Defining the criteria for the evaluation of self-study multimedia language learning materials: do they facilitate or inhibit learner autonomy?

Durant els darrers anys, s’han publicat un gran nombre de materials multimèdia destinats a l’aprenentatge de llengües, la major part dels quals son CD-ROM dissenyats com a cursos per l’autoaprenentatge. Amb aquests materials, els alumnes poden treballar independentment sense l’assessorament d’un professor, i per aquest motiu s’ha afirmat que promouen i faciliten l’aprenentatge autònom. Aquesta relació, però, no es certa, com Phil Benson i Peter Voller 1997:10) han manifestat encertadament:(…) Such claims are often dubious, however, because of the limited range of options and roles offered to the learner. Nevertheless, technologies of education in the broadest sense can be considered to be either more or less supportive of autonomy. The question is what kind of criteria do we apply in evaluating them? En aquest article presentem una investigació conjunta on es defineixen els criteris que poden ser utilitzats per avaluar materials multimèdia en relació a la seva facilitat per permetre l’aprenentatge autònom. Aquests criteris son la base d’un qüestionari que s’ha emprat per avaluar una selecció de CD-ROM destinats a l’autoaprenentatge de llengües. La estructura d’aquest article és la següent: - Una introducció de l’estudi - Els criteris que s’han utilitzar per la creació del qüestionari - Els resultats generals de l’avaluació - Les conclusions que s’han extret i la seva importància pel disseny instructiu multimèdia

Energy policies for rural electrification: a social multi-criteria evaluation approach

In this article, a real-world case- study is presented with two general objectives: to give a clear and simple illustrative example of application of social multi-criteria evaluation (SMCE) in the field of rural renewable energy policies, and to help in understanding to what extent and under which circumstances solar energy is suitable for electrifying isolated farmhouses. In this sense, this study might offer public decision- makers some insight on the conditions that favour the diffusion of renewable energy, in order to help them to design more effective energy policies for rural communities.

Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation (SMCE)

The main argument developed here is the proposal of the concept of “Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation” (SMCE) as a possible useful framework for the application of social choice to the difficult policy problems of our Millennium, where, as stated by Funtowicz and Ravetz, “facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent”. This paper starts from the following main questions: 1. Why “Social” Multi-criteria Evaluation? 2. How such an approach should be developed? The foundations of SMCE are set up by referring to concepts coming from complex system theory and philosophy, such as reflexive complexity, post-normal science and incommensurability. To give some operational guidelines on the application of SMCE basic questions to be answered are: 1. How is it possible to deal with technical incommensurability? 2. How can we deal with the issue of social incommensurability? To answer these questions, by using theoretical considerations and lessons learned from realworld case studies, is the main objective of the present article.

The choice of banking firm: Are the interest rate a significant criteria?

The objective of the research is to know the factors that in Spain determine the choice of banking organization. The obtained results indicate that the dimension of the network of branches is the reason more valued. In spite of the increasing symmetry of the Spanish banking market, the preferences of the clients of the savings banks and those of the banks are not absolutely coincident, being the proximity - the main reason for election- much more valued by the former than by the latter. The existence of divergences in the preferences has also been detected according to the region and the typology of city of residence.

Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement

In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bank-ruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that financially less sound contractors are selected with higher probability in any feasible mechanism. Informational rents are associated with unsound financial situations. By selecting the financially weakest contractor, stronger price competition (auctions) may not only increase the probability of default but also expected rents. Thus, weak conditions are suffcient for auctions to be suboptimal. In particular, we show that pooling firms with higher assets may reduce the cost of procurement even when default is costless for the sponsor.

Competition for Procurement Shares

We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to par- ticipate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirma- tive action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement ex- penditures might be lower than under a classical auction format. Keywords: Procurement Auction, Affirmative Action. JEL: C72, D44, H57

Criteria for ICT-supported Higher Education Teachers Training

Aquest document pretén recollir aportacions teòriques sobre les pràctiques pedagògiques que incorporen i promouen l'ús de les TIC per tal de definir els criteris per al disseny de la formació dels professors d'educació superior en les TIC.

Refinement criteria for global illumination using convex funcions

In several computer graphics areas, a refinement criterion is often needed to decide whether to goon or to stop sampling a signal. When the sampled values are homogeneous enough, we assume thatthey represent the signal fairly well and we do not need further refinement, otherwise more samples arerequired, possibly with adaptive subdivision of the domain. For this purpose, a criterion which is verysensitive to variability is necessary. In this paper, we present a family of discrimination measures, thef-divergences, meeting this requirement. These convex functions have been well studied and successfullyapplied to image processing and several areas of engineering. Two applications to global illuminationare shown: oracles for hierarchical radiosity and criteria for adaptive refinement in ray-tracing. Weobtain significantly better results than with classic criteria, showing that f-divergences are worth furtherinvestigation in computer graphics. Also a discrimination measure based on entropy of the samples forrefinement in ray-tracing is introduced. The recursive decomposition of entropy provides us with a naturalmethod to deal with the adaptive subdivision of the sampling region

New delay-dependent stability criteria for uncertain neutral systems with mixed time-varying delays and nonlinear perturbations

The problem of stability analysis for a class of neutral systems with mixed time-varying neutral, discrete and distributed delays and nonlinear parameter perturbations is addressed. By introducing a novel Lyapunov-Krasovskii functional and combining the descriptor model transformation, the Leibniz-Newton formula, some free-weighting matrices, and a suitable change of variables, new sufficient conditions are established for the stability of the considered system, which are neutral-delay-dependent, discrete-delay-range dependent, and distributeddelay-dependent. The conditions are presented in terms of linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) and can be efficiently solved using convex programming techniques. Two numerical examples are given to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed method

Combining multivariate density forecasts using predictive criteria

This paper combines multivariate density forecasts of output growth, inflationand interest rates from a suite of models. An out-of-sample weighting scheme based onthe predictive likelihood as proposed by Eklund and Karlsson (2005) and Andersson andKarlsson (2007) is used to combine the models. Three classes of models are considered: aBayesian vector autoregression (BVAR), a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR)and a medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Using Australiandata, we find that, at short forecast horizons, the Bayesian VAR model is assignedthe most weight, while at intermediate and longer horizons the factor model is preferred.The DSGE model is assigned little weight at all horizons, a result that can be attributedto the DSGE model producing density forecasts that are very wide when compared withthe actual distribution of observations. While a density forecast evaluation exercise revealslittle formal evidence that the optimally combined densities are superior to those from thebest-performing individual model, or a simple equal-weighting scheme, this may be a resultof the short sample available.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Wild bids. Gambling for resurrection in procurement contracts

This paper analyzes the problem of abnormally low tenders in theprocurement process. Limited liability causes firms in a bad financialsituation to bid more aggressively than good firms in the procurementauction. Therefore, it is more likely that the winning firm is a firm infinancial difficulties with a high risk of bankruptcy. The paper analyzesthe different regulatory practices to face this problem with a specialemphasis on surety bonds used e.g. in the US. We characterize the optimalsurety bond and show that it does not coincide with the current USregulation. In particular we show that under a natural assumption the USregulation is too expensive and provides overinsurance to the problem ofabnormally low tenders.

Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.