Psychological aspects of the experiences of athletes at the Olympic Villages: issues and challenges

Article providing the athlete perspective on Olympic Villages. This article was published in the book entitled "Olympic Villages: a hundred years of urban planning and shared experiences" compiling the papers given at the 1997 International Symposium on International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB).

Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment

Much like cognitive abilities, emotional skills can have major effects on performance and economic outcomes. This paper studies the behavior of professionalsubjects involved in a dynamic competition in their own natural environment. Thesetting is a penalty shoot-out in soccer where two teams compete in a tournamentframework taking turns in a sequence of five penalty kicks each. As the kicking order is determined by the random outcome of a coin flip, the treatment and control groups are determined via explicit randomization. Therefore, absent any psychological effects, both teams should have the same probability of winning regardless of the kicking order. Yet, we find a systematic first-kicker advantage. Using data on 2,731 penalty kicks from 262 shoot-outs for a three decade period, we find that teams kicking first win the penalty shoot-out 60.5% of the time. A dynamic panel data analysis shows that the psychological mechanism underlying this result arises from the asymmetry in the partial score. As most kicks are scored, kicking first typically means having the opportunity to lead in the partial score, whereas kicking second typically means lagging in the score and having the opportunity to, at most, get even. Having a worse prospect than the opponent hinders subjects' performance.Further, we also find that professionals are self-aware of their own psychological effects. When a recent change in regulations gives winners of the coin toss the chance to choose the kicking order, they rationally react to it by systematically choosing to kick first. A survey of professional players reveals that when asked to explain why they prefer to kick first, they precisely identify the psychological mechanism for which we find empirical support in the data: they want to lead in the score inorder to put pressure on the opponent.

Moral hazard and dynamics of insider ownership stakes

In this paper, I analyze the ownership dynamics of N strategic risk-averse corporate insiders facing a moral hazard problem. A solution for the equilibrium share price and the dynamics of the aggregate insider stake is obtained in two cases: when agents can crediblycommit to an optimal ownership policy and when they cannot commit (time-consistent case). Inthe latter case, the aggregate stake gradually adjusts towards the competitive allocation. The speed of adjustment increases with N when outside investors are risk-averse, and does not depend on it when investors are risk-neutral. Predictions of the model are consistent with recent empirical findings.

A measure of group dissimilarity for psychological attributes

El funcionamiento y el rendimiento de los grupos en contextos diferentes están relacionados con el grado en que las características de los miembros son complementarias o suplementarias. El presente artículo describe un procedimiento para cuantificar el grado de disimilitud a nivel de grupo. A diferencia de la mayoría de técnicas existentes, el procedimiento que aquí se describe está normalizado y es invariante a los cambios de localización y escala. Por lo tanto, es posible comparar la disimilitud en escalas con diferente métrica y en grupos de distinto tamaño. La disimilitud está medida en términos relativos, independientemente de la posición que ocupan los individuos en la dimensión que mide la escala. Cuando no existe una justificación teórica para combinar las diversas propiedades medidas, se puede cuantificar la disimilitud para cada escala por separado. También es posible obtener las contribuciones diádicas e individuales respecto a la diversidad global y la asignada a cada escala. Las medidas descriptivas pueden ser complementadas con la significación estadística para, así, comparar los resultados obtenidos con distribuciones discretas de referencia, ya sean simétricas o asimétricas. Se ha elaborado un paquete en R que permite obtener los índices descriptivos y los valores p, además de contener las expresiones desarrolladas para simular una amplia variedad de distribuciones discretas de probabilidad.

Goal setting and monetary incentives: when large stakes are not enough

The aim of this paper is to test the effectiveness of wage-irrelevant goal setting policies in a laboratory environment. In our design, managers can assign a goal to their workers by setting a certain level of performance on the work task. We establish our theoretical conjectures by developing a model where assigned goals act as reference points to workers’ intrinsic motivation. Consistent with our model, we find that managers set goals which are challenging but attainable for an average-ability worker. Workers respond to these goals by increasing effort, performance and by decreasing on-the-job leisure activities with respect to the no-goal setting baseline. Finally, we study the interaction between goal setting and monetary rewards and find that goal setting is most effective when monetary incentives are strong. These results suggest that goal setting may produce intrinsic motivation and increase workers’ performance beyond what is achieved using solely monetary incentives.

A Theory of Representative Behavior in the Dictator Game

In this paper we present a model of representative behavior in the dictator game. Individuals have simultaneous and non-contradictory preferences over monetary payoffs, altruistic actions and equity concerns. We require that these behaviors must be aggregated and founded in principles of representativeness and empathy. The model results match closely the observed mean split and replicate other empirical regularities (for instance, higher stakes reduce the willingness to give). In addition, we connect representative behavior with an allocation rule built on psychological and behavioral arguments. An approach consistently neglected in this literature. Key words: Dictator Game, Behavioral Allocation Rules, Altruism, Equity Concerns, Empathy, Self-interest JEL classification: C91, D03, D63, D74.

És possible l'espai europeu d'educació superior?: l'ensenyament de la psicologia al Institute of Psychological Sciences de la Universitat de Leeds

L'Espai Europeu d'Educació Superior s'ha convertit en un repte, un desafiament que implica assolir una convergència de titulacions universitàries equivalents. Per això es requereix una modificació del tradicional ensenyament, en el nostre cas, de la psicologia. En aquest article s'examina l'ensenyament de la psicologia al Institute of Psychological Sciences de la Universitat de Leeds (metodologia docent; avaluació i contingut curricular)

Psychological and Family Factors Associated with Suicidal Ideation in Pre-Adolescents

To assess the psychological and family factors associated with suicidal ideation in preadolescent children, we studied a sample of 361 students, average age 9 years old. Twogroups were formed, on the basis of the presence (n = 34) or absence (n = 44) of suicidal ideation. Suicidal ideation was assessed with the Children’s Depression Inventory and the Children’s Depression Rating Scale-Revised. Depression, hopelessness, self-esteem, and perceived family environment were compared in both the suicidal ideation and the control groups. Students with suicidal ideation generally presented greater depressive symptoms and hopelessness, and lower self-esteem and family expressiveness, although there weredifferences both between sexes, and when the variable depression was controlled. Identifying these risk factors in pre-adolescents may have an impact on prevention of suicidal behavior at higher risk ages