphasizes the potentially "dark side" of social capital. This paper examines the role of social capital in the downfall of democracy in interwar Germany by analyzing Nazi party entry rates in a cross-section of towns and cities. Before the Nazi Party's triumphs at the ballot box, it built an extensive organizational structure, becoming a mass movement with nearly a million members by early 1933. We show that dense networks of civic associations such as bowling clubs, animal breeder associations, or choirs facilitated the rise of the Nazi Party. The effects are large: Towns with one standard deviation higher association density saw at least one-third faster growth in the strength of the Nazi Party. IV results based on 19th century measures of social capital reinforce our conclusions. In addition, all types of associations veteran associations and non-military clubs, "bridging" and "bonding" associations positively predict NS party entry. These results suggest that social capital in Weimar Germany aided the rise of the Nazi movement that ultimately destroyed Germany's first democracy.

The republican case for workplace democracy

The republican case for workplace democracy (WD) is presented and defended from two alternative means of ensuring freedom from arbitrary interference in the firmnamely, (a) the right to freely exit the firm and (b) workplace regulation. This paper shows, respectively, that costless exit is neither possible nor desirable in either perfect or imperfect labor markets, and that managerial discretion is both desirable and inevitable due to the incompleteness of employment contracts and labor legislation. The paper then shows that WD is necessary, from a republican standpoint, if workers" interests are to be adequately tracked in the exercise of managerial authority. Three important objections are finally addressed (i) that WD is redundant, (ii) that it is unnecessary provided that litigation and unionism can produce similar outcomes, and (iii) that it falls short of ensuring republican freedom compared to self-employment.