Economic Booms, Trade Deficits, and Economic Policy

Many economic booms have been accompanied by real exchange rate appreciations, large trade defcits -which have sometimes persisted after the return to the initial exchange rate parity- and a deteriorating traded sector. Those circumstances have typically raised the question of the de-sirability of some stabilization policy. We show that the dynamics induced by an expected productivity shock in an economy where the capital stock is non-mobile across sectors, match those circumstances. Furthermore, we obtain that credit market imperfections tend to exacerbate trade deficits, and to cause an inefficient capacity reduction in the traded sector. Some stabilization policies are explored.

Economic booms, trade deficits and economic policy

Many economic booms have been accompanied by realexchange rate appreciations, large trade defcits -whichhave sometimes persisted after the return to the initialexchange rate parity- and a deteriorating traded sector.Those circumstances have typically raised the questionof the de-sirability of some stabilization policy. We show that the dynamics induced by an expectedproductivity shock in an economy where the capital stockis non-mobile across sectors, match those circumstances.Furthermore, we obtain that credit market imperfectionstend to exacerbate trade deficits, and to cause aninefficient capacity reduction in the traded sector.Some stabilization policies are explored.

Venezuelan economic laboratory. The Case of the altruistic economy of Felipe Pérez Martí

Felipe Pérez Martí, who was the Venezuelan Minister of Planning and Development in the government of Hugo Chávez, proposes an economic model that he calls the altruistic economy or fourth way, which leads cooperative game theory to its logical extremes postulating a pure communism. Here we sustain that, first, it is impossible in the model of Pérez Martí to marginally allocate non-primary goods to those most in need or who most value them, facing a problem of defective economic calculation, and second, in order to achieve equality, he would have to replace his atomic local planners by a central planner, who would be unable to overcome the problem of imperfect and and incomplete information.

Endogenous integration and welfare in complementary goods markets

This paper analyzes the strategic decision to integrate by firms that produce complementary products. Integration entails bundling pricing. We find out that integration is privately profitable for a high enough degree of product differentiation, that profits of the non-integrated firms decrease, and that consumer surplus need not necessarily increase when firms integrate despite the fact that prices diminish. Thus, integration of a system is welfare-improving for a high enough degree of product differentiation combined with a minimum demand advantage relative to the competing system. Overall, and from a number of extensions undertaken, we conclude that bundling need not be anti-competitive and that integration should be permitted only under some circumstances.

On the number of limit cycles bifurcating from a non-global degenerated center

Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt

Creating and using a non-dedicated HPC cluster with ParallelKnoppix

This note describes ParallelKnoppix, a bootable CD that allows econometricians with average knowledge of computers to create and begin using a high performance computing cluster for parallel computing in very little time. The computers used may be heterogeneous machines, and clusters of up to 200 nodes are supported. When the cluster is shut down, all machines are in their original state, so their temporary use in the cluster does not interfere with their normal uses. An example shows how a Monte Carlo study of a bootstrap test procedure may be done in parallel. Using a cluster of 20 nodes, the example runs approximately 20 times faster than it does on a single computer.

ParallelKnoppix - Rapid deployment of a linux cluster for MPI parallel processing using non-dedicated computers

This note describes ParallelKnoppix, a bootable CD that allows creation of a Linux cluster in very little time. An experienced user can create a cluster ready to execute MPI programs in less than 10 minutes. The computers used may be heterogeneous machines, of the IA-32 architecture. When the cluster is shut down, all machines except one are in their original state, and the last can be returned to its original state by deleting a directory. The system thus provides a means of using non-dedicated computers to create a cluster. An example session is documented.

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.

Social capital and government in the production of public goods

As a response to the rapidly growing empirical literature on social capital and the evidence of its correlation with government performance, we build a theoretical framework to study the interactions between social capital and government's action. This paper presents a model of homogeneous agents in an overlapping generations framework incorporating social capital as the values transmitted from parent to child. The government's role is to provide public goods. First, government expenditure is exogenously given. Then, it will be chosen at the preferred level of the representative agent. For both setups the equilibrium outcomes are characterized and the resulting dynamics studied. Briefly we include an analysis of the effect of productivity growth on the evolution of social capital. The results obtained caution caution against both the crowding out effect of the welfare state and the impact of sustained economic growth on social capital.

Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme

This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game