Preventive health care and payment systems to providers

Prevention has been a main issue of recent policy orientations in health care. This renews the interest on how different organizational designs and the definition of payment schemes to providers may affect the incentives to provide preventive health care. We present, both the normative and the positive analyses of the change from independent providers to integrated services. We show the evaluation of that change to depend on the particular way payment to providers is done. We focus on the externality resulting from referral decisions from primary to acute care providers. This makes our analysis complementary to most works in the literature allowing to address in a more direct way the issue of preventive health care.

Towards economic and monetary union: changing trends in payment systems for new european members

The objective of this paper is preciselyto study the evolution of payment systems within the accession countries between 1996 and 2003 and compare them with those of the E.U. and the Eurozone countries

Openness and technology diffusion in payment

We study the relationship between openness and payment system development. In particular, we analyze how the existence of technology diffusion from a more developed country fosters a transformation of payment choice in a less developed country. We apply our analysis to Mexico. Economic growth in Mexico was not high enough to cause a transformation of payment choice observed in the data after 2001. We argue that the switch towards electronic payments can be attributed to openness and related payment technology spillovers from the US in the context of NAFTA.

Contagion and efficiency in gross and net interbank payment systems

The increased fragility of the banking industry has generatedgrowing concern about the risks associated with the paymentsystems. Although in most industrial countries differentinterbank payment systems coexist, little is really knownabout their propierties in terms of risk and efficiency. Wetackle this question by comparing the two main types ofpayment systems, gross and net, in a framework whereuncertainty arises from several sources: the time ofconsumption, the location of consumption and the return oninvestment. Payments across locations can be made either bydirectly transferrring liquidity or by transferring claimsagainst the bank in the other location. The two mechanism areinterpreted as the gross and net settlement systems ininterbank payments. We characterize the equilibria in the twosystems and identify the trade-off in terms of safety andefficiency.

European payment system and monetary union

We make a comparative study of payment systems for E.U. -fifteen countries for the 1996-2002 period. Special attention is paid to the introduction of the new European single currency. The overall trend in payments is for a move from cash to noncash payment instruments, although electronic instruments are not widely used yet. We find a significant impact from the introduction of the new banknotes and coins on card use

Effects of institutional environment and technology development on payment choice

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the combination of institutional factors and technology advances as determinants of payment systems choice. The theoretical set up suggests that countries entering into a new institutional environment approach accepting group attitudes towards payment choices as a consequence of institutional pressure and technology development. We apply the results of the model to 2004 European Union enlargement process. Results confirm the relevance of both institutional environment and technology development in retail payment system decisions of newly acceded countries.

Seniority-based pay: is it used as a motivation device?

The purpose of this article is to explain what factors determine the use of seniority-based pay for production workers in Spanish manufacturing industry. The data used in order to achieve these objectives was taken from 774 Spanish industrial plants. The estimation of several ordered probit models enabled us to see that in firms where it was more costly for management to engage in opportunistic behaviour, deferred payment shows a negative relation to the use of devices, like monitoring or incentive payment, designed to align workers’ objectives with those of the company.

Labour market frictions, social policies, and barriers to technology adoption

Barriers to technological changes have recently been shown to be a key element in explaining differences in output per worker across countries. This study examines the role that labour market features and institutions have in explaining barriers to technology adoption. I build a model that includes labour market frictions, capital market imperfections and heterogeneity in workers' skills. I found that the unemployment rate together with the welfare losses that workers experiment after displacement are key factors in explaining the existence of barriers to technology adoption. Moreover, I found that none of these factors alone is sufficient to build these barriers. The theory also suggests that welfare policies like the unemployment insurance system may enhance these kinds of barriers while policies like a severance payment system financed by an income tax seem to be more effective in eliminating them.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. Journal of Economic Literature classiffication numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot Competition, Contract Delegation, Moral Hazard, Entry, Market Size, Wage Cost.

Technological adoption in health care

This paper addresses the impact of payment systems on the rate of technology adoption. We present a model where technological shift is driven by demand uncertainty, increased patients' benefit, financial variables, and the reimbursement system to providers. Two payment systems are studied: cost reimbursement and (two variants of) DRG. According to the system considered, adoption occurs either when patients' benefits are large enough or when the differential reimbursement across technologies offsets the cost of adoption. Cost reimbursement leads to higher adoption of the new technology if the rate of reimbursement is high relative to the margin of new vs. old technology reimbursement under DRG. Having larger patient benefits favors more adoption under the cost reimbursement payment system, provided that adoption occurs initially under both payment systems.

Restaurant-OnLine

Aquesta és una aplicació de comerç electrònic que, encara que no inclou la possibilitat de realitzar el pagament en línia, ofereix una alternativa a la realització de comandes a establiments de restauració. S'ha utilitzat l'arquitectura J2EE.

TFC Seguretat Informàtica : Sistema de micropagaments PayWord

Es tracta de la creació d'una pàgina web de venda d'elements multimèdia, de manera que els pagaments es puguin fer per mitjà del sistema PayWord. Aquest sistema és ideal per a pagaments de petites quantitats.

Anàlisi, disseny i implementació d'unaaplicació de gestió de menjadors escolars mitjançant Java Enterprise Edition

Aquest Treball Final de Carrera té per objecte l'anàlisi, disseny i implementació d'una aplicació degestió de menjadors escolars. Aquesta aplicació neix de la necessitat de donar resposta a unademanda dels responsables d'aquests menjadors que es veuen desbordats per controlar totes lesincidències que tenen a veure amb el menjador d'un centre educatiu: des del registre d'un client (alumne, professor o convidat) que entra al menjador a dinar fins al cobrament dels serveiscorresponents.

Passarel·la de Pagaments

El treball consisteix en la realització d'una passarel·la de pagaments triangular. Una passarel·la d'aquest tipus permet gestionar pagaments on-line entre agents (comprador - comerciant - entitat financera), evitant que el comerciant conegui les dades de la tarjeta de crèdit i pugui realitzar canvis de la quantitat a pagar pel client.