Study of the effect of oral health on physical condition of professional soccer players of the Football Club Barcelona

Objectives: The objective of this study was to evaluate the oral health status of professional soccer players of F.C. Barcelona and its relation to the incidence of sport lesions. Methods: Thirty professional soccer players were consecutively evaluated in the seasons 2003/4, 2004/5 and 2005/6. A research protocol to assess their oral health was developed. DMFT, Quigley & Hein plaque index (PI), Löe & Silness gingival index (GI), World Health Organization malocclusion index, Ramfjord teeth probing pocket depth (PPD), TMJ examination and history of dental trauma were recorded. All physical injuries sustained by players during the season were documented from F.C. Barcelona medical services. Results: Mean DMFT score was 5.7 (SD 4.1), Quigley & Hein plaque index score was 2.3 (SD 1.1), Löe & Silness gingival index was 1.1 (SD 0.8), and periodontal pocket depth was 1.9 mm (SD 0.3). Pearson"s analysis showed a significant correlation between PI and GI (p<0.01). Nine players (30%) presented bruxism - the same proportion of those with severe malocclusion. Seven (23.3%) players had suffered uncomplicated crown fractures. The mean incidence of physical injuries was 8 (SD 3.4) per player. PI and PPD showed a statistically significant correlation to muscle injuries (p<0.05). Conclusions: Soccer players, despite intensive medical follow-up, have significant oral health problems such as untreated caries, gingivitis or malocclusion, and suffer dental trauma as a result of sports activities. Their physical condition could also be associated to oral health

Análisis de la eficacia de los saques de esquina en la copa del mundo de fútbol 2010. Un intento de identificación de variables explicativas

In soccer, dead-ball moves are those in which the ball is returned to play from a stationary position following an interruption of play. The aim of this study was to analyse the effectiveness of one such dead-ball move, namely corner kicks, and to identify the key variables that determine the success of a shot or header following a corner, thereby enabling a model of successful corner kicks to be proposed. We recorded 554 corner kicks performed during the 2010 World Cup in South Africa and carried out a univariate, bivariate and multivariate analysis of the data. The results indicated that corners were of limited effectiveness in terms of the success of subsequent shots or headers. The analysis also revealed a series of variables that were significantly related to one another, and this enabled us to propose an explanatory model. Although this model had limited explanatory power, it nonetheless helps to understand the execution of corner kicks in practical terms.

Relació entre la funcionalitat i l’estat de seguretat amb un mateix i en l’acció motriu després de la readaptació a la lesió de LCA

Els jugadors de futbol sotmesos a una reconstrucció de LCA es veuen afectats per dos vessants. La primera és a nivell funcional de l’articulació del genoll, entenent aquesta com la capacitat que presenta el genoll a suportar pes, generar força, realitzar moviments i mantenir-se estable durant la practica esportiva (Mattacola et. al., 2002). La segona és a nivell psicològic en seguretat amb un mateix i en seguretat a l’acció motriu (Brewer et. al., 1993). Aquesta recerca presenta un estudi sobre la funcionalitat i l’estat psicològic de deu jugadors de futbol amateur un cop ja han estat rehabilitats i readaptats a la practica esportiva. L’objectiu de l’estudi és conèixer la relació entre les respostes funcionals i subjectives. El procés s’ha dividit en tres fases, la primera ha estat la selecció del grup i realització del qüestionari de creació pròpia QSCFEG 2014 (que permet extreure el nivell de seguretat en l’acció motriu i el nivell de seguretat amb un mateix), la segona fase ha consistit en passar les quatre proves del HOP Test i mesurar els perímetres i l’amplitud de moviment de les extremitats inferiors (per mesurar l’índex de simetria de les extremitat inferior i veure el nivell funcional) i la última la recopilació de dades, anàlisi dels resultats i extracció de conclusions. A l’analitzar el grup s’ha comprovat que tots els subjectes presenten un nivell funcional superior al paràmetre mínim, que segon Barber et. al (1990) és del 85%. Tot i això, la gran majoria presenten mancances a nivell psicològic, ja que han demostrat una puntuació baixa en relació als mínims establerts als nivells de seguretat motriu (40 punts mínim) i seguretat amb un mateix (20 punts mínim).

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

Nash equilibrium strategies in discrete-time finite-horizon dynamic games with risk-and effort-averse players

The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.

Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Two main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the literature: Boston and deferred acceptance (DA). The question arises on the ex-ante welfareimplications when the game is played by participants that vary in terms of their strategicsophistication. Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2011) have shown that the chances ofnaive participants getting into a good school are higher under the Boston mechanism thanunder DA, and some naive participants are actually better off. In this note we show thatthese results can be extended to show that, under the veil of ignorance, i.e. students not yetknowing their utility values, all naive students may prefer to adopt the Boston mechanism.

Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment

Much like cognitive abilities, emotional skills can have major effects on performance and economic outcomes. This paper studies the behavior of professionalsubjects involved in a dynamic competition in their own natural environment. Thesetting is a penalty shoot-out in soccer where two teams compete in a tournamentframework taking turns in a sequence of five penalty kicks each. As the kicking order is determined by the random outcome of a coin flip, the treatment and control groups are determined via explicit randomization. Therefore, absent any psychological effects, both teams should have the same probability of winning regardless of the kicking order. Yet, we find a systematic first-kicker advantage. Using data on 2,731 penalty kicks from 262 shoot-outs for a three decade period, we find that teams kicking first win the penalty shoot-out 60.5% of the time. A dynamic panel data analysis shows that the psychological mechanism underlying this result arises from the asymmetry in the partial score. As most kicks are scored, kicking first typically means having the opportunity to lead in the partial score, whereas kicking second typically means lagging in the score and having the opportunity to, at most, get even. Having a worse prospect than the opponent hinders subjects' performance.Further, we also find that professionals are self-aware of their own psychological effects. When a recent change in regulations gives winners of the coin toss the chance to choose the kicking order, they rationally react to it by systematically choosing to kick first. A survey of professional players reveals that when asked to explain why they prefer to kick first, they precisely identify the psychological mechanism for which we find empirical support in the data: they want to lead in the score inorder to put pressure on the opponent.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Dynamic Criteria: a Longitudinal Analysis of Professional Basketball Players" Outcomes

This paper describes the fluctuations of temporal criteria dynamics in the context of professional sport. Specifically, we try to verify the underlying deterministic patterns in the outcomes of professional basketball players. We use a longitudinal approach based on the analysis of the outcomes of 94 basketball players over ten years, covering practically players" entire career development. Time series were analyzed with techniques derived from nonlinear dynamical systems theory. These techniques analyze the underlying patterns in outcomes without previous shape assumptions (linear or nonlinear). These techniques are capable of detecting an intermediate situation between randomness and determinism, called chaos. So they are very useful for the study of dynamic criteria in organizations. We have found most players (88.30%) have a deterministic pattern in their outcomes, and most cases are chaotic (81.92%). Players with chaotic patterns have higher outcomes than players with linear patterns. Moreover, players with power forward and center positions achieve better results than other players. The high number of chaotic patterns found suggests caution when appraising individual outcomes, when coaches try to find the appropriate combination of players to design a competitive team, and other personnel decisions. Management efforts must be made to assume this uncertainty.