An evaluation of the life-cycle effects of minimum pensions on retirement behavior

In this paper we explore the effects of the minimum pension program on welfare andretirement in Spain. This is done with a stylized life-cycle model which provides a convenient analytical characterization of optimal behavior. We use data from the Spanish Social Security to estimate the behavioral parameters of the model and then simulate the changes induced by the minimum pension in aggregate retirement patterns. The impact is substantial: there is threefold increase in retirement at 60 (the age of first entitlement) with respect to the economy without minimum pensions, and total early retirement (before or at 60) is almost 50% larger.

Sustainable and equitable retirement in a life course perspective

We argue that long term sustainability of social security systems requires not only better equilibrium between the proportion in retirement and in employment but also an equitable distribution of the additional financial burden that aging inevitably will require. We examine how a proportional fixed ratios model of burden sharing between the aged and non-aged will establish inter-generational equity. Additionally we address the question of intra-generational equity and argue that the positive association between lifetime income and longevity requires more progressive financing of pensions and of care for the elderly.

Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns

[cat]El capital humà i, per tant, l’educació tenen un impacte en el benestar futur de la societat. En aquest treball s’estudia la connexió entre el suport dels votants per una educació pública i les preocupacions sobre la seva jubilació. Mostrem com els votants anticipen els efectes positius que té l’educació sobre les pensions futures. Així, el recolzament a un sistema educatiu públic s’incrementa si el sistema de pensions és més redistributiu, cosa que també es dóna entre els ciutadans que prefereixen una educació privada. També mostrem que el tipus d’equilibri “ends against the middle” pot ocórrer fins i tot quan la taxa impositiva preferida pels votants és decreixent amb la renda.

Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns

[cat]El capital humà i, per tant, l’educació tenen un impacte en el benestar futur de la societat. En aquest treball s’estudia la connexió entre el suport dels votants per una educació pública i les preocupacions sobre la seva jubilació. Mostrem com els votants anticipen els efectes positius que té l’educació sobre les pensions futures. Així, el recolzament a un sistema educatiu públic s’incrementa si el sistema de pensions és més redistributiu, cosa que també es dóna entre els ciutadans que prefereixen una educació privada. També mostrem que el tipus d’equilibri “ends against the middle” pot ocórrer fins i tot quan la taxa impositiva preferida pels votants és decreixent amb la renda.

Spanish pension system: population aging and immigration policy

There is a widespread consensus in the literature that, as consequence of the demographic transition, the current Spanish pension system will become unsustainable in the next decades. In this article we evaluate the sustainability of the contributory pensions' sub-system, taking into account the demographic projections by the Spanish Statistical Office (INE). A baseline scenario is projected as well as several reforms are simulated, focusing on: (i) selective immigration policy, (ii) changes in the way of setting the pensions and (iii) increase of the legal age of retirement up to 68. The main results are the following. The current system would not incur deficits until 2018, from then deficits will begin to be accumulated. The expenditure in pensions practically would double (from 8.3 % in 2005 to 17.2 % in 2050). A selective immigration policy -towards foreign young people- would help, but does not solve the long-term sustainability of the current system. A policy that combines a pensions' growth at a pace lower than productivity growth and extends the legal age of retirement up to 68 would give solvency to the system beyond 2029

Health care utilization among immigrants and native-born populations in 11 European countries. Results from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe

Objective: This study examines health care utilization of immigrants relative to the native-born populations aged 50 years and older in eleven European countries. Methods. We analyzed data from the Survey of Health Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) from 2004 for a sample of 27,444 individuals in 11 European countries. Negative Binomial regression was conducted to examine the difference in number of doctor visits, visits to General Practitioners (GPs), and hospital stays between immigrants and the native-born individuals. Results: We find evidence those immigrants above age 50 use health services on average more than the native-born populations with the same characteristics. Our models show immigrants have between 6% and 27% more expected visits to the doctor, GP or hospital stays when compared to native-born populations in a number of European countries. Discussion: Elderly immigrant populations might be using health services more intensively due to cultural reasons.

És sostenible el nostre sistema de pensions?

En el document es discuteix l’afirmació estàndard sobre que el sistema de pensions de jubilació públiques a Espanya –i, per extensió, els sistemes públics europeus- no és financerament viable. Es mostra perquè la pròpia interrogació retòrica que recull el títol és de fet una pregunta mal formulada (oblida coses essencials). I es posa de manifest que un sistema de pensions de jubilació privat –com els dels fons de pensions de les entitats financeres- sols és viable per a una minoria de la població: la de rendes més elevades

Prediction of the economic cost of individual long-term care in the Spanish population

Pensions together with savings and investments during active life are key elements of retirement planning. Motivation for personal choices about the standard of living, bequest and the replacement ratio of pension with respect to last salary income must be considered. This research contributes to the financial planning by helping to quantify long-term care economic needs. We estimate life expectancy from retirement age onwards. The economic cost of care per unit of service is linked to the expected time of needed care and the intensity of required services. The expected individual cost of long-term care from an onset of dependence is estimated separately for men and women. Assumptions on the mortality of the dependent people compared to the general population are introduced. Parameters defining eligibility for various forms of coverage by the universal public social care of the welfare system are addressed. The impact of the intensity of social services on individual predictions is assessed, and a partial coverage by standard private insurance products is also explored. Data were collected by the Spanish Institute of Statistics in two surveys conducted on the general Spanish population in 1999 and in 2008. Official mortality records and life table trends were used to create realistic scenarios for longevity. We find empirical evidence that the public long-term care system in Spain effectively mitigates the risk of incurring huge lifetime costs. We also find that the most vulnerable categories are citizens with moderate disabilities that do not qualify to obtain public social care support. In the Spanish case, the trends between 1999 and 2008 need to be further explored.

Les pensions compensatòries de l'article 84 del Codi de família de Catalunya: proposta per la seva determinació i estudi dels seus efectes pels cònjugues deutor i creditor

El present projecte pretén representar una aproximació complerta a l'estudi de la pensió compensatòria regulada a l'article 84 del Codi de Família. Aquesta aproximació s'ha fet des de dos punts de vista diferents: d'una banda, a través de la definició d'un marc teòric relatiu al context normatiu de la pensió compensatòria, a la seva determinació, pagament i potencial modificació i d'altra banda, un punt de vista més aplicat a través de l'estudi de la jurisprudència del Tribunal Superior de Justícia de Catalunya que ha interpretat i aplicat l'article 84 del Codi de Família en seu de crisis matrimonials. Els principals resultats d'aquesta recerca fan referència essencialment a incorporar les noves tendències socials, familiars i econòmiques, d'una banda, definir la naturalesa de la pensió compensatòria i de l'altra, determinar la quantitat, modificació i modalitat de pagament de la pensió compensatòria. Des del punt de vista de la naturalesa d'aquesta pensió, aquesta va néixer amb l'objectiu de protegir les dones que principalment eren les que duien a terme el treball domèstic i per tant sortien més perjudicades patrimonialment en els moments de crisi matrimonial. Tot i que avui dia la gran majoria de pensions compensatòries encara són pagades pels marits, cal adaptar la nova realitat social de les dones i per tant de les famílies a la concepció i rol que la pensió compensatòria té en el moments de crisis matrimonials. D'altra banda, el nou rol dels cònjuges en la família i la simetria – encara no completa, però – d'homes i dones al mercat laboral fa que aquest treball de recerca defensi que la determinació, modificació i modalitat de pagament de la pensió compensatòria s'hagi de fer tenint en compte les possibilitats professionals que els cònjuges tenien abans de contraure matrimoni per tal de poder valorar acuradament les decisions que han pres i les possibilitats a les quals han renunciat per tal d'invertir a la vida familiar.

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Social security, retirement, and the single-mindedness of the electorate

We propose a positive theory that is consistent with two important featuresof social security programs around the world: (1) they redistributeincome from young to old and (2) they induce retirement. We construct avoting model that includes a political campaign or debate prior to theelection. The model incorporates single-mindedness of the groups that donot work: while the workers divide their political capital between their age concerns and occupational concerns , the retired concentrate alltheir political capital to support their age group. In our model, theelderly end up getting transfers from the government (paid by the young)and distortionary labor income taxes induce the retirement of the elderly.In addition, our model predicts that occupational groups that work morewill tend to have more political power. The opposite is true fornon-occupational groups (such as the elderly). We provide some evidencethat supports these additional predictions.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Retirement incentives, individual heterogeneity and labour transitions of employed and unemployed workers

In this paper we analyze the sensitivity of the labour market decisions of workers close toretirement with respect to the incentives created by public regulations. We improve upon the extensiveprior literature on the effect of pension incentives on retirement in two ways. First, bymodeling the transitions between employment, unemployment and retirement in a simultaneousmanner, paying special attention to the transition from unemployment to retirement (which is particularlyimportant in Spain). Second, by considering the influence of unobserved heterogeneity inthe estimation of the effect of our (carefully constructed) incentive variables.Using administrative data, we find that, when properly defined, economic incentives have astrong impact on labour market decisions in Spain. Unemployment regulations are shown to be particularlyinfluential for retirement behaviour, along with the more traditional determinants linked tothe pension system. Pension variables also have a major bearing on both workers reemploymentdecisions and on the strategic actions of employers. The quantitative impact of the incentives, however,is greatly affected by the existence of unobserved heterogeneity among workers. Its omissionleads to sizable biases in the assessment of the sensitivity to economic incentives, a finding thathas clear consequences for the credibility of any model-based policy analysis. We confirm theimportance of this potential problem in one especially interesting instance: the reform of earlyretirement provisions undertaken in Spain in 2002. We use a difference-in-difference approach tomeasure the behavioural reaction to this change, finding a large overestimation when unobservedheterogeneity is not taken into account.

Gerontocracy, retirement, and social security

Why are the old politically successful? We build a simple interest group model in which political pressure is time-intensive, showing that in the political competitive equilibrium each group lobbies for government policies that lower their own value of time but the old do so to a greater extent and as a result are net gainers from the political process. What distinguishes the elderly from other political groups (and what makes them more succesful) is that they have lower labor productivity and/or that we are all likely to become elderly at some point, while we are relatively unlikely to change gender, race, sexual orientation, or even ocupation, The model has a variety of implications for the design of social security programs, which we test using data from the Social Security Administration. For example, the model predicts that social security programs with retirement incentives are larger and that the old are more "single-minded" in their politics, implications which we verify using cross-country government finance data and cross-country political participation surveys. Finally, we show that the forced savings programs intended to "reform" the social security system may increase the amount of intergenerational redistribution. As a model for evaluating policy reforms, ours has the attractive feature that reforms must be time time consistent from a political point of view rather than a public interest point of view.

Life-time redistribution effects of the Spanish public pension system

The paper analyses the inter and intragenerational redistribution effects ofthe public pensions system in Spain. This is achieved by first comparing the expected present value of life-time income transfers (PVT) and internalrates of return (IRR) of different population cohorts. Secondly, we study the intragenerational aspects of the Spanish public pensions by calculating PVTs the IRRs for workers of different categories, grouped by earnings, gender and marital status.The results obtained show the nature of the important intergenerational effects of the Social Security System in Spain. The oldest 1935 cohort clearlybenefits in relation to the youngest 1965 cohort. This is basically due to thegap between current wages and the contribution bases established in the 60s and 70s in Spain during the early stages of the Social Security System, and to the worsening shortfall in Social Security funding, combined with the longer of life expectancy.In addition, intragenerational effects exist by income levels. For contributors who pay between the minimum and the maximum allowable contribution bases, net transfers and rates of return are higher in actuarial terms for high incomecontributors. The social security `dealï is again more profitable for highincome individuals since they contribute at the maximum basis, with respect tolow income contributors at the minimum basis. This is due to the late entry and a higher survival rate for high income contributors.The system tends to favour women, given that they generally live longer than men and this factor is only partially offset by their lower wages. Married males, given the fact that they have longer life expectancy and leave a pension to their spouse, obtain higher present net transfers too than do single contributors.We close the paper with some comments on the slight impact and moderate effects of proposals for Social Security reform and on how these may change the previously observed redistribution effects.