The making of international environmental agreements

We examine in this paper the formation and the stability of international environmental agreements when cooperation means to commit to a minimum abatement level. Each country decides whether to ratify the agreement and this latter enters into force only if it is ratified by a number of countries at least equal to some ratification threshold. We analyze the role played by ratification threshold rules and provide conditions for international environmental agreements to enter into force. We show that a large typology of agreements can enter into force among the one constituted by the grand coalition.

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching

This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.

Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.

A General model of bilateral migration agreements

Unilateral migration policies impose externalities on other countries. In order to try to internalize these externalities, countries sign bilateral migration agreements. One element of these agreements is the emphasis on enforcing migration policies: immigrant-receiving countries agree to allow more immigrants from their emigrant-sending partner if they cooperate in enforcing their migration policy at the border. I present a simple theoretical model that justifies this behavior in a two-country setting with welfare maximizing governments. These governments establish migration quotas that need to be enforced at a cost. I prove that uncoordinated migration policies are inefficient. Both countries can improve welfare by exchanging a more "generous" migration quota for expenditure on enforcement policy. Contrary to what could be expected, this result does not depend on the enforcement technology that both countries employ.

On the role of retaliation in trade agreements

This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presenceof private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from suchagreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is anecessary feature of any efficient equilibrium.We argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to internationaltransfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms-of-trade externalities. Within the currentworld trading system, though, in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidiesare prohibited, the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might beoptimal. The model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the lastdecades, and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies.

Are R&D collaborative agreements persistent at the firm level? Empirical evidence for the Spanish case

We provide evidence on the dynamics in firms’ R&D cooperation behaviour. Our main objective is to analyse if R&D collaborative agreements are persistent at the firm level, and in such a case, to study what are the main drivers of this phenomenon. R&D cooperation activities at the firm level can be persistent due to true state dependence, this implying that cooperating in a given period enhances the probability of doing it in the subsequent period and it can also be a consequence of firms’ individual heterogeneity, so that certain firms have certain characteristics that make them more likely to carry out technological alliances.

Are R&D collaborative agreements persistent at the firm level? Empirical evidence for the Spanish case

We provide evidence on the dynamics in firms’ R&D cooperation behaviour. Our main objective is to analyse if R&D collaborative agreements are persistent at the firm level, and in such a case, to study what are the main drivers of this phenomenon. R&D cooperation activities at the firm level can be persistent due to true state dependence, this implying that cooperating in a given period enhances the probability of doing it in the subsequent period and it can also be a consequence of firms’ individual heterogeneity, so that certain firms have certain characteristics that make them more likely to carry out technological alliances.

Intraregional trade in South America, 1913-50. Economic linkages before institutional agreements

Dejando de lado NAFTA, la integración comercial en América Latina sigue siendo muy moderada hoy en día, representando alrededor del 20% del comercio total. Lo sorprendente es que estos valores eran más altos en 1945. Esto constituye un hecho paradoxal: la integración comercial alcanzó su récord antes de la firma de acuerdos de integración comercial. En el presente trabajo se estudia el comercio intrarregional a lo largo del período de entreguerras (1913-1950) a través del análisis de cinco casos: Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile y Peru. El análisis de la integración comercial en este período representa una novedad en la literatura, ya que los trabajos sobre América Latina, específicos de comercio intraregional, se centran en el período a partir de la década de 1960. El documento destaca dos conclusiones principales: a) con la excepción de los períodos de las guerras mundiales, el comercio intraregional ha sido muy modesto desde 1913 hasta la actualidad, b) en general, el comercio intrarregional repitió la especialización del comercio mundial: una alta concentración en productos de bajo valor añadido.

Intraregional trade in South America, 1913-50. Economic linkages before institutional agreements

Dejando de lado NAFTA, la integración comercial en América Latina sigue siendo muy moderada hoy en día, representando alrededor del 20% del comercio total. Lo sorprendente es que estos valores eran más altos en 1945. Esto constituye un hecho paradoxal: la integración comercial alcanzó su récord antes de la firma de acuerdos de integración comercial. En el presente trabajo se estudia el comercio intrarregional a lo largo del período de entreguerras (1913-1950) a través del análisis de cinco casos: Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile y Peru. El análisis de la integración comercial en este período representa una novedad en la literatura, ya que los trabajos sobre América Latina, específicos de comercio intraregional, se centran en el período a partir de la década de 1960. El documento destaca dos conclusiones principales: a) con la excepción de los períodos de las guerras mundiales, el comercio intraregional ha sido muy modesto desde 1913 hasta la actualidad, b) en general, el comercio intrarregional repitió la especialización del comercio mundial: una alta concentración en productos de bajo valor añadido.

Collaboration strategies and technological innovation: a contractual perspective of the relationship between firms and techonological centers

In this paper, a theoretical framework for analyzing the selection of governance structures for implementing collaboration agreements between firms and Technological Centers is presented and empirically discussed. This framework includes Transaction Costs and Property Rights’ theoretical assumptions, though complemented with several proposals coming from the Transactional Value Theory. This last theory is used for adding some dynamism in the governance structure selection. As empirical evidence of this theoretical explanation, we analyse four real experiences of collaboration between firms and one Technological Center. These experiences are aimed to represent the typology of relationships which Technological Centers usually face. Among others, a key interesting result is obtained: R&D collaboration activities do not need to always be organized through hierarchical solutions. In those cases where future expected benefits and/or reputation issues could play an important role, the traditional more static theories could not fully explain the selected governance structure for managing the R&D relationship. As a consequence, these results justify further research about the adequacy of the theoretical framework presented in this paper in other contexts, for example, R&D collaborations between firms and/or between Universities or Public Research Centers and firms.

Sharing the surplus: a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.

Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative mechanisms in the EU decision making process

According to the account of the European Union (EU) decision making proposed in this paper, this is a bargaining process during which actors shift their policy positions with a view to reaching agreements on controversial issues.

Equity and CO2 emissions distribution in climate change integrated assessment

Emissions distribution is a focus variable for the design of future international agreements to tackle global warming. This paper specifically analyses the future path of emissions distribution and its determinants in different scenarios. Whereas our analysis is driven by tools which are typically applied in the income distribution literature and which have recently been applied to the analysis of CO2 emissions distribution, a new methodological approach is that our study is driven by simulations run with a popular regionalised optimal growth climate change model over the 1995-2105 period. We find that the architecture of environmental policies, the implementation of flexible mechanisms and income concentration are key determinants of emissions distribution over time. In particular we find a robust positive relationship between measures of inequalities.

Diagnosis socioambiental y presupuesto para el Parque Nacional Los Quetzales (Costa Rica)

Se realiza una diagnosis socioambiental y un presupuesto para el Plan de Manejo del Parque Nacional Los Quetzales (PNLQ). El PNLQ ocupa una superficie de 4117 ha. Presenta un régimen hí­drico elevado favorecido por la topografí­a quebrada que permite la presencia de fajas de condensación. Estas condiciones favorecen la presencia del bosque nublado que como se ha observado es el hábitat de innumerables especies, algunas de las cuales presentan gran valor ecológico. El presupuesto para el Plan de Manejo refleja cómo los gastos superan en una proporción importante a los ingresos, por lo que se recomienda centrar los esfuerzos en la búsqueda de formas de financiación (pago por servicios ambientales, convenios, co-manejo y donaciones). También se hace precisa una aportación anual del Gobierno Central para la ejecución del Plan.