55 resultados para maximal ontological completeness
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
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The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document adjunt."
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
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Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt.
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Motivated by the work of Mateu, Orobitg, Pérez and Verdera, who proved inequalities of the form $T_*f\lesssim M(Tf)$ or $T_*f\lesssim M^2(Tf)$ for certain singular integral operators $T$, such as the Hilbert or the Beurling transforms, we study the possibility of establishing this type of control for the Cauchy transform along a Lipschitz graph. We show that this is not possible in general, and we give a partial positive result when the graph is substituted by a Jordan curve.
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La memòria que ací es presenta s'emmarca dins de l'àrea de teoria de grafs. En concret es treballa la implementació d'un algorisme per trobar el subgraf comú maximal (SCM) de dos grafs mitjançant la cerca de colles maximals (CM). L'aportació principal del projecte consisteix en, donats dos grafs qualsevol, trobar el seu graf associat per tal de poder cercar la seva colla maximal (CM). I així, utilitzant funcions existents en el llenguatge de programació, poder trobar el seu subgraf comú maximal (SCM), necessari per calcular la distància entre grafs i així determinar quan d'isomorfs són.
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In this paper, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten, 1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta-Ray, 1991). Both results are based on a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. Keywords: Cooperative game, equity core, equal division core, Lorenz domination. JEL classification: C71
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Computer based training or distance education are facing dramatic changes withthe advent of standardization efforts, some of them concentrating in maximal reuse.This is of paramount importance for a sustainable -cost affordable- production ofeducational materials. Reuse in itself should not be a goal, though, since manymethodological aspects might be lost. In this paper we propose two contentproduction approaches for the InterMediActor platform under a competence-basedmethodology: either a bottom-up approach where content is designed from scratchor a top-down methodology where existing material can be gradually adapted tofulfil requisites to be used with maximal flexibility into InterMediActor.