21 resultados para market entry mode
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
Export activities are a major source of economic growth and are considered important both at the national level and for individual businesses. Moreover, in the case of SMEs, they gain particular relevance, exporting being the most common foreign market entry mode for these firms. The decision maker’s role in the export activity is crucial, particularly in the case of SMEs. However, the extant literature on internationalization is characterized by a lack of consensus among scholars as to what constitutes the managerial factor in determining exporting. Therefore, this study focuses on the following issue: Which are the decision maker’s characteristics and perceptions that may influence the export behaviour of Catalan SMEs? To address this question a multiple case study method is applied across four Catalan exporting SMEs. The methodology chosen for analysing the empirical data is relying on the proposition testing approach while the investigation is conducted including both within and cross-case analysis. The findings show that high educational level, language skills, high risk tolerance, innovativeness as well as strongly perceived export stimuli as compared to low and easy to overcome export barriers positively influence the export involvement and development of SMEs. The study provides further insights into the research topic by jointly studying managerial characteristics and perceptions. Additionally, the majority of research on exporting topics has been carried out in the USA, so there is a clear need of investigation in the field in other countries, moreover in Spain where the exporting activities have not been as widely studied.
Resumo:
This paper concerns the effects of territorial factors on the processes involved in the creation of manufacturing firms in Spanish cities. Most contributions have focused on regional factors rather than urban ones. Here we assume that it is possible to identify certain urban factors that attract new firms. We use data for the entry of firms in Spanish manufacturing industries between 1994 and 2002. This paper contributes to the existing literature on market entry. Key words: cities, regions, firm entry and Spanish economy. JEL: R0, R12, L60
Resumo:
We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulationand equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combininga Mortensen-Pissarides model with monopolistic competition in the goods marketand individual wage bargaining. Product market competition affects unemploymentvia two channels: the output expansion effect and a countervailing effect dueto a hiring externality. Competition is then linked to barriers to entry. Acalibrated model compares a high-regulation European regime to a low-regulationAnglo-American one. Our quantitative analysis suggests that under individualbargaining, no more than half a percentage point of European unemployment ratescan be attributed to entry regulation.
Resumo:
We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulation and equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combining a job matchingmodel with monopolistic competition in the goods market and individual wage bargaining.Product market competition affects unemployment by two channels: the output expansion effect and a countervailing effect due to a hiring externality. Competition is then linked to barriers to entry. We calibrate the model to US data and perform a policy experiment to assess whether the decrease in trend unemployment during the 1980 s and 1990 s could be attributed to product market deregulation. Our quantitative analysis suggests that under individual bargaining, a decrease of less than two tenths of a percentage point of unemployment rates can be attributed to product market deregulation, a surprisingly small amount.
Resumo:
In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We compare experimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill alone and combinations of skill and luck. We find more risk taking with skill and luck as opposed to skill alone, particularly for males, and little overconfidence. Our data support an explanation based on differential attitudes toward luck by those whose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making luck more important induces greater optimism for the former, while the latter maintain a belief that high levels of skill are sufficient to overcome the vagaries of chance.
Resumo:
Excess entry or the high failure rate of market-entry decisions is often attributed tooverconfidence exhibited by entreprene urs. We show analytically that whereas excess entryis an inevitable consequence of imperfect assessments of entrepreneurial skill, it does notimply overconfidence. Judgmental fallibility leads to excess entry even when everyone isunderconfident. Self-selection implies greater confidence (but not necessarilyoverconfidence) among those who start new businesses than those who do not and amongsuccessful entrants than failures. Our results question claims that entrepreneurs areoverconfident and emphasize the need to understand the role of judgmental fallibility inproducing economic outcomes.
Resumo:
The decade of the 1940s was one of the darkest periods in the country's history, with years of famine, repression, general misery, and impoverishment of all aspects of national life ranging from culture to the economy. During those years plans were made to establish a Spanish motor industry once the Civil War had come to an end in 1939. It seemed a propitious moment for private enterprise and various foreign motor companies presented proposals for manufacturing their entire vehicle range, from cars to trucks. However, the government plans were for a State monopoly, a policy which meant that any private projects which did not contemplate the regime taking management decisions were rejected out of hand. From 1941 onwards, any new initiative was required to meet the plans set by INI. The main argument running through this paper is that one can only understand the development of the modern Spanish motor industry if one grasps the haggling between motor companies and government regarding market entry and the impact of the regime's autarchic policies in the 1940s.
Resumo:
In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We contrastexperimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill as opposed tocombinations of skill and chance. Our data show differential attitudes toward chance by thosewhose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making chance more important induces greateroptimism for the former who start taking more risk, while the latter maintain a belief that highlevels of skill are sufficient to overcome the vagaries of chance. Finally, although weobserved excess entry (i.e., too many participants entered markets), this could not beattributed to overconfidence.
Resumo:
We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the amount of time during which incumbents are protected from entry. Before entry incumbents are able to collude in all cases. When all firms' costs are the same entry always leads consumer surplus and profits to their equilibrium levels. When entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer surplus to equilibrium. However, total profits remain below equilibrium, due to the fact that the inefficient incumbents produce too much and efficient entrants produce too little. Market behavior is satisfactory from the consumers' standpoint, but does not yield adequate signals to other potential entrants. These results are not affected by whether entry is simultaneous or sequential. The length of the incumbency phase does have some subtle effects.
Resumo:
The aim of this paper is to analyse empirically entry decisions by generic firms intomarkets with tough regulation. Generic drugs might be a key driver of competitionand cost containment in pharmaceutical markets. The dynamics of reforms ofpatents and pricing across drug markets in Spain are useful to identify the impact ofregulations on generic entry. Estimates from a count data model using a panel of 86active ingredients during the 1999 2005 period show that the drivers of genericentry in markets with price regulations are similar to less regulated markets: genericfirms entries are positively affected by the market size and time trend, and negativelyaffected by the number of incumbent laboratories and the number of substitutesactive ingredients. We also find that contrary to what policy makers expected, thesystem of reference pricing restrains considerably the generic entry. Short run brandname drug price reductions are obtained by governments at the cost of long runbenefits from fostering generic entry and post-patent competition into the markets.
Resumo:
In this paper we explore the determinants of firm start-up size of Spanish manufacturing industries. The industries' barriers to entry affect the ability of potential entrants to enter the markets and the size range at which they decide to enter. In order to examine the relationships between barriers to entry and size we applied the quantile regression techniques. Our results indicate that the variables that characterize the structure of the market, the variables that are related to the behaviour of the incumbent firms and the rate of growth of the industries generate different barriers depending on the initial size of the entrants. Keywords: Entry, regression quantiles, start-up size. JEL classification: L110, L600
Resumo:
The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.
Resumo:
The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. Journal of Economic Literature classiffication numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot Competition, Contract Delegation, Moral Hazard, Entry, Market Size, Wage Cost.
Resumo:
This paper provides a new benchmark for the analysis of the international diversi cation puzzle in a tractable new open economy macroeconomic model. Building on Cole and Obstfeld (1991) and Heathcote and Perri (2009), this model speci es an equilibrium model of perfect risk sharing in incomplete markets, with endogenous portfolios and number of varieties. Equity home bias may not be a puzzle but a perfectly optimal allocation for hedging risk. In contrast to previous work, the model shows that: (i) optimal international portfolio diversi cation is driven by home bias in capital goods, independently of home bias in consumption, and by the share of income accruing to labour. The model explains reasonably well the recent patterns of portfolio allocations in developed economies; and (ii) optimal portfolio shares are independent of market dynamics.
Resumo:
Before firms decide whether to enter a new market or not, they havethe opportunity to buy information about several variables that might affectthe profitability of this market. Our model differs from the existing literatureon endogenous information acquisition in two respects: (1) there is uncertaintyabout more than one variable, and (2) information is acquired secretly. Whenthe cost of acquiring information is small, entry decisions will be as ifthere was perfect information. Equilibria where each firm acquires only asmall amount of information are more robust than the socially undesirableequilibria where all firms gather all information. Examples illustrate theimportance of assumptions (1) and (2).