Security, Privacy and Anonymity in Legal Distribution of Copyrighted Multimedia Content over Peer-to-Peer Networks: A Brief Overview

Peer-reviewed

Polyamine metabolism and signaling in plant abiotic stress protection

Polyamines (PAs) are small polycationic compounds present in all living organisms. Compelling evidences indicate a role for PAs in plant protection against stress. During the recent years, genetic, molecular and ‘omic’ approaches have been undertaken to unravel the role of PAs in stress signaling. Overall, results point to intricate relationships between PAs, stress hormone pathways and ROS signaling. Such cross-regulations condition stress signaling through the modulation of abscisic acid (ABA) and ROS amplification-loops. In this chapter we compile our recent findings which elucidate molecular mechanisms and signalingpathways by which PAs contribute to stress protection in plants.

Governance mechanisms in Spanish financial intermediaries

This paper examines the governance of Spanish Banks around two main issues. First, does a poor economic performance activate those governance interventions that favor the removal of executive directors and the merger of non-performing banks? And second, does the relationship between governance intervention and economic performance vary with the ownership form of the bank? Our results show that a bad performance does activate governance mechanisms in banks, although for the case of Savings Banks intervention is confined to a merger or acquisition. Nevertheless, the distinct ownership structure of Savings Banks does not fully protect non-performing banks from disappearing. Product-market competition compensates for those weak internal governance mechanisms that result from an ownership form which gives voice to several stakeholder groups.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.

Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative mechanisms in the EU decision making process

According to the account of the European Union (EU) decision making proposed in this paper, this is a bargaining process during which actors shift their policy positions with a view to reaching agreements on controversial issues.

Investor protection and income inequality: risk sharing vs risk taking

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, entrepreneurial risk taking and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more firms to undertake risky projects. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, investor protection raises income inequality to the extent that it fosters risk taking, while it reduces it for a given level of risk taking. Empirical evidence from a panel of forty-five countries spanning the period 1976-2000 supports the predictions of the model.

Canvi climàtic i malalties infeccioses

El canvi climàtic és una realitat i té efectes, tant directes com indirectes, sobre la salut. Són necessàries actuacions concertades per abordar aquestes qüestions de salut pública plantejades pel canvi climàtic, així com també disposar de mecanismes per predir quina serà la seva evolució. En aquest projecte es discuteixen les malalties infeccioses adquirides a través de diferents vies (artròpodes vectors, rosegadors, aigua, aliments i aire) en referència al canvi climàtic al món i també a Catalunya. Basat en una extensa revisió dels treballs i articles publicats, i de comentaris d’experts, es presenta una avaluació dels canvis de les malalties infeccioses: incidència, prevalença i distribució dels patògens i vehicles transmissors en un entorn canviant. En el present estudi es detallen alguns dels casos més estudiats i demostrats d’emergència i reemergència de brots infecciosos a diferents zones del planeta associats a certes variacions en les variables climàtiques. Degut a l’alt nivell d’incertesa sobre el ritme del canvi climàtic i el seu impacte sobre les malalties infeccioses, es proposa un seguit de línies de futur. Una de les propostes és crear una xarxa integrada de dades ambientals i epidemiològiques, amb capacitat de connectar aquestes dades amb la vigilància dels patògens, vectors i de la qualitat de l’aigua, entre d’altres factors. Aquestes anàlisis podrien orientar les estratègies d’actuació en un futur per la protecció de la salut de la població.

Mechanisms of agglomeration: Evidence from the location of new manufacturing firms in Spain

El objetivo de esta investigación es aportar evidencia sobre las fuentes de las economías de aglomeración para el caso español. De todas las maneras posibles que se han tomado en la literatura para medir las economías de aglomeración, nosotros lo analizamos a partir de las decisiones de localización de las empresas manufactureras. La literatura reciente ha puesto de relieve que el análisis basado en la disyuntiva localización / urbanización (relaciones dentro de un mismo sector) no es suficiente para entender las economías de aglomeración. Sin embargo, las relaciones entre los diferentes sectores sí resultan significativas al examinar por qué las empresas que pertenecen a diferentes sectores se localizan unas al lado de las otras. Con esto en mente, intentamos explicar que relaciones entre diferentes sectores pueden explicar coaglomeración. Para ello, nos centramos en aquellas relaciones entre sectores definidos a partir de los mecanismos de aglomeración de Marshall, es decir, labor market, input sharing y knowledge spillovers. Trabajamos con el labor market pooling en la medida en que los dos sectores utilizan los mismos trabajadores (clasificación de ocupaciones). Con el segundo mecanismo de Marshall, input sharing, introducimos cómo dos sectores tienen una relación de comprador / vendedor. Por último, nos referimos a dos sectores que utilizan las mismas tecnologías en cuanto a los knowledge spillovers. Con el fin de capturar todos los efectos de los mecanismos de aglomeracion en España, en esta investigación trabajamos con dos ámbitos geográficos, los municipios y los mercados de trabajo locales. La literatura existente nunca se ha puesto de acuerdo en cual es el ámbito geográfico en el que mejor trabajan los mecanismos Marshall, por lo que hemos cubierto todas las unidades geográficas potenciales.

Smooth multibidding mechanisms

We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects (possibly with the help of a social planner). Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is "smoother" in the sense that small variations in an agent's bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. This mechanism is shown to possess several interesting properties. Unlike in the study by Pérez Castrillo and Wettstein (2002), the equilibrium outcome is unique. Second, it ensures an equal sharing of the surplus that it induces. Finally, it enables reaching an outcome as close to effciency as is desired.

Enhancing MPLS QoS routing algorithms by using the network protection degree paradigm

IP based networks still do not have the required degree of reliability required by new multimedia services, achieving such reliability will be crucial in the success or failure of the new Internet generation. Most of existing schemes for QoS routing do not take into consideration parameters concerning the quality of the protection, such as packet loss or restoration time. In this paper, we define a new paradigm to develop new protection strategies for building reliable MPLS networks, based on what we have called the network protection degree (NPD). This NPD consists of an a priori evaluation, the failure sensibility degree (FSD), which provides the failure probability and an a posteriori evaluation, the failure impact degree (FID), to determine the impact on the network in case of failure. Having mathematical formulated these components, we point out the most relevant components. Experimental results demonstrate the benefits of the utilization of the NPD, when used to enhance some current QoS routing algorithms to offer a certain degree of protection