EU foreign policy towards Georgia: just for energy?

The paper analyses how the EU foreign policy towards Georgia changed after the Rose Revolution, reaching greater levels of involvement and assistance. It is argued that the pro-western and reformist new government in Georgia triggered a new orientation in the EU foreign policy towards the country based on a logic of appropriateness, that is EU´s values, in addition to energy interests. Comparative analysis in the Southern-Caucasus and other Eastern-European countries shows how reformist and pro-EU governments receive more EU support and assistance. This does not mean that material interest do not play an important role. However, the EU seems to be coherent with its values when regarding the European neighbourhood.

Development and Democratization

Current studies, mainly focused on the postwar period, are split on the impact of development on democracy. Examining panel data that runs from early nineteenth century (a time where hardly any democracy was in place) to the end of the twentieth century, I show income matters positively for democratization – both after controlling for country and time effects and instrumenting for income. Since the effect of time partly varies over time, with some historical periods that are more favorable to democracy than others, I investigate the domestic variables (a decreasing marginal effect of growth in already developed economies) and international factors (the strategies of great powers toward small countries) generating that result. I finally probe the underlying processes through which income shapes political institutions, showing that development produces key changes in the distribution and nature of wealth that, in turn, make democracy a stable political outcome.

The Impact of democratization: a preliminary investigation on social policies and political violence in Latin America

The recent strides of democracy in Latin America have been associated to conflicting outcomes. The expectation that democracy would bring about peace and prosperity have been only partly satisfied. While political violence has been by and large eradicated from the sub-continent, poverty and social injustice still prevail and hold sway. Our study argues that democracy matters for inequality through the growing strength of center left and left parties and by making political leaders in general more responsive to the underprivileged. Furthermore, although the pension reforms recently enacted in the region generated overall regressive outcomes on income distribution, democratic countries still benefit from their political past: where democratic tradition was stronger, such outcomes have been milder. Democratic tradition and the specific ideological connotations of the parties in power, on the other hand, did not play an equally crucial role in securing lower levels of political violence: during the last wave of democratizations in Latin America, domestic peace was rather an outcome of political and social concessions to those in distress. In sum, together with other factors and especially economic ones, the reason why recent democratizations have provided domestic peace in most cases, but have been unable so far to solve the problem of poverty and inequality, is that democratic traditions in the subcontinent have been relatively weak and, more specifically, that this weakness has undermined the growth of left and progressive parties, acting as an obstacle to redistribution. Such weakness, on the other hand, has not prevented the drastic reduction of domestic political violence, since what mattered in this case was a combination of symbolic or material concessions and political agreements among powerful élites and counter-élites.

Conflictes i articulacions entre el dret local i el dret estatal a Madagascar

Aquesta recerca analitza els conflictes i les articulacions entre el dret local i el dret estatal que tenen lloc a les comunitats rurals de Madagascar a l’hora de resoldre els conflictes a l’àmbit local. L’anàlisi es porta a terme a partir d’un cas etnogràfic concret que permet descriure aquesta pluralitat jurídica. A la present memòria es descriu el treball realitzat en el recorregut de la investigació i dóna compte de la gestació del projecte fins a l’actualitat, moment en el qual la recerca es troba en el seu darrer punt de redacció de la tesi.

Els bara : una comunitat ramadera. El robatori de zebús a Madagascar

Els membres de l'ètnia bara de Madagascar, eminentment ramadera, viuen la seva cultura entorn d'un animal, el zebú, que no només és moneda de canvi i força per al transport, sinó tot un símbol per a aquest poble, i entorn del qual se segueixen tot un seguit de rituals. L'estudi es centra en el robatori de zebús, com a ritual de pas de l'edat jove a l'adulta. Tanmateix, el poble bara és en l'actualitat víctima d'un prejudici lamentable, ja que s'associa amb els lladres de bestiar en el context del problema social i econòmic actual de bandits armats i el robatori de l'espècie bovina a gran escala.Passant d'allò general a allò concret, l'estudi s'estructura de la següent manera: en primer lloc, es fa una aproximació inicial a l'ètnia bara i a la seva cultura lligada al seu ramat, fent esment al fenomen de la desforestació que devasta el país i que guarda certa relació amb l'objecte de recerca; posteriorment, es passa a explicar en què consisteix el robatori de zebús, les diverses motivacions que el provoquen i la seva evolució fins a l'actualitat.

Productivity Growth during the English Industrial Revolution: A Dual Approach

This paper presents new estimates of total factor productivity growth in Britain for the period 1770-1860. We use a dual technique recently popularized by Hsieh (1999), and argue that the estimates we derive from factor prices are of similar quality to quantity-based calculations. Our results provide further evidence, derived from this independent set of sources, that productivity growth during the British Industrial Revolution was relatively slow. During the years 1770-1800, TFP growth was close to zero, according to our estimates. The period 1800-1830 experienced an acceleration of productivity growth. The Crafts-Harley view of the Industrial Revolution is thus reinforced. We also consider alternative explanations of slow productivity growth, and reject the interpretation that focuses on the introduction of steam as a general purpose technology.

The Speed of the Financial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare’s Bank

Finance is important for development, yet the onset of modern economic growth in Britain lagged the British financial revolution by over a century. We present evidence from a new West-End London private bank to explain this delay. Hoare’s Bank loaned primarily to a highly select and well-born clientele, although it did not discriminate against “unknown” borrowers in the early 18th century. It could not extend credit more generally because of government restrictions (usury limits) and policies (frequent wars). Britain’s financial development could have aided growth substantially, had it not been for the rigidities and turmoil introduced by government interference.

The electric revolution in Latin America

Latin America participated in the electric revolution which profoundly transformed the most developed Western economies between 1880 and 1930. The electrification of Latin America began relatively soon after these economies, but it was incapable of keeping up with them. Public electric lighting was introduced early in the big Latin American cities, where electric trams started running at almost the same time as in Europe, and electricity spread rapidly in the mining sector. In the most advanced countries or areas in the region, the manufacturing industry substituted the steam engine with the electric motor, following the example of industry in the United States and Europe. Nevertheless, towards 1930 electricity consumption per inhabitant for Latin America was far below that of the more advanced economies, and only the Latin American countries which lead the process of electrification had reached levels of electric consumption that were similar to those of the late industrialised European countries. One of the most striking features of the electric revolution in Latin America is rooted precisely in the enormous national differences. These differences are indicative of the great economic inequalities existing in the heart of the region and these nations highly diverse capacity for economic modernisation.

Credit rationing and crowding out during the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare's Bank, 1702-1862

Crowding-out during the British Industrial Revolution has long been one of the leadingexplanations for slow growth during the Industrial Revolution, but little empirical evidence exists to support it. We argue that examinations of interest rates are fundamentally misguided, and that the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century private loan market balanced through quantity rationing. Using a unique set of observations on lending volume at a London goldsmith bank, Hoare s, we document the impact of wartime financing on private credit markets. We conclude that there is considerable evidence that government borrowing, especially during wartime, crowded out private credit.

Factor prices and productivity growth during the British Industrial Revolution

This paper presents new estimates of total factor productivity growth in Britain for the period1770 1860. We use the dual technique and argue that the estimates we derive from factorprices are of similar quality to quantity-based calculations. Our results provide further evidence,calculated on the basis of an independent set of sources, that productivity growth duringthe British Industrial Revolution was relatively slow. The Crafts Harley view of theIndustrial Revolution is thus reinforced. Our preferred estimates suggest a modest accelerationafter 1800.

Why England? Demand, growth and inequality during the Industrial Revolution

Why was England first? And why Europe? We present a probabilistic model that builds on big-push models by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), combined with hierarchical preferences. The interaction of exogenous demographic factors (in particular the English low-pressure variant of the European marriage pattern)and redistributive institutions such as the old Poor Law combined to make an Industrial Revolution more likely. Essentially, industrialization is the result of having a critical mass of consumers that is rich enough to afford (potentially) mass-produced goods. Our model is then calibrated to match the main characteristics of the English economy in 1750 and the observed transition until 1850.This allows us to address explicitly one of the key features of the British IndustrialRevolution unearthed by economic historians over the last three decades the slowness of productivity and output change. In our calibration, we find that the probability of Britain industrializing is 5 times larger than France s. Contrary to the recent argument by Pomeranz, China in the 18th century had essentially no chance to industrialize at all. This difference is decomposed into a demographic and a policy component, with the former being far more important than the latter.

Falling real wages during an industrial revolution

The Industrial Revolution was characterized by technologicalprogress and an increasing capital intensity. Why did real wages stagnateor fall in the beginning? I answer this question by modeling the IndustrialRevolution as the introduction of a relatively more capital intensiveproduction method in a standard neoclassical framework. I show that{\sl real wages fall in the beginning of an industrial revolution if andonly if technological progress in the relatively more capital intensivesector is relatively fast.}

Private borrowing during the financial revolution: Hoare’s Bank and its customers, 1702-1724

The financial revolution improved the British government s ability to borrow, andthus its ability to wage war. North andWeingast argued that it also permitted privateparties to borrow more cheaply and widely.We test these inferences with evidencefrom a London bank.We confirm that private bank credit was cheap in the earlyeighteenth century, but we argue that it was not available widely. Importantly, thegovernment reduced the usury rate in 1714, sharply reducing the circle of privateclients that could be served profitably.

The EU strategy of policy convergence with its neighbours in the area of trade

The objective of this paper is to ascertain whether the EU is seeking policy convergence with its neighbours in the area of trade by means of EU regulations. For each trade- related topic, we carried out a content analysis of the available official documents to identify the model of relations that has been established between the EU and four neighbouring countries (Morocco, Algeria, Ukraine and Georgia). The findings indicate that Europeanization is the EU strategy in most cases. However, adaptation to European regulations is only a long-term aim. When international regulations exist in a specific area, the EU usually demands the internationalization of a country¿s regulations as a first step. When there are no international regulations, the convergence process is established on the basis of bilaterally developed norms. EU strategy also varies depending on the country. Its relations with Algeria are the most particular. We conclude that the EU is promoting policy convergence with its neighbours in the area of trade mainly on the basis of international and bilaterally-developed regulations.