Sequencing games without initial order

In this note we study uncertainty sequencing situations, i.e., 1-machine sequencing situations in which no initial order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links with the classic sequencing games introduced by Curiel et al. (1989). Moreover, we propose and characterize two simple cost allocation rules for uncertainty sequencing situations with equal processing times.

Distribution center consolidation games

We study the location-inventory model as introduced by Teo et al. (2001) to analyze the impact of consolidation of distribution centers on facility and inventory costs. We extend their result on profitability of consolidation. We associate a cooperative game with each location-inventory situation and prove that this game has a non-empty core for identical and independent demand processes. This illustrates that consolidation does not only lower joint costs (which was shown by Teo et al. (2001)), but it allows for a stable division of the minimal costs as well.

On games corresponding to sequencing situations with precedence relations

In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are imposed on the jobs. It is shown that these sequencing games are convex.

Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence by market games

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

Fair procedures. Evidence from games involving lotteries

Procedural fairness plays a prominent role in the social discourse concerning the marketplace in particular, and social institutions in general. Random procedures are a simple case, and they have found application in several important social allocation decisions. We investigate random procedures in the laboratory. We find that an unbiased random procedure is an acceptable substitute for an unbiased allocation: similar patterns of acceptance and rejection result when either is inserted as a feasible proposal in a sequential battle-of-the-sexes. We also find that unbiasedness, known to be a crucial characteristic of allocation fairness, is important to procedural fairness: in the context of a random offer game, a biased outcome is more readily accepted when chosen by an unbiased random draw than by one that is biased. Procedural fairness is conceptually different than allocation fairness or attribution-based behavior, and none of the current models of fairness and reciprocity captures our results. Post hoc extension of one of these models (ERC) suggests that a deeper understanding of procedural fairness requires further investigation of competing fairness norms.

Repeated games played in a network

Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by letting the players form a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. This and the bilateral communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.

Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games

We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.

Frames and games

Decision-makers are sometimes influenced by the way in which choice situations are presented to them or "framed" This can be seen as an important challenge to the social sciences, since strong and pervasive framing effects would make it difficult to study human behavior in a synthetic or theoretic manner. We present results from experiments with dilemma games designed to shed light on the effects of several frame variations. We study, among others, the particular public bad frame used by Andreoni (1995) and two more naturalistic frames involving stories. Our results show that none of the frame manipulations have a significant effect on average behavior, but we do find some effects on extreme behavior. We also find that incentives do matter where frames do not matter.

Communication, cultural identities and the Olympic Games: the Barcelona’92 experience

This document includes the results of the research undertaken by the author on the media planning and coverage of the Barcelona'92 and its cultural implications.

Symbol and logo of Barcelona’92 Olympic Games

This text has been published in the book Jocs Olímpics, comunicació i intercanvis culturals: l’experiència dels últims quatre Jocs Olímpics d’estiu, gathering the communications presented in the international Symposium that was celebrated in Barcelona from 3 to 5 april of 1991.

The Olympic Games as a tool for urban renewal: the experience of Barcelona’92 Olympic Village

Paper discussing on the impact of the Games on the urban development of host cities, analysing in particular the Barcelona'92 Olympic Village. This article was published in the book entitled "Olympic Villages: a hundred years of urban planning and shared experiences" compiling the papers given at the 1997 International Symposium on International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB).

Socio-economic impact of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games

Paper presented at the 2001 seminar of the International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB). The seminar offers a general reflection, from the time of the bid onwards, of the 2000 Games experience in Sydney and Australia.

Keys to interpret the Games: Sydney 2000 Olympics

Document published by the CEO-UAB, corresponding to the results of the research undertaken by the author during the celebration of the Sydney 2000 Games.

Olympic Villages after the Games

Article analysing the use of Olympic villages once the Games are finished. This article was published in the book entitled ‘Olympic Villages: a hundred years of urban planning and shared experiences’ compiling the papers given at the 1997 International Symposium on International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB).