A process approach to the utility for gambling

This paper argues that any specific utility or disutility for gamblingmust be excluded from expected utility because such a theory is consequentialwhile a pleasure or displeasure for gambling is a matter of process, notof consequences. A (dis)utility for gambling is modeled as a process utilitywhich monotonically combines with expected utility restricted to consequences.This allows for a process (dis)utility for gambling to be revealed. Asan illustration, the model shows how empirical observations in the Allaisparadox can reveal a process disutility of gambling. A more general modelof rational behavior combining processes and consequences is then proposedand discussed.

Banning Obsolete Weapons or Reshaping Perceptions of Military Utility: Discursive Dynamics in Weapons Prohibitions

The paper focuses on the argumentative process through which new international norms prohibiting the use of weapons causing severe civilian harm emerge. It examines the debate surrounding the use and usefulness of landmines and cluster munitions and traces the process through which NGOs change conceptions of military utility and effectiveness of certain weapons by highlighting their humanitarian problems and questioning their military value. By challenging military thinking on these issues, NGOs redefine the terms of the debate – from a commonplace practice, the use of such weapons becomes controversial and military decisions need to be justified. The argument-counterargument dynamic shifts the burden of proof of the necessity and safety of the weapons to the users. The process witnesses the ability of NGOs to influence debates on military issues despite their disadvantaged position in hard security issue areas. It also challenges realist assumptions that only weapons that are obsolete or low-cost force equalizers for weak actors can be banned. To the contrary, the paper shows that in the case of landmines and cluster munitions, defining the military (in)effectiveness of the weapons is part and parcel of the struggle for their prohibition.

A One-Shot Prisoners Dilemma with Procedural Utility

This article introduces a model of rationality that combines procedural utility over actions with consequential utility over payoffs. It applies the model to the Prisoners Dilemma and shows that empirically observed cooperative behaviors can be rationally explained by a procedural utility for cooperation. The model characterizes the situations in which cooperation emerges as a Nash equilibrium. When rational individuals are not solely concerned by the consequences of their behavior but also care for the process by which these consequences are obtained, there is no one single rational solution to a Prisoners Dilemma. Rational behavior depends on the payoffs at stake and on the procedural utility of individuals. In this manner, this model of procedural utility reflects how ethical considerations, social norms or emotions can transform a game of consequences.

Additional utility of insiders with imperfect dynamical information

In this paper we consider an insider with privileged information thatis affected by an independent noise vanishing as the revelation timeapproaches. At this time, information is available to every trader. Ourfinancial markets are based on Wiener space. In probabilistic terms weobtain an infinite dimensional extension of Jacod s theorem to covercases of progressive enlargement of filtrations. The application ofthis result gives the semimartingale decomposition of the originalWiener process under the progressively enlarged filtration. As anapplication we prove that if the rate at which the additional noise inthe insider s information vanishes is slow enough then there is noarbitrage and the additional utility of the insider is finite.

A one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma with procedural utility

This article introduces a model of rationality that combines procedural utility over actions with consequential utility over payoffs. It applies the model to the Prisoners Dilemma and shows that empirically observed cooperative behaviors can be rationally explained by a procedural utility for cooperation. The model characterizes the situations in which cooperation emerges as a Nash equilibrium. When rational individuals are not solely concerned by the consequences of their behavior but also care for the process by which these consequences are obtained, there is no one single rational solution to a Prisoners Dilemma. Rational behavior depends on the payoffs at stake and on the procedural utility of individuals. In this manner, this model of procedural utility reflects how ethical considerations, social norms or emotions can transform a game of consequences.

Approximation to the theory of affinities to manage the problems of the groupping process

New economic and enterprise needs have increased the interest and utility of the methods of the grouping process based on the theory of uncertainty. A fuzzy grouping (clustering) process is a key phase of knowledge acquisition and reduction complexity regarding different groups of objects. Here, we considered some elements of the theory of affinities and uncertain pretopology that form a significant support tool for a fuzzy clustering process. A Galois lattice is introduced in order to provide a clearer vision of the results. We made an homogeneous grouping process of the economic regions of Russian Federation and Ukraine. The obtained results gave us a large panorama of a regional economic situation of two countries as well as the key guidelines for the decision-making. The mathematical method is very sensible to any changes the regional economy can have. We gave an alternative method of the grouping process under uncertainty.

Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints

In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.

Increasing quasiconcave production and utility functions with diminishing returns to scale

In microeconomic analysis functions with diminishing returns to scale (DRS) have frequently been employed. Various properties of increasing quasiconcave aggregator functions with DRS are derived. Furthermore duality in the classical sense as well as of a new type is studied for such aggregator functions in production and consumer theory. In particular representation theorems for direct and indirect aggregator functions are obtained. These involve only small sets of generator functions. The study is carried out in the contemporary framework of abstract convexity and abstract concavity.

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative mechanisms in the EU decision making process

According to the account of the European Union (EU) decision making proposed in this paper, this is a bargaining process during which actors shift their policy positions with a view to reaching agreements on controversial issues.

From creative ideas to new emerging ventures: the process of identification and exploitation among finnish design entrepreneurs

This study focuses on identification and exploitation processes among Finnish design entrepreneurs (i.e. selfemployed industrial designers). More specifically, this study strives to find out what design entrepreneurs do when they create new ventures, how venture ideas are identified and how entrepreneurial processes are organized to identify and exploit such venture ideas in the given industrial context. Indeed, what does educated and creative individuals do when they decide to create new ventures, where do the venture ideas originally come from, and moreover, how are venture ideas identified and developed into viable business concepts that are introduced on the markets? From an academic perspective: there is a need to increase our understanding of the interaction between the identification and exploitation of emerging ventures, in this and other empirical contexts. Rather than assuming that venture ideas are constant in time, this study examines how emerging ideas are adjusted to enable exploitation in dynamic market settings. It builds on the insights from previous entrepreneurship process research. The interpretations from the theoretical discussion build on the assumption that the subprocesses of identification and exploitation interact, and moreover, they are closely entwined with each other (e.g. McKelvie & Wiklund, 2004, Davidsson, 2005). This explanation challenges the common assumption that entrepreneurs would first identify venture ideas and then exploit them (e.g. Shane, 2003). The assumption is that exploitation influences identification, just as identification influences exploitation. Based on interviews with design entrepreneurs and external actors (e.g. potential customers, suppliers and collaborators), it appears as identification and exploitation of venture ideas are carried out in close interaction between a number of actors, rather than alone by entrepreneurs. Due to their available resources, design entrepreneurs have a desire to focus on identification related activities and to find external actors that take care of exploitation related activities. The involvement of external actors may have a direct impact on decisionmaking and various activities along the processes of identification and exploitation, which is something that previous research does not particularly emphasize. For instance, Bhave (1994) suggests both operative and strategic feedback from the market, but does not explain how external parties are actually involved in the decisionmaking, and in carrying out various activities along the entrepreneurial process.

The Monetary policy rules and the inflation process in open emerging

This paper has three objectives. First, it aims at revealing the logic of interest rate setting pursued by monetary authorities of 12 new EU members. Using estimation of an augmented Taylor rule, we find that this setting was not always consistent with the official monetary policy. Second, we seek to shed light on the inflation process of these countries. To this end, we carry out an estimation of an open economy Philips curve (PC). Our main finding is that inflation rates were not only driven by backward persistency but also held a forward-looking component. Finally, we assess the viability of existing monetary arrangements for price stability. The analysis of the conditional inflation variance obtained from GARCH estimation of PC is used for this purpose. We conclude that inflation targeting is preferable to an exchange rate peg because it allowed decreasing the inflation rate and anchored its volatility.