Scepticism Revisited

Liberalism claims that for a subject S to be justified in believing p, a proposition about the external world, on the basis of his senses it is not necessary to be antecedently justified in believing propositions as there is an external world. On the other hand, conservatism claims that to be justified in believing that p on the basis of one’s perception, one must have antecedent justification to believe that p. Intuitively, we are inclined to think that liberalism about the structure of perceptual justification fits better with our epistemic practices. We acknowledge that, although we cannot produce warrant for the background belief in the external world, our empirical beliefs can be perceptually justified. However, I am interested in arguing that conservatism is theoretically better supported than liberalism. The first reason to defend this is based on the fact that in embracing liberalism dogmatism is affected by pervasive problems. The second one comes from recognizing the strength of the argument based on the thesis that experience is theory-laden. But not all are advantages for conservatism. Conservatism is presupposed in contemporary formulations of scepticism through the requirement of prior justification for background assumptions, and this fact compels anti-sceptical conservatives to conceive a non-evidential form of warrant, entitlement, to contest the sceptical threat My main worry is that, although the path of entitlement has some prospects to succeed, this new notion of justification seems to be posed ad hoc for conservatives to solve the sceptical problem. These contents are organized along the three chapters. The result of chapter 1 is a pattern of sceptical argument formed by two premises: P1*, a conservative principle, and P2*. In chapter 2 and chapter 3 two anti-sceptical proposals against the argument sketched in chapter 1 are described. Chapter 2 is devoted to explain and assess a first anti-sceptical proposal that denies P1*: dogmatism. Moreover, in chapter 3, another anti-sceptical strategy is described (the route of entitlement) that contests scepticism denying the plausibility of P2*.

La il·lustració britànica

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada a la School of Modern Languages de la University of London, Gran Bretanya, entre agost i desembre del 2006. L’objectiu de la recerca consisteix en exposar el moviment empirista a través de Hume, Locke, Berkeley i altres filòsofs del segle XVIII. A més, s’analitza la filosofia escocesa del sentit comú, ja que va influenciar la filosofia catalana durant la “Renaixença”. El seu fundador, Thomas Reid, és conegut perquè va introduir una filosofia que no seguia l’escepticisme dels filòsofs citats. Sintetitzant, Hume va afirmar que l’experiència del sentit consisteix exclusivament en idees o impressions subjectives en la ment. Una resposta aquest “sistema ideal” va ser la filosofia del sentit comú que es va desenvolupar com a reacció a l’escepticisme de David Hume i altres filòsofs escocesos. Contra aquest “sistema ideal” la nova escola considera que l’experiència ordinària dels homes dona instintivament certes creences de la pròpia existència; de la existència dels objectes reals directament percebuts; i de “principis bàsics” basats en creences morals i religioses. Entre 1816 a 1870 la doctrina escocesa va ser adoptada com a filosofia oficial a França. Els seus principis van obtenir força a través de Víctor Cousin i de la traducció de les obres de Thomas Reid al francès per Jouffroy. Serà doncs, a partir de les traduccions franceses que Ramon Martí d’Eixalà va introduir a Catalunya la filosofia escocesa (no existeix cap prova que Martí d’Eixalà hagués conegut les versions angleses de les obres de Reid). En conclusió, el moviment escocès del sentit comú va influenciar l’escola catalana de filosofia.