Fishery of the Goliath grouper, Epinephelus itajara (Teleostei: Epinephelidae) based on local ecological knowledge and fishery records in Yucatan, Mexico

The Goliath grouper, Epinephelus itajara, a large-bodied (similar to 2.5 m TL, > 400 kg) and critically endangered fish (Epinephelidae), is highly Vulnerable to overfishing. Although protected from fishing in many countries, its exploitation in Mexico is unregulated; a situation that puts its populations at risk. Fishery records of E. itajara are scarce, which prevents determination of its fishery status. This work aimed to elucidate the E itajara fishery in the northern Yucatan Peninsula by 1) analyzing available catch records and 2) interviewing veteran fishermen (local ecological knowledge) from two traditional landing sites: Dzilam de Bravo and Puerto Progreso. Historic fishery records from two fishing cooperatives were analyzed in order to elucidate the current situation and offer viable alternatives for conservation and management. Catches have decreased severely. Local knowledge obtained from fishermen represented a very important source of information for reconstructing the fisheries history of this species. Conservation measures that incorporate regional and international regulations on critically endangered fish species are suggested

Platform pricing and consumer foresight: The case of airports

Airports have become platforms that derive revenues from both aeronautical and commercial activities. The demand for these services is characterized by a one-way complementarity in that only air travelers can purchase retail goods at the airport terminals. We analyze a model of optimal airport behavior in which this one-way complementarity is subject to consumer foresight, i.e., consumers may not anticipate in full the ex post retail surplus when purchasing a flight ticket. An airport sets landing fees, and, in addition, also chooses the retail market structure by selecting the number of retail concessions to be awarded. We find that, with perfectly myopic consumers, the airport chooses to attract more passengers via low landing fees, and also sets the minimum possible number of retailers in order to increase the concessions’ revenues, from which it obtains the largest share of profits. However, even a very small amount of anticipation of the consumer surplus from retail activities changes significantly the airport’s choices: the optimal airport policy is dependent on the degree of differentiation in the retail market. When consumers instead have perfect foresight, the airport establishes a very competitive retail market, where consumers enjoy a large surplus. This attracts passengers and it is exploited by the airport by charging higher landing fees, which then constitute the largest share of its profits. Overall, the airport’s profits are maximal when consumers have perfect foresight. Keywords: two-sided markets, platform pricing, one-way demand complementarity, consumer foresight. JEL classification: L1, L2, L93.