The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Trata de seres humanos y delincuencia organizada: conexión entre ambos fenómenos criminales y su plasmación jurídico-penal

Este trabajo aborda el estudio del tipo cualificado del delito de trata de personas cometido en el seno de organizaciones o asociaciones criminales introducido en el Código penal en la reforma de 2010. Con dicha finalidad, se analizan los mandatos de incriminación de esta forma de comisión del delito de trata en instrumentos normativos internacionales y se coteja la coherencia de la regulación interna española con las obligaciones de tipificación asumidas por el Estado español conforme a dichos instrumentos, analizando críticamente la duplicidad incriminatoria de esta manifestación delictiva en nuestro código penal. El estudio jurídico se completa con el análisis fenomenológico acerca de la relación entre el fenómeno de la trata de seres humanos y el de la delincuencia organizada.

From Opacity to Transparency? The Place of Organized Interests within the European Institutions

Regulació dels Grup d'interès en la governança europea és crucial per a una comprensió completa de com s'exerceix el poder a la Unió Europea (UE) i per a una descripció més precisa de com funciona el sistema polític de la UE (i dels seus principis subjacents). Un dels temes principals aquí és com els interessos privats o particulars comprometre amb un interès general o públic encarnat en una forma o altra per aquells que actuen per a la UE. Donada la varietat de temes sensibles en joc, no és d'estranyar que la qüestió de la regulació es troba amb una resistència considerable, sobre tot en la Comissió. No obstant això, els recents obstacles a la integració europea han tingut l'efecte de rellançar un debat que fa que l'ètica i la transparència de les peces centrals de l'agenda. Dinàmiques polítiques actuals semblen donar testimoni d'una creixent receptivitat de la UE a les reivindicacions del moviment ALTER-EU que busca un entorn molt més regulat per cabilderos i funcionaris comunitaris.

The role of moral values in the economic analysis of crime: A general equilibrium approach

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime and show thatlaw enforcement has different roles depending on the equilibrium characterization and the value of social norms. When an economy has a unique stable equilibrium where a fraction of the population is productive and the remaining predates, the government can choose an optimal law enforcement policy to maximize a welfare function evaluated at the steady state. If such steady state is not unique, law enforcement is still relevant but in a completely different way because the steady state that prevails depends on the initial proportions of productive and predator individuals in the economy. The relative importance of these proportions can be changed through law enforcement policy.

Crime and punishment: Further results

I consider a general specification of criminals' objective functionand argue that, when the general non-expected utility theory issubstituted for the traditional expected utility theory, thehigh-fine-low-probability result (Becker, 1968) only holds underspecific and strong restrictions.

Property enforcement as organized consent

This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that makeproperty rights viable, ensuring their enforcement, mobilizing thecollateral value of assets and promoting growth. In contrast tocontractual rights, property rights are enforced in rem, being affectedonly with the consent of the right holder. This ensures enforcement butis costly when multiple, potentially colliding rights are held in thesame asset. Different institutions reduce the cost of gathering consentsto overcome this trade-off of enforcement benefits for consent costs:recording of deeds with title insurance, registration of rights and evena regimen of purely private transactions. All three provide functionallysimilar services, but their relative performance varies with the numberof transactions, the risk of political opportunism and regulatoryconsistency. The analysis also shows the rationality of allowingcompetition in the preparation and support of private contractswhile requiring territorial monopoly in recording and registrationactivities, this to ensure independence and protect third parties.

Organized vs. competitive corruption

We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituencysets required levels for a given set of activities. Each activity iscarried out by an external provider, and its realization is supervisedby a bureaucrat. While bureaucrats are supposed to act on behalf of theconstituency, they can decide to be corrupt and allow providers todeliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange for a bribe.Given this, the constituency sets the optimal activity levels weighingoff the value of activity levels, their costs, as well as the possibilityfor the bureaucrats to be corrupt. We use this setup to study the impacton equilibrium corruption of the degree of decentralization of corruption.To do this we compute equilibrium corruption in two different settings:1) Each bureaucrat acts in such a way as to maximize his own individualutility (competitive corruption); 2) An illegal syndicate oversee thecorruption decisions of the population of bureaucrats in such a way asto maximize total proceeds from corruption (organized corruption). Weshow that, since average corruption payoff is increasing in the activitylevels set by the constituency, and since the latter responds to highlevels of corruption by reducing required activity levels, in equilibriumthe illegal syndicate acts in such a way as to restrain the total numberof corrupt transactions, so that corruption is lower when it is organizedthan when it is competitive.

Genesis of self-organized zebra textures in burial dolomites: Displacive veins, induced stress, and dolomitization

The dolomite veins making up rhythmites common in burial dolomites are not cement infillings of supposed cavities, as in the prevailing view, but are instead displacive veins, veins that pushed aside the host dolostone as they grew. Evidence that the veins are displacive includes a) small transform-fault-like displacements that could not have taken place if the veins were passive cements, and b) stylolites in host rock that formed as the veins grew in order to compensate for the volume added by the veins. Each zebra vein consists of crystals that grow inward from both sides, and displaces its walls via the local induced stress generated by the crystal growth itself. The petrographic criterion used in recent literature to interpret zebra veins in dolomites as cements - namely, that euhedral crystals can grow only in a prior void - disregards evidence to the contrary. The idea that flat voids did form in dolostones is incompatible with the observed optical continuity between the saddle dolomite euhedra of a vein and the replacive dolomite crystals of the host. The induced stress is also the key to the self-organization of zebra veins: In a set of many incipient, randomly-spaced, parallel veins just starting to grow in a host dolostone, each vein¿s induced stress prevents too-close neighbor veins from nucleating, or redissolves them by pressure-solution. The veins that survive this triage are those just outside their neighbors¿s induced stress haloes, now forming a set of equidistant veins, as observed.

Identifying the socioeconomic determinants of crime in Spanish provinces

In this paper we study, having as theoretical reference the economic model of crime (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973), which are the socioeconomic and demographic determinants of crime in Spain paying attention on the role of provincial peculiarities. We estimate a crime equation using a panel dataset of Spanish provinces (NUTS3) for the period 1993 to 1999 employing the GMMsystem estimator. Empirical results suggest that lagged crime rate and clear-up rate are correlated to all typologies of crime rate considered. Property crimes are better explained by socioeconomic variables (GDP per capita, GDP growth rate and percentage of population with high school and university degree), while demographic factors reveal important and significant influences, in particular for crimes against the person. These results are obtained using an instrumental variable approach that takes advantage of the dynamic properties of our dataset to control for both measurement errors in crime data and joint endogeneity of the explanatory variables

Identifying the socioeconomic determinants of crime in Spanish provinces

In this paper we study, having as theoretical reference the economic model of crime (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973), which are the socioeconomic and demographic determinants of crime in Spain paying attention on the role of provincial peculiarities. We estimate a crime equation using a panel dataset of Spanish provinces (NUTS3) for the period 1993 to 1999 employing the GMMsystem estimator. Empirical results suggest that lagged crime rate and clear-up rate are correlated to all typologies of crime rate considered. Property crimes are better explained by socioeconomic variables (GDP per capita, GDP growth rate and percentage of population with high school and university degree), while demographic factors reveal important and significant influences, in particular for crimes against the person. These results are obtained using an instrumental variable approach that takes advantage of the dynamic properties of our dataset to control for both measurement errors in crime data and joint endogeneity of the explanatory variables

Giant step bunching from self-organized coalescence of SrRuO3 islands

Step bunching develops in the epitaxy of SrRuO3 on vicinal SrTiO3(001) substrates. We have investigated the formation mechanisms and we show here that step bunching forms by lateral coalescence of wedgelike three-dimensional islands that are nucleated at substrate steps. After coalescence, wedgelike islands become wider and straighter with growth, forming a self-organized network of parallel step bunches with altitudes exceeding 30 unit cells, separated by atomically flat terraces. The formation mechanism of step bunching in SrRuO3, from nucleated islands, radically differs from one-dimensional models used to describe bunching in semiconducting materials. These results illustrate that growth phenomena of complex oxides can be dramatically different to those in semiconducting or metallic systems.

Self-organized criticality induced by diversity

We have studied the collective behavior of a population of integrate-and-fire oscillators. We show that diversity, introduced in terms of a random distribution of natural periods, is the mechanism that permits one to observe self-organized criticality (SOC) in the long time regime. As diversity increases the system undergoes several transitions from a supercritical regime to a subcritical one, crossing the SOC region. Although there are resemblances with percolation, we give proofs that criticality takes place for a wide range of values of the control parameter instead of a single value.

Long-tailed trapping times and Lévy flights in a self-organized critical granular system

We present a continuous time random walk model for the scale-invariant transport found in a self-organized critical rice pile [K. Christensen et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 77, 107 (1996)]. From our analytical results it is shown that the dynamics of the experiment can be explained in terms of Lvy flights for the grains and a long-tailed distribution of trapping times. Scaling relations for the exponents of these distributions are obtained. The predicted microscopic behavior is confirmed by means of a cellular automaton model.

Self-organized criticality and synchronization in a coupled map lattice model of integrate-and-fire oscillators

We introduce two coupled map lattice models with nonconservative interactions and a continuous nonlinear driving. Depending on both the degree of conservation and the convexity of the driving we find different behaviors, ranging from self-organized criticality, in the sense that the distribution of events (avalanches) obeys a power law, to a macroscopic synchronization of the population of oscillators, with avalanches of the size of the system.