EU “actorness” in International Relations: The Non-Proliferation Policy of the EU in the Southern Mediterranean

El punt de partida d'aquesta investigació és una retòrica molt utilitzada que la UE és un actor global. En vista d'això, la no proliferació de la política comunitària al sud de la Mediterrània s'examina. L'estudi es realitza sobre la base de la conceptualització de la UE "actorness" ia través d'alguns criteris (context extern, l'evolució de l'aparell de política exterior de la UE, la Unió Europea l'auto-presentació i la percepció de tercers, la consistència i la disponibilitat d'instruments de política i accions concretes) que involucren tant factors ideacionals i materials, d'acord amb el "pluralisme metodològic". Aquest marc conceptual va ajudar a avaluar la no proliferació de la política comunitària en aquesta regió en particular on la UE té interessos i bones raons per actuar. Cada un dels criteris de manifest els avantatges i desavantatges de la UE "actorness" en aquest camp seleccionat i la caixa. Aquest document sosté que la no proliferació "actorness" de la UE a la regió del sud de la Mediterrània ha estat limitat a causa d'una varietat de raons.

Personal redistribution and the regional allocation of public investment

How should an equity-motivated policy-marker allocate public capital (infrastructure) across regions. Should it aim at reducing interregional differences in per capita output, or at maximizing total output? Such a normative question is examined in a model where the policy-marker is exclusively concerned about personal inequality and has access to two policy instruments. (i) a personal tax-transfer system (taxation is distortionary), and (ii) the regional allocation of public investment. I show that the case for public investment as a significant instrument for interpersonal redistribution is rather weak. In the most favorable case, when the tax code is constrained to be uniform across regions, it is optimal to distort the allocation of public investment in favor of the poor regions, but only to a limited extent. The reason is that poor individuals are relatively more sensitive to public trans fers, which are maximized by allocating public investment efficiently. If! the tax code can vary across regions then the optimal policy may involve an allocation of public investment distorted in favor of the rich regions.

The role of central bank operating procedures in an economy with productive government spending

The choice of either the rate of monetary growth or the nominal interest rate as the instrument controlled by monetary authorities has both positive and normative implications for economic performance. We reexamine some of the issues related to the choice of the monetary policy instrument in a dynamic general equilibrium model exhibiting endogenous growth in which a fraction of productive government spending is financed by means of issuing currency. When we evaluate the performance of the two monetary instruments attending to the fluctuations of endogenous variables, we find that the inflation rate is less volatile under nominal interest rate targeting. Concerning the fluctuations of consumption and of the growth rate, both monetary policy instruments lead to statistically equivalent volatilities. Finally, we show that none of these two targeting procedures displays unambiguously higher welfare levels.

A never-ending debate: Demand versus supply water policies. A CGE analysis for Catalonia

Water scarcity is a long-standing problem in Catalonia, as there are significant differences in the spatial and temporal distribution of water through the territory. There has consequently been a debate for many years about whether the solution to water scarcity must be considered in terms of efficiency or equity, the role that the public sector must play and the role that market-based instruments should play in water management. The aim of this paper is to use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to analyze the advantages and disadvantages associated with different policy instruments, from both a supply and a demand viewpoint, which can be applied to water management in Catalonia. We also introduce an ecological sector in our CGE model, allowing us to analyze the environmental impact of the alternative policies simulated. The calibration of the exogenous variables of the CGE model is performed by using a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the Catalan economy with 2001 data. The results suggest that taking into account the principle of sustainability of the resource, the policy debate between supply and demand in water policies is obsolete, and a new combination of policies is required to respect the different values associated with water. Keywords: Water Policies; Computable General Equilibrium Model; Economic Effects; Environmental Effects.

Forest fires: Evaluation of government intervention measures

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between government measures, volunteer participation, climate variables and forest fires. A number of studies have related forest fires to causes of ignition, to fire history in one area, to the type of vegetation and weathercharacteristics or to community institutions, but there is little research on the relation between fire production and government prevention and extinction measures from a policy evaluation perspective.An observational approach is first applied to select forest fires in the north east of Spain. Taking a selection of fires with a certain size, a multiple regression analysis is conducted to find significant relations between policy instruments under the control of the government and the number of hectares burn in each case, controlling at the same time the effect of weather conditions and other context variables. The paper brings evidence on the effects of simultaneity and the relevance of recurring to army soldiers in specific days with extraordinary high simultaneity. The analysis also brings light on the effectiveness of twopreventive policies and of helicopters for extinction tasks.

Tax reforms and inequality: theoretical and empirical implications

In this paper we examine the effect of tax policy on the relationship between inequality and growth in a two-sector non-scale model. With non-scale models, the longrun equilibrium growth rate is determined by technological parameters and it is independent of macroeconomic policy instruments. However, this fact does not imply that fiscal policy is unimportant for long-run economic performance. It indeed has important effects on the different levels of key economic variables such as per capita stock of capital and output. Hence, although the economy grows at the same rate across steady states, the bases for economic growth may be different.The model has three essential features. First, we explicitly model skill accumulation, second, we introduce government finance into the production function, and we introduce an income tax to mirror the fiscal events of the 1980¿s and 1990¿s in the US. The fact that the non-scale model is associated with higher order dynamics enables it to replicate the distinctly non-linear nature of inequality in the US with relative ease. The results derived in this paper attract attention to the fact that the non-scale growth model does not only fit the US data well for the long-run (Jones, 1995b) but also that it possesses unique abilities in explaining short term fluctuations of the economy. It is shown that during transition the response of the relative simulated wage to changes in the tax code is rather non-monotonic, quite in accordance to the US inequality pattern in the 1980¿s and early 1990¿s.More specifically, we have analyzed in detail the dynamics following the simulation of an isolated tax decrease and an isolated tax increase. So, after a tax decrease the skill premium follows a lower trajectory than the one it would follow without a tax decrease. Hence we are able to reduce inequality for several periods after the fiscal shock. On the contrary, following a tax increase, the evolution of the skill premium remains above the trajectory carried on by the skill premium under a situation with no tax increase. Consequently, a tax increase would imply a higher level of inequality in the economy

Tax reforms and inequality: theoretical and empirical implications

In this paper we examine the effect of tax policy on the relationship between inequality and growth in a two-sector non-scale model. With non-scale models, the longrun equilibrium growth rate is determined by technological parameters and it is independent of macroeconomic policy instruments. However, this fact does not imply that fiscal policy is unimportant for long-run economic performance. It indeed has important effects on the different levels of key economic variables such as per capita stock of capital and output. Hence, although the economy grows at the same rate across steady states, the bases for economic growth may be different.The model has three essential features. First, we explicitly model skill accumulation, second, we introduce government finance into the production function, and we introduce an income tax to mirror the fiscal events of the 1980¿s and 1990¿s in the US. The fact that the non-scale model is associated with higher order dynamics enables it to replicate the distinctly non-linear nature of inequality in the US with relative ease. The results derived in this paper attract attention to the fact that the non-scale growth model does not only fit the US data well for the long-run (Jones, 1995b) but also that it possesses unique abilities in explaining short term fluctuations of the economy. It is shown that during transition the response of the relative simulated wage to changes in the tax code is rather non-monotonic, quite in accordance to the US inequality pattern in the 1980¿s and early 1990¿s.More specifically, we have analyzed in detail the dynamics following the simulation of an isolated tax decrease and an isolated tax increase. So, after a tax decrease the skill premium follows a lower trajectory than the one it would follow without a tax decrease. Hence we are able to reduce inequality for several periods after the fiscal shock. On the contrary, following a tax increase, the evolution of the skill premium remains above the trajectory carried on by the skill premium under a situation with no tax increase. Consequently, a tax increase would imply a higher level of inequality in the economy

The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from charitable contributions in France

Optimal tax formulas expressed in "sufficient statistics" are usually calibrated under the assumptionthat the relevant tax elasticities are unaffected by other available policy instruments.In practice though, tax authorities have many more instruments than the mere tax rates andtax elasticities are functions of all these policy instruments. In this paper we provide evidencethat tax elasticities are extremely sensitive to a particular policy instrument: the level of taxenforcement. We exploit a natural experiment that took place in France in 1983, when the taxadministration tightened the requirements to claim charitable deductions. The reform led to asubstantial drop in the amount of contributions reported to the administration, which can becredibly attributed to overreporting of charitable contributions before the reform, rather thanto a real change in giving behaviours. We show that the reform was also associated with asubstantial decline in the absolute value of the elasticity of reported contributions. This findingallows us to partially identify the elasticity of overreporting contributions, which is shown tobe large and inferior to -2 in the lax enforcement regime. We further show using bunching oftaxpayers at kink-points of the tax schedule that the elasticity of taxable income also experienceda significant decline after the reform. Our results suggest that optimizing the tax rate fora given tax elasticity when other policy instruments are not optimized can lead to misleadingconclusions when tax authorities have another instrument that could set the tax elasticity itselfat its optimal level as in Kopczuk and Slemrod [2002].

The reform of the European Energy Tax Directive reform : effect on prices

[spa] Para hacer frente a los riesgos relacionados con la contaminación atmosférica, es ampliamente aceptada la necesidad de instrumentos de política encaminados a reducir las emisiones. La intervención tiene por objeto reducir las conductas contaminantes y incentivar una conducta más respetuosa y el uso de tecnologías más eficientes. La Unión Europea cuenta con dos importantes mecanismos económicos para el control de emisiones a escala europea: la directiva sobre los impuestos energéticos, un instrumento de fiscalidad ambiental aprobado en 2003 que afecta el precio de los productos energéticos, y el sistema de comercio de los derechos de emisiones, introducido en 2005, que afecta directamente a la cantidad de emisiones de CO2. En 2011, la Comisión Europea propuso una nueva versión de la directiva sobre los impuestos energéticos. El objetivo principal de la propuesta es aumentar la eficacia del instrumento a través de una mayor presión fiscal sobre los productos energéticos y de coordinar este instrumento de fiscalidad medioambiental con el sistema de comercio de los derechos de emisiones, para establecer una señal de precio de CO2 coherente para todos los sectores. Sin embargo, en mayo de 2012 el Parlamento Europeo bloqueó la propuesta de la nueva versión del impuesto, y el proceso de actualización se detuvo. La preocupación principal parecía ser el efecto de dicha propuesta en la competitividad, en particular para los sectores que serían los más afectados dado el uso intensivo de los productos energéticos, como el sector del transporte. El objetivo de este estudio es analizar el efecto que la reforma de la directiva sobre los impuestos energéticos podría tener sobre el nivel de precios, en particular en los países de la Unión Europea donde esta reforma implicaría un aumento de los impuestos energéticos. Utilizando datos del proyecto “World Input-Output Database”, la principal conclusión es que el nuevo sistema de impuestos energéticos tendría un impacto muy bajo sobre los precios. Por lo tanto, dado que los precios no serían fuertemente afectados por la reforma, no habrá inconvenientes para la competitividad y implicaciones en términos de distribución, pero, por otro lado, este resultado también implica una baja capacidad de esta reforma para provocar cambios en el consumo y la producción hacia menos presiones ambientales.

The reform of the European Energy Tax Directive reform : effect on prices

[spa] Para hacer frente a los riesgos relacionados con la contaminación atmosférica, es ampliamente aceptada la necesidad de instrumentos de política encaminados a reducir las emisiones. La intervención tiene por objeto reducir las conductas contaminantes y incentivar una conducta más respetuosa y el uso de tecnologías más eficientes. La Unión Europea cuenta con dos importantes mecanismos económicos para el control de emisiones a escala europea: la directiva sobre los impuestos energéticos, un instrumento de fiscalidad ambiental aprobado en 2003 que afecta el precio de los productos energéticos, y el sistema de comercio de los derechos de emisiones, introducido en 2005, que afecta directamente a la cantidad de emisiones de CO2. En 2011, la Comisión Europea propuso una nueva versión de la directiva sobre los impuestos energéticos. El objetivo principal de la propuesta es aumentar la eficacia del instrumento a través de una mayor presión fiscal sobre los productos energéticos y de coordinar este instrumento de fiscalidad medioambiental con el sistema de comercio de los derechos de emisiones, para establecer una señal de precio de CO2 coherente para todos los sectores. Sin embargo, en mayo de 2012 el Parlamento Europeo bloqueó la propuesta de la nueva versión del impuesto, y el proceso de actualización se detuvo. La preocupación principal parecía ser el efecto de dicha propuesta en la competitividad, en particular para los sectores que serían los más afectados dado el uso intensivo de los productos energéticos, como el sector del transporte. El objetivo de este estudio es analizar el efecto que la reforma de la directiva sobre los impuestos energéticos podría tener sobre el nivel de precios, en particular en los países de la Unión Europea donde esta reforma implicaría un aumento de los impuestos energéticos. Utilizando datos del proyecto “World Input-Output Database”, la principal conclusión es que el nuevo sistema de impuestos energéticos tendría un impacto muy bajo sobre los precios. Por lo tanto, dado que los precios no serían fuertemente afectados por la reforma, no habrá inconvenientes para la competitividad y implicaciones en términos de distribución, pero, por otro lado, este resultado también implica una baja capacidad de esta reforma para provocar cambios en el consumo y la producción hacia menos presiones ambientales.

When ESDP confronts ENP: security sector reform as a bridge in the EU’s foreign policy

The European Neighbourhood Policy’s birth has taken place in parallel with the renewed momentum of the European Security and Defence Policy, which has launched 14 operations since 2003. Both policies’ instruments have converged in the neighbouring area covered by ENP: Georgia, in the East and the Palestinian Territories in the South. In both cases, the Security Sector Reform strategies have been the main focus for ESDP and an important objective for ENP. In this paper, two objectives are pursued: first, to assess the EU’s involvement in both cases in SSR terms; and second, to analyse whether the convergence of ESDP operations with a broader EU neighbourhood policy implies that the former has become an instrument for the a EU external action.

Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy

A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending marketis crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. Thispaper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. Weconsider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to different implications foroptimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held amongbanks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that thetraditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregateliquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Twodifferent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required tocope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failureto cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the riskof bank runs.

Optimal fiscal policy in overlapping generations models

[eng] This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an explanation of why taxes on capital returns are high (around 35%) by analyzing the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with intergenerational redistribution. For this purpose, the government is modeled explicitly and can choose (and commit to) an optimal tax policy in order to maximize society's welfare. In an infinitely lived economy with heterogeneous agents, the long run optimal capital tax is zero. If heterogeneity is due to the existence of overlapping generations, this result in general is no longer true. I provide sufficient conditions for zero capital and labor taxes, and show that a general class of preferences, commonly used on the macro and public finance literature, violate these conditions. For a version of the model, calibrated to the US economy, the main results are: first, if the government is restricted to a set of instruments, the observed fiscal policy cannot be disregarded as sub optimal and capital taxes are positive and quantitatively relevant. Second, if the government can use age specific taxes for each generation, then the age profile capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset returns of the younger generations and taxing at higher rates the asset returns of the older ones.

Optimal fiscal policy in overlapping generations models

[eng] This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an explanation of why taxes on capital returns are high (around 35%) by analyzing the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with intergenerational redistribution. For this purpose, the government is modeled explicitly and can choose (and commit to) an optimal tax policy in order to maximize society's welfare. In an infinitely lived economy with heterogeneous agents, the long run optimal capital tax is zero. If heterogeneity is due to the existence of overlapping generations, this result in general is no longer true. I provide sufficient conditions for zero capital and labor taxes, and show that a general class of preferences, commonly used on the macro and public finance literature, violate these conditions. For a version of the model, calibrated to the US economy, the main results are: first, if the government is restricted to a set of instruments, the observed fiscal policy cannot be disregarded as sub optimal and capital taxes are positive and quantitatively relevant. Second, if the government can use age specific taxes for each generation, then the age profile capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset returns of the younger generations and taxing at higher rates the asset returns of the older ones.

Empowering local democracy in Catalonia: tools and policy domains to implement a top-down solution

This article is the result of an ongoing research into a variety of features of Spanish local government. It aims, in particular, at providing a profile of the tools implemented by local authorities to improve local democracy in Catalonia. The main hypothesis of the work is that, even though the Spanish local model is constrained by a shared and unique set of legal regulations, local institutions in Catalonia have developed their own model of local participation. And the range of instruments like these is still now increasing. More specifically, the scope of this research is twofold. On the one hand, different types of instruments for public deliberation in the Catalan local administration system are identified and presented, based on the place they take in the policy cycle. On the other hand, we focus on policy domains and the quality of the decision-making processes. Researching the stability of the participation tools or whether local democracy prefers more 'ad hoc' processes allows us to analyze the boundaries/limits of local democracy in Catalonia. The main idea underlying this paper is that, despite the existence of a single legal model regulating municipalities in Catalonia, local authorities tend to use their legally granted selfmanagement capacities to design their own instruments which end up presenting perceivable distinct features, stressing democracy in different policy domains, and in diverse policy cycles. Therefore, this paper is intended to identify such models and to provide factors (variables) so that an explanatory model can be built.