Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games

We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.

Exact lower bounds to the ground-state energy of spin systems: The two-dimensional S=1/2 antiferromagnetic Heisenberg model

We present a very simple but fairly unknown method to obtain exact lower bounds to the ground-state energy of any Hamiltonian that can be partitioned into a sum of sub-Hamiltonians. The technique is applied, in particular, to the two-dimensional spin-1/2 antiferromagnetic Heisenberg model. Reasonably good results are easily obtained and the extension of the method to other systems is straightforward.