A cooperative appproach to queue allocation of indivisible objects

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.

Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

Fairness under uncertainty with indivisibilities

I analyze an economy with uncertainty in which a set of indivisible objects and a certain amount of money is to be distributed among agents. The set of intertemporally fair social choice functions based on envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency is characterized. I give a necessary and sufficient condition for its non-emptiness and propose a mechanism that implements the set of intertemporally fair allocations in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Implementation at the ex ante stage is considered, too. I also generalize the existence result obtained with envy-freeness using a broader fairness concept, introducing the aspiration function.

Efficient priority rules

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.

Personal redistribution and the regional allocation of public investment

How should an equity-motivated policy-marker allocate public capital (infrastructure) across regions. Should it aim at reducing interregional differences in per capita output, or at maximizing total output? Such a normative question is examined in a model where the policy-marker is exclusively concerned about personal inequality and has access to two policy instruments. (i) a personal tax-transfer system (taxation is distortionary), and (ii) the regional allocation of public investment. I show that the case for public investment as a significant instrument for interpersonal redistribution is rather weak. In the most favorable case, when the tax code is constrained to be uniform across regions, it is optimal to distort the allocation of public investment in favor of the poor regions, but only to a limited extent. The reason is that poor individuals are relatively more sensitive to public trans fers, which are maximized by allocating public investment efficiently. If! the tax code can vary across regions then the optimal policy may involve an allocation of public investment distorted in favor of the rich regions.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible

Abstract Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that the existence of pure strategy undominated Nash equilibria requires that the bidding space is not "too divisible" (that is, a continuum). In fact, when bids must form part of a finite grid there always exists a "high price equilibrium". However, there might also be "low price equilibria" and when the bidding space is very restrictive the revenue obtained in these "low price equilibria" might be very low. We discuss the properties of the equilibria and an application of auction theoretical thinking in which "low price equilibria" may be relevant. Keywords: First-price auctions, undominated Nash equilibria. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D44 (Auctions).

Object recognition for autonomous objects: comparison of two approaches

Report for the scientific sojourn at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, Switzerland, between September and December 2007. In order to make robots useful assistants for our everyday life, the ability to learn and recognize objects is of essential importance. However, object recognition in real scenes is one of the most challenging problems in computer vision, as it is necessary to deal with difficulties. Furthermore, in mobile robotics a new challenge is added to the list: computational complexity. In a dynamic world, information about the objects in the scene can become obsolete before it is ready to be used if the detection algorithm is not fast enough. Two recent object recognition techniques have achieved notable results: the constellation approach proposed by Lowe and the bag of words approach proposed by Nistér and Stewénius. The Lowe constellation approach is the one currently being used in the robot localization project of the COGNIRON project. This report is divided in two main sections. The first section is devoted to briefly review the currently used object recognition system, the Lowe approach, and bring to light the drawbacks found for object recognition in the context of indoor mobile robot navigation. Additionally the proposed improvements for the algorithm are described. In the second section the alternative bag of words method is reviewed, as well as several experiments conducted to evaluate its performance with our own object databases. Furthermore, some modifications to the original algorithm to make it suitable for object detection in unsegmented images are proposed.

La capa de persistènica : Java Data Objects

L'objectiu que es proposa aquest document és conèixer la problemàtica de la persistència dels objectes, trobar i estudiar les diferents solucions existents i estudiar-ne una de concreta, la capa de persistència JDO.

PERSONAL(ONTO) : Personalizing the Learning Process in Virtual Environments by means of Adaptive Formative Itineraries based on Reusable Learning Objects and Ontologies TIN2006-15107-C02

Personalization in e-learning allows the adaptation of contents, learning strategiesand educational resources to the competencies, previous knowledge or preferences of the student. This project takes a multidisciplinary perspective for devising standards-based personalization capabilities into virtual e-learning environments, focusing on the conceptof adaptive learning itinerary, using reusable learning objects as the basis of the system and using ontologies and semantic web technologies.

COINE Project : Cultural Objects in Networked Environments

La idea subjacent al Projecte de Recerca i Desenvolupament COINE és permetre a la gent contar les seves pròpies històries. COINE pretén proporcionar les eines necessàries per crear estructuradament, un entorn basat en el World Wide Web, que permeti compartir continguts. Els resultats del Projecte ajudaran al desenvolupament d'estàndards per a la implantació i la recuperació estructurades de recursos digitals en entorns en xarxa distribuïda. El Projecte de COINE s'inicià el març de 2002 i finalitzà l'agost de 2004. Avui en dia estem al WorkPackage 5 on estem construint el Sistema, el programari i les interfícies. COINE pretén cobrir la gamma més àmplia possible d'usuaris potencials, des d'organitzacions de patrimoni cultural i institucions de qualsevol mida (principalment biblioteques, arxius i museus) fins a individus de qualsevol edat sense habilitats en l'ús de les TIC, o a grups petits de ciutadans. Els usuaris no utilitzaran només COINE com a eina de cerca, sinó que contribuiran amb el seu propi contingut.

Discovering similarities in the time use patterns of the Spanish Autonomous Communities by Fuzzy techniques

In 2000 the European Statistical Office published the guidelines for developing theHarmonized European Time Use Surveys system. Under such a unified framework,the first Time Use Survey of national scope was conducted in Spain during 2002–03. The aim of these surveys is to understand human behavior and the lifestyle ofpeople. Time allocation data are of compositional nature in origin, that is, they aresubject to non-negativity and constant-sum constraints. Thus, standard multivariatetechniques cannot be directly applied to analyze them. The goal of this work is toidentify homogeneous Spanish Autonomous Communities with regard to the typicalactivity pattern of their respective populations. To this end, fuzzy clustering approachis followed. Rather than the hard partitioning of classical clustering, where objects areallocated to only a single group, fuzzy method identify overlapping groups of objectsby allowing them to belong to more than one group. Concretely, the probabilistic fuzzyc-means algorithm is conveniently adapted to deal with the Spanish Time Use Surveymicrodata. As a result, a map distinguishing Autonomous Communities with similaractivity pattern is drawn.Key words: Time use data, Fuzzy clustering; FCM; simplex space; Aitchison distance

Bandwidth allocation based on real time calculations using the convolution approach

This paper focuses on one of the methods for bandwidth allocation in an ATM network: the convolution approach. The convolution approach permits an accurate study of the system load in statistical terms by accumulated calculations, since probabilistic results of the bandwidth allocation can be obtained. Nevertheless, the convolution approach has a high cost in terms of calculation and storage requirements. This aspect makes real-time calculations difficult, so many authors do not consider this approach. With the aim of reducing the cost we propose to use the multinomial distribution function: the enhanced convolution approach (ECA). This permits direct computation of the associated probabilities of the instantaneous bandwidth requirements and makes a simple deconvolution process possible. The ECA is used in connection acceptance control, and some results are presented