Financement et autonomie fiscale de la Catalogne: Deux décénnies de problèmes non résolus

From the perspective of redistributing income fromrich to poor, equalizing intergovernmental grants are bound to have some perverse effects. For suchgrants, although transfering income from wealthy topoor on average, will inevitably result in some incometransfers from poor individuals who reside in wealthyjurisdictions to rich persons in generally poor areas.

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Estimating the effects of fiscal policy under the budget constraint

I reconsider the short-term effects of fiscal policy when both government spending and taxes are allowed to respond to the level of public debt. I embed the long-term government budget constraint in a VAR, and apply this common trends model to US quarterly data. The results overturn some widely held beliefs on fiscal policy effects. The main finding is that expansionary fiscal policy has contractionary effects on output and inflation. Ricardian effects may dominate when fiscal expansions are expected to be adjusted by future tax rises or spending cuts. The evidence supports RBC models with distortionary taxation. We can discard some alternative interpretations that are based on monetary policy reactions or supply-side effects.

Optimal fiscal policy in overlapping generations models

[eng] This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an explanation of why taxes on capital returns are high (around 35%) by analyzing the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with intergenerational redistribution. For this purpose, the government is modeled explicitly and can choose (and commit to) an optimal tax policy in order to maximize society's welfare. In an infinitely lived economy with heterogeneous agents, the long run optimal capital tax is zero. If heterogeneity is due to the existence of overlapping generations, this result in general is no longer true. I provide sufficient conditions for zero capital and labor taxes, and show that a general class of preferences, commonly used on the macro and public finance literature, violate these conditions. For a version of the model, calibrated to the US economy, the main results are: first, if the government is restricted to a set of instruments, the observed fiscal policy cannot be disregarded as sub optimal and capital taxes are positive and quantitatively relevant. Second, if the government can use age specific taxes for each generation, then the age profile capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset returns of the younger generations and taxing at higher rates the asset returns of the older ones.

The determinants of social spending in Spain (1880-1960): Is Lindert right?

[spa] El principal objetivo de este artículo se centra en analizar los orígenes del Estado de Bienestar en España a partir del marco teórico elaborado por Peter Lindert. Con este fin, se ofrece un análisis econométrico de los factores que determinaron la evolución del gasto social público en este país entre 1880 y 1960. Utilizando nueva evidencia cuantitativa, se construyó un panel de datos por quinquenios con el porcentaje de gasto social respecto al PIB desagregado en tres partidas: sanidad, seguridad social y beneficencia. El análisis permite insertar el caso español en el debate internacional y los resultados revelan interesantes singularidades de este país.

The determinants of social spending in Spain (1880-1960): Is Lindert right?

[spa] El principal objetivo de este artículo se centra en analizar los orígenes del Estado de Bienestar en España a partir del marco teórico elaborado por Peter Lindert. Con este fin, se ofrece un análisis econométrico de los factores que determinaron la evolución del gasto social público en este país entre 1880 y 1960. Utilizando nueva evidencia cuantitativa, se construyó un panel de datos por quinquenios con el porcentaje de gasto social respecto al PIB desagregado en tres partidas: sanidad, seguridad social y beneficencia. El análisis permite insertar el caso español en el debate internacional y los resultados revelan interesantes singularidades de este país.

Optimal fiscal policy in overlapping generations models

[eng] This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an explanation of why taxes on capital returns are high (around 35%) by analyzing the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with intergenerational redistribution. For this purpose, the government is modeled explicitly and can choose (and commit to) an optimal tax policy in order to maximize society's welfare. In an infinitely lived economy with heterogeneous agents, the long run optimal capital tax is zero. If heterogeneity is due to the existence of overlapping generations, this result in general is no longer true. I provide sufficient conditions for zero capital and labor taxes, and show that a general class of preferences, commonly used on the macro and public finance literature, violate these conditions. For a version of the model, calibrated to the US economy, the main results are: first, if the government is restricted to a set of instruments, the observed fiscal policy cannot be disregarded as sub optimal and capital taxes are positive and quantitatively relevant. Second, if the government can use age specific taxes for each generation, then the age profile capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset returns of the younger generations and taxing at higher rates the asset returns of the older ones.

Política i empresa, companyes de viatge La qüestió catalana Reportatge digital sobre l’empresariat català i l’encaix Catalunya- Espanya. Valoracions entorn el debat sobiranista

El debat sobiranista català està a l‟ordre del dia i actualment no passa desapercebut en cap mitjà de comunicació ni tampoc en el món polític, econòmic i empresarial. El fet d‟estar tan viva una temàtica així de delicada està ocasionant controvèrsies dins l‟empresariat català o que té la seva empresa ubicada a Catalunya perquè tot plegat provoca moltes incerteses, que són el pitjor enemic dels empresaris i dels negocis. Tanmateix, però, les informacions publicades o emeses venen marcades per les opinions polítiques i periodístiques, que es troben censurades en certa mesura perquè segueixen una determinada línia política i/o editorial. Per això s‟ha elaborat un reportatge digital focalitzat en l‟empresariat català i l‟encaix Catalunya-Espanya que pretén aportar noves valoracions entorn a aquest debat donant veu a empresaris i professionals, entre altres. La part teòrica de la memòria defineix els conceptes bàsics que són de forçat coneixement per realitzar una part pràctica que ha de ser entesa per qualsevol persona i que s‟ha de tractar amb la major objectivitat possible. Per això, el web http://laquestiocatalana.cat aporta un llenguatge planer i les eines bàsiques per donar a conèixer una matèria molt criticada per alguns sectors. A través d‟entrevistes a personatges rellevants, el web introdueix nous punts de vista sobre una qüestió marcada, a simple vista, per la preocupació d‟un possible boicot per part d‟Espanya. Però aquesta no sembla ser la principal inquietud dels entesos, i és que hi ha altres aspectes encara més alarmants que poden influir en l‟empresariat i que no són tractats per cap mitjà de comunicació convencional.

Economic ideas and economists in the Parliament in the liberal age: The attempt to implement a tax on incomes in Spain in 1868-1869

[spa] El estudio de la presencia de ideas económicas en los debates parlamentarios se ha convertido recientemente en un objeto importante dentro de la investigación sobre el proceso de institucionalización de la economía política en Europa Occidental en la llamada era liberal. En este marco general, este artículo se centra en el análisis de un caso de particular interés: La relevancia del pensamiento económico y el papel jugado por los economistas en los debates parlamentarios que siguieron a la creación de un nuevo impuesto que trataba de captar la renta personal, que fue lanzado por el ministro de Hacienda Laureano Figuerola en 1868. El artículo intenta demostrar, en primer lugar, que las ideas económicas jugaron efectivamente un papel relevante en las discusiones sobre el impuesto sobre la renta y que la presencia e influencia de los economistas en el Legislativo en este tiempo fue notable. En segundo lugar, que este fue un intento serio de modernizar la estructura fiscal española llevado a cabo por el Gobierno Provisional, el cual trató de diseñar un sistema impositivo capaz de fomentar el crecimiento económico del país.

Economic ideas and economists in the Parliament in the liberal age: The attempt to implement a tax on incomes in Spain in 1868-1869

[spa] El estudio de la presencia de ideas económicas en los debates parlamentarios se ha convertido recientemente en un objeto importante dentro de la investigación sobre el proceso de institucionalización de la economía política en Europa Occidental en la llamada era liberal. En este marco general, este artículo se centra en el análisis de un caso de particular interés: La relevancia del pensamiento económico y el papel jugado por los economistas en los debates parlamentarios que siguieron a la creación de un nuevo impuesto que trataba de captar la renta personal, que fue lanzado por el ministro de Hacienda Laureano Figuerola en 1868. El artículo intenta demostrar, en primer lugar, que las ideas económicas jugaron efectivamente un papel relevante en las discusiones sobre el impuesto sobre la renta y que la presencia e influencia de los economistas en el Legislativo en este tiempo fue notable. En segundo lugar, que este fue un intento serio de modernizar la estructura fiscal española llevado a cabo por el Gobierno Provisional, el cual trató de diseñar un sistema impositivo capaz de fomentar el crecimiento económico del país.

Las claves de la financiación autonómica: José V. Sevilla Segura, Crítica, Barcelona 2001

Reseña del libro 'Las claves de la financiación autonómica', de José V. Sevilla Segura (Barcelona: Crítica, 2001).

Riesgo de contaminar y tributos autómicos

El propósito del presente trabajo es el de ofrecer una puesta al día de la normativa vigente en lo relativo a aquellos impuestos autonómicos propios que inciden sobre las emisiones atmosféricas, las instalaciones que se califican como contaminantes y determinadas actividades consideradas de riesgo.

Personal redistribution and the regional allocation of public investment

How should an equity-motivated policy-marker allocate public capital (infrastructure) across regions. Should it aim at reducing interregional differences in per capita output, or at maximizing total output? Such a normative question is examined in a model where the policy-marker is exclusively concerned about personal inequality and has access to two policy instruments. (i) a personal tax-transfer system (taxation is distortionary), and (ii) the regional allocation of public investment. I show that the case for public investment as a significant instrument for interpersonal redistribution is rather weak. In the most favorable case, when the tax code is constrained to be uniform across regions, it is optimal to distort the allocation of public investment in favor of the poor regions, but only to a limited extent. The reason is that poor individuals are relatively more sensitive to public trans fers, which are maximized by allocating public investment efficiently. If! the tax code can vary across regions then the optimal policy may involve an allocation of public investment distorted in favor of the rich regions.

On the regional impact of public capital formation in Spain

The objective of this paper is to investigate, in a methodologically consistent manner, the regional effects of public capital formation and the possible existence of regional spillover effects in Spain. The empirical results are based on VAR estimates at both the aggregate and regional levels using output, employment, and private capital, as well as different measures of public capital. Empirical results suggest that public capital affects output positively at the aggregate level as well as in all but one region. For most regions, the effects of public capital installed in the region itself are important but the spillover effects induced from public capital installed elsewhere are also very important. In fact, the spillover effects account for over half of the total effects of public capital formation in Spain. Furthermore, these spillover effects have a clear geographical pattern in that they tend to be more important in the peripheral regions of the country. We also find that relative to their share of the Spanish output, the biggest beneficiaries of public capital formation are the largest regions in the country. This suggests that public capital formation has contributed to concentration of output in these regions. Finally, in terms of the effects of public capital formation on the private inputs we find that both private capital and employment are affected positively at the aggregate level as well as for most of the regions. Nevertheless, the effects on private capital seem to be larger. Also, the spillover effects are very important for private capital but not for employment. This reflects a great degree of dynamism and mobility in the capital markets as opposed to the labor markets.