Traducción de fragmentos humorísticos de dos videojuegos

En este trabajo se estudia la relación entre el humor y el mundo de la localización de videojuegos mediante el análisis de las diferentes técnicas de traducción utilizadas en la traducción oficial de dos fragmentos de los videojuegos Portal (2007) y Portal 2(2011) respectivamente. De este modo, por una parte, el trabajo profundiza en el mundo de la localización de videojuegos centrándose en diferentes aspectos relacionados como la interfaz, los componentes que forman un videojuego y los tipos, modelos y procesos de localización existentes y, por la otra, se centra en cómo traducir referencias humorísticas en este ámbito de la traducción especializada. Para poner en práctica todo lo analizado, se realiza una traducción de los fragmentos de Portal y de Portal 2 seleccionados con tal de comparar las soluciones que hemos ofrecido con las que aparecen en los productos oficiales.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Localization of algebras over coloured operads

We give sufficient conditions for homotopical localization functors to preserve algebras over coloured operads in monoidal model categories. Our approach encompasses a number of previous results about preservation of structures under localizations, such as loop spaces or infinite loop spaces, and provides new results of the same kind. For instance, under suitable assumptions, homotopical localizations preserve ring spectra (in the strict sense, not only up to homotopy), modules over ring spectra, and algebras over commutative ring spectra, as well as ring maps, module maps, and algebra maps. It is principally the treatment of module spectra and their maps that led us to the use of coloured operads (also called enriched multicategories) in this context.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

What underlies localization and urbanization economies? Evidence from the location of new firms

The objective of this paper is to analyze why firms in some industries locate in specialized economic environments (localization economies) while those in other industries prefer large city locations (urbanization economies). To this end, we examine the location decisions of new manufacturing firms in Spain at the city level and for narrowly defined industries (three-digit level). First, we estimate firm location models to obtain estimates that reflect the importance of localization and urbanization economies in each industry. In a second step, we regress these estimates on industry characteristics that are related to the potential importance of three agglomeration theories, namely, labor market pooling, input sharing and knowledge spillovers. Localization effects are low and urbanization effects are high in knowledge-intensive industries, suggesting that firms (partly) locate in large cities to reap the benefits of inter-industry knowledge spillovers. We also find that localization effects are high in industries that employ workers whose skills are more industry-specific, suggesting that industries (partly) locate in specialized economic environments to share a common pool of specialized workers.

Open Chess Game Analyzer

Aquest document detalla la feina que s'ha dut a terme per desenvolupar el projecte Open Chess Game Analyzer. La finalitat del mateix és desenvolupar un aplicatiu lliure que sigui capaç d'analitzar partides d'escacs a partir d'un fitxer PGN.

Serious game de código abierto para la educación y entrenamiento en el procedimiento de artroscopia de rodilla

En esta memoria se describe el diseño a nivel conceptual de un serious game con el objetivo de ofrecer soluciones para la mejora del aprendizaje y adquisición de aptitudes y habilidades de los residentes-profesionales en las técnicas de artroscopia de rodilla, con el objetivo de comprobar la hipótesis de que los modelos de aprendizaje basados en videojuegos pueden servir de puente entre el cuerpo teórico de la especialidad y el ejercicio práctico, reduciendo los riesgos de las primeras intervenciones y acelerando la formación de los especialistas, en otras palabras, difuminando el umbral entre teoría y práctica y reduciendo los costos derivados del ejercicio práctico (económicos y temporales) y a su vez, paliando las necesidades formativas de estas.

Vision-based localization of an underwater robot in a structured environment

This paper presents a vision-based localization approach for an underwater robot in a structured environment. The system is based on a coded pattern placed on the bottom of a water tank and an onboard down looking camera. Main features are, absolute and map-based localization, landmark detection and tracking, and real-time computation (12.5 Hz). The proposed system provides three-dimensional position and orientation of the vehicle along with its velocity. Accuracy of the drift-free estimates is very high, allowing them to be used as feedback measures of a velocity-based low-level controller. The paper details the localization algorithm, by showing some graphical results, and the accuracy of the system

Correction of shading effects in vision-based UUV localization

This paper describes the improvements achieved in our mosaicking system to assist unmanned underwater vehicle navigation. A major advance has been attained in the processing of images of the ocean floor when light absorption effects are evident. Due to the absorption of natural light, underwater vehicles often require artificial light sources attached to them to provide the adequate illumination for processing underwater images. Unfortunately, these flashlights tend to illuminate the scene in a nonuniform fashion. In this paper a technique to correct non-uniform lighting is proposed. The acquired frames are compensated through a point-by-point division of the image by an estimation of the illumination field. Then, the gray-levels of the obtained image remapped to enhance image contrast. Experiments with real images are presented