41 resultados para mortgagees’ powers
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
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This article starts a computational study of congruences of modular forms and modular Galoisrepresentations modulo prime powers. Algorithms are described that compute the maximum integermodulo which two monic coprime integral polynomials have a root in common in a sensethat is defined. These techniques are applied to the study of congruences of modular forms andmodular Galois representations modulo prime powers. Finally, some computational results withimplications on the (non-)liftability of modular forms modulo prime powers and possible generalisationsof level raising are presented.
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En els darrers temps els agrocombustibles s’han promocionat com una alternativa als combustibles fòssils,adquirint un pes important en les agendes polítiques internacionals. Les dues grans potències econòmiques mundials, els Estats Units i la Unió Europea, han impulsat els agrocombustibles a través de diferents estratègies; plans, legislació, però també amb excempcions fiscals i obligacions de barreja amb combustibles fòssils. En aquest marc, Catalunya va ser de les comunitats autònomes de l’Estat espanyol pioneres en la potenciació d’experiències de producció i consum d’agrocombustibles. A partir de l’anàlisi de la política i el debat a Catalunya es pot destacar la gran influència de l’esfera europea a través de diversos mecanismes en el procés, el que s’ha anomenat en la literatura com europeïtzació. Darrerament Europa s’ha convertit en un important centre de producció de polítiques públiques, especialment en polítiques ambientals i agrícoles a partir dels anys 80. És per aquest motiu que resulta rellevant conèixer les dinàmiques europees en una política complexa com la dels agrocombustibles a Catalunya, que presenta components energètics, però també amb altres aspectes relacionats amb el món agràri i el medi ambient.
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Current studies, mainly focused on the postwar period, are split on the impact of development on democracy. Examining panel data that runs from early nineteenth century (a time where hardly any democracy was in place) to the end of the twentieth century, I show income matters positively for democratization – both after controlling for country and time effects and instrumenting for income. Since the effect of time partly varies over time, with some historical periods that are more favorable to democracy than others, I investigate the domestic variables (a decreasing marginal effect of growth in already developed economies) and international factors (the strategies of great powers toward small countries) generating that result. I finally probe the underlying processes through which income shapes political institutions, showing that development produces key changes in the distribution and nature of wealth that, in turn, make democracy a stable political outcome.
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Over the last few years, ther has been a devolutionary tendency in many developed and developing countries. In this article we propose a methodology to decompose whether the benefits in terms of effciency derived from transfers of powers from higher to municipal levels of government "the "economic dividend" of devolution) might increase over time. This methodology is based on linear programming approaches for effciency measurement. We provide anapplication to Spanish municipalities, which have had to adapt to both the European Stability and Growth Pact as well as to domestic regulation seeking local governments balanced budget. Results indicate that efficiency gains from enhaced decentralization have increased over time. However, the way through which these gains accrue differs across municipalities -in some cases technical change is the main component, whereas in others catching up dominates.
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This paper analyses whether the different powers and resources at the disposal of local and regional governments across Europe deliver greater satisfaction with political institutions and lead to greater personal happiness. The analysis uses microdata from the four available waves of the European social survey (2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008), including more than 160,000 observations of individuals living in 29 European countries. Our results reveal that political and fiscal decentralization have a positive and significant effect on individuals’ overall happiness. Fiscal decentralization also exerts a significant effect on the level of satisfaction with political and economic institutions and with the education and health systems, whereas the effect of political decentralization on these variables is more limited. The results show that citizens seem to be happier with the actual capacity of their local governments to deliver than with the general principle that they can have a say on their daily politics and policies. Keywords: Happiness, well-being, satisfaction, fiscal and political decentralization, Europe. JEL codes: H11, H77
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Graph pebbling is a network model for studying whether or not a given supply of discrete pebbles can satisfy a given demand via pebbling moves. A pebbling move across an edge of a graph takes two pebbles from one endpoint and places one pebble at the other endpoint; the other pebble is lost in transit as a toll. It has been shown that deciding whether a supply can meet a demand on a graph is NP-complete. The pebbling number of a graph is the smallest t such that every supply of t pebbles can satisfy every demand of one pebble. Deciding if the pebbling number is at most k is NP 2 -complete. In this paper we develop a tool, called theWeight Function Lemma, for computing upper bounds and sometimes exact values for pebbling numbers with the assistance of linear optimization. With this tool we are able to calculate the pebbling numbers of much larger graphs than in previous algorithms, and much more quickly as well. We also obtain results for many families of graphs, in many cases by hand, with much simpler and remarkably shorter proofs than given in previously existing arguments (certificates typically of size at most the number of vertices times the maximum degree), especially for highly symmetric graphs. Here we apply theWeight Function Lemma to several specific graphs, including the Petersen, Lemke, 4th weak Bruhat, Lemke squared, and two random graphs, as well as to a number of infinite families of graphs, such as trees, cycles, graph powers of cycles, cubes, and some generalized Petersen and Coxeter graphs. This partly answers a question of Pachter, et al., by computing the pebbling exponent of cycles to within an asymptotically small range. It is conceivable that this method yields an approximation algorithm for graph pebbling.
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Report for the scientific sojourn at the UC Berkeley, USA, from march until july 2008. This document starts by surveying the literature on economic federalism and relating it to network industries. The insights and some new developments (which focus on the role of interjurisdictional externalities, multiple objectives and investment incentives) are used to analyze regulatory arrangements in telecommunications and energy in the EU and the US. In the long history of vertically integrated monopolies in telecommunications and energy, there was a historical trend to move regulation up in the vertical structure of government, at least form the local level to the state or nation-state level. This move alleviated the pressure on regulators to renege on the commitment not to expropriate sunk investments, although it did not eliminate the practice of taxation by regulation that was the result of multiple interest group action. Although central or federal policy making is more focused and especialized and makes it difficult for more interest groups to organize, it is not clear that under all conditions central powers will not be associated with underinvestment. When technology makes the introduction of competition in some segments possible, the possibilities for organizing the institutional architechture of regulation expand. The central level may focus on structural regulation and the location of behavioral regulation of the remaining monopolists may be resolved in a cooperative way or concentrated at the level where the relevant spillovers are internalized.
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La pràctica consisteix a crear una pàgina web monogràfica sobre Bernat I -Unifred, que va exercir les funcions comtals a la Ribagorça (920 -950) i va generar al voltant de la seva figura la llegenda de Bernat de Ribagorça, entre d'altres. Dins aquest context, es vol relacionar la història amb la llegenda de Bernat de Ribagorça.
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Segons L'índex de Desenvolupament Democràtic d'Amèrica Llatina (IDD-Lat 2004) tot i que a la zona hi ha símbols democràtics com eleccions periòdiques, alternança en el poder per part dels partits polítics, divisió de poders, en alguns dels països llatinoamericans també s'hi ha trobat signes de debilitat del sistema democràtic.
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As commonly held, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) suffers from a “double democratic deficit”: the EP has a marginal role in the ESDP-making process and the national parliaments remain unable to account for their own government. Therefore pressure coming from these two institutions had been exercised during the Convention on the Future of Europe to improve the democratic oversight on this rapidly evolving policy. This paper investigates the innovations included in the Constitutional Treaty, focusing specifically on the new role granted to the EP. It shows that even though this text does not substantially modify the inter-institutional balance of powers in the ESDP area, the EP may take advantage of some of its articles to become an actor in the ESDP-control process in the ‘living constitution.
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This book addresses the debate on the democratic deficit of European foreign and defence policies. This debate revolves around two dimensions. The first one has to do with the accountability of CFSP institutions. Is the current degree of parliamentary oversight of these policies the most appropriate? Has the disengagement of national parliaments regarding European foreign policy been counterbalanced by giving sufficient powers to the European Parliament? And, regarding the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), are national parliaments effectively controlling it? The second dimension of the debate is related to the wider question of whether the European Parliament is capable of legitimising EU policy outcomes. In the absence of a Europe-wide demos and of a true party system, what interests do Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) represent when dealing with foreign policy issues? Are there transnational cleavages in foreign policy or are they mainly national? Furthermore, is the European Parliament developing a transnational, autonomous stance on foreign policy issues, different from that of the Council or the Commission? The present volume is the result of the 2nd Meeting of the FORNET Working Group on “Evolution and Accountability of CFSP Institutions” organised by the Observatory of European Foreign Policy (Research line of the Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus), which took place in Barcelona, the 4 and 5 March 2005.
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We study the equidistribution of Fekete points in a compact complex manifold. These are extremal point configurations defined through sections of powers of a positive line bundle. Their equidistribution is a known result. The novelty of our approach is that we relate them to the problem of sampling and interpolation on line bundles, which allows us to estimate the equidistribution of the Fekete points quantitatively. In particular we estimate the Kantorovich-Wasserstein distance of the Fekete points to its limiting measure. The sampling and interpolation arrays on line bundles are a subject of independent interest, and we provide necessary density conditions through the classical approach of Landau, that in this context measures the local dimension of the space of sections of the line bundle. We obtain a complete geometric characterization of sampling and interpolation arrays in the case of compact manifolds of dimension one, and we prove that there are no arrays of both sampling and interpolation in the more general setting of semipositive line bundles.
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La relación educativa entraña, inevitablemente, el debate entorno de la verticalidad y del ejercicio del poder. De qué modo nos relacionamos y cómo gestionamos la comunicación entre educadores y educandos, así como entre iguales. Esa tensión se ve amplificada en la medida que incorporamos lógicas evaluativas en nuestro quehacer profesional. La siguiente comunicación describe la experiencia de la metodología de aprendizaje basada en la evaluación entre iguales aplicada a la profesionalización de los y las educadores/as sociales. Tanto a nivel escolar como en el universitario hay numerosas experiencias publicadas en relación a la metodología de evaluación entre iguales. Además, existen numerosos apartados de los “Documentos profesionalizadores” donde se justifica el hecho de que se entrenen algunas habilidades que deberían darse en la práctica profesional (como por ejemplo en la definición, en el código ético, y en el catálogo de funciones y competencias del/la educador/a social). En esta comunicación pretendemos dar a conocer la experiencia de entrenamiento de futuros educadores en aspectos que tienen una relación directa con la evaluación entre educadores/as sociales. Así pues, utilizaremos una justificación académica y metodológica de la actividad, enlazándola con los documentos profesionalizadores con un fin relacionado directamente con el ejercicio de la profesión.