Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Equilibrium asset prices and savings of heterogeneous agents in the presence of incomplete markets and portfolio constraints

We study the quantitative properties of a dynamic general equilibrium model in which agents face both idiosyncratic and aggregate income risk, state-dependent borrowing constraints that bind in some but not all periods and markets are incomplete. Optimal individual consumption-savings plans and equilibrium asset prices are computed under various assumptions about income uncertainty. Then we investigate whether our general equilibrium model with incomplete markets replicates two empirical observations: the high correlation between individual consumption and individual income, and the equity premium puzzle. We find that, when the driving processes are calibrated according to the data from wage income in different sectors of the US economy, the results move in the direction of explaining these observations, but the model falls short of explaining the observed correlations quantitatively. If the incomes of agents are assumed independent of each other, the observations can be explained quantitatively.

Incomplete markets, labor supply and capital accumulation

In this paper we explore the accumulation of capital in the presence oflimited insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, borrowing constraintsand endogenous labor supply. As in the exogenous labor supply case(e.g. Aiyagari 1994, Huggett 1997), we find that steady states arecharacterized with an interest rate smaller than the rate of timepreference. However,wealsofind that when labor supply is endogenous thepresence of uncertainty and a borrowing limit are not enough to giverise to aggregate precautionary savings .

The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit ofYoung (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi-strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest wecharacterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incompleteinformation of Nash's demand game, or a simple version ofthe so-called sealed bid double auction. For both gamesselection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesianequilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Stabilization versus insurance: Welfare effects of procyclical taxation under incomplete markets

We construct and calibrate a general equilibrium business cycle model with unemployment and precautionary saving. We compute the cost of business cycles and locate the optimum in a set of simple cyclical fiscal policies. Our economy exhibits productivity shocks, giving firms an incentive to hire more when productivity is high. However, business cycles make workers' income riskier, both by increasing the unconditional probability of unusuallylong unemployment spells, and by making wages more variable, and therefore they decrease social welfare by around one-fourth or one-third of 1% of consumption. Optimal fiscal policy offsets the cycle, holding unemployment benefits constant but varying the tax rate procyclically to smooth hiring. By running a deficit of 4% to 5% of output in recessions, the government eliminates half the variation in the unemployment rate, most of the variation in workers'aggregate consumption, and most of the welfare cost of business cycles.

Engineered Trx2p industrial yeast strain protects glycolysis and fermentation proteins from oxidative carbonylation during biomass propagation

Background: In the yeast biomass production process, protein carbonylation has severe adverse effects since it diminishes biomass yield and profitability of industrial production plants. However, this significant detriment of yeast performance can be alleviated by increasing thioredoxins levels. Thioredoxins are important antioxidant defenses implicated in many functions in cells, and their primordial functions include scavenging of reactive oxygen species that produce dramatic and irreversible alterations such as protein carbonylation. Results: In this work we have found several proteins specifically protected by yeast Thioredoxin 2 (Trx2p). Bidimensional electrophoresis and carbonylated protein identification from TRX-deficient and TRX-overexpressing cells revealed that glycolysis and fermentation-related proteins are specific targets of Trx2p protection. Indeed, the TRX2 overexpressing strain presented increased activity of the central carbon metabolism enzymes. Interestingly, Trx2p specifically preserved alcohol dehydrogenase I (Adh1p) from carbonylation, decreased oligomer aggregates and increased its enzymatic activity. Conclusions: The identified proteins suggest that the fermentative capacity detriment observed under industrial conditions in T73 wine commercial strain results from the oxidative carbonylation of specific glycolytic and fermentation enzymes. Indeed, increased thioredoxin levels enhance the performance of key fermentation enzymes such as Adh1p, which consequently increases fermentative capacity.

Weighted Hardy spaces for the unit disc: approximation properties

In this paper we study basic properties of the weighted Hardy space for the unit disc with the weight function satisfying Muckenhoupt's (Aq) condition, and study related approximation problems (expansion, moment and interpolation) with respect to two incomplete systems of holomorphic functions in this space.

Information networks and worker recruitment

This paper studies experimentally how the existence of social information networks affects the ways in which firms recruit new personnel. Through such networks firms learn about prospective employees' performance in previous jobs. Assuming individualistic preferences social networks are predicted not to affect overall labor market behavior, while with social preferences the prediction is that when bilaterally negotiated: (i) wages will be higher and (ii) that workers in jobs with incomplete contracts will respond with higher effort. Our experimental results are consistent with the social preferences view, both for the case of excess demand and excess supply of labor. In particular, the presence of information networks leads to more efficient allocations.

Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets

We analyse the implications of optimal taxation for the stochastic behaviour of debt. We show that when a government pursues an optimal fiscal policy under complete markets, the value of debt has the same or less persistence than other variables in the economy and it declines in response to shocks that cause the deficit to increase. By contrast, under incomplete markets debt shows more persistence than other variables and it increases in response to shocks that cause a higher deficit. Data for US government debt reveals diametrically opposite results from those of complete markets and is much more supportive of bond market incompleteness.

In Search of a theory of debt management

A growing literature integrates theories of debt management into models of optimal fiscal policy. One promising theory argues that the composition of government debt should be chosen so that fluctuations in the market value of debt offset changes in expected future deficits. This complete market approach to debt management is valid even when the government only issues non-contingent bonds. A number of authors conclude from this approach that governments should issue long term debt and invest in short term assets. We argue that the conclusions of this approach are too fragile to serve as a basis for policy recommendations. This is because bonds at different maturities have highly correlated returns, causing the determination of the optimal portfolio to be ill-conditioned. To make this point concrete we examine the implications of this approach to debt management in various models, both analytically and using numerical methods calibrated to the US economy. We find the complete market approach recommends asset positions which are huge multiples of GDP. Introducing persistent shocks or capital accumulation only worsens this problem. Increasing the volatility of interest rates through habits partly reduces the size of these simulations we find no presumption that governments should issue long term debt ? policy recommendations can be easily reversed through small perturbations in the specification of shocks or small variations in the maturity of bonds issued. We further extend the literature by removing the assumption that governments every period costlessly repurchase all outstanding debt. This exacerbates the size of the required positions, worsens their volatility and in some cases produces instability in debt holdings. We conclude that it is very difficult to insulate fiscal policy from shocks by using the complete markets approach to debt management. Given the limited variability of the yield curve using maturities is a poor way to substitute for state contingent debt. The result is the positions recommended by this approach conflict with a number of features that we believe are important in making bond markets incomplete e.g allowing for transaction costs, liquidity effects, etc.. Until these features are all fully incorporated we remain in search of a theory of debt management capable of providing robust policy insights.

QoS support in satellite and wireless networks: study under the network simulator (NS-2)

Aquest projecte es basa en l'estudi de l'oferiment de qualitat de servei en xarxes wireless i satel·litals. Per això l'estudi de les tècniques de cross-layer i del IEEE 802.11e ha sigut el punt clau per al desenvolupament teòric d’aquest estudi. Usant el simulador de xarxes network simulator, a la part de simulacions es plantegen tres situacions: l'estudi de la xarxa satel·lital, l'estudi del mètode d'accés HCCA i la interconnexió de la xarxa satel·lital amb la wireless. Encara que aquest últim punt, incomplet en aquest projecte, ha de ser la continuació per a futures investigacions.

Foundations for contest success functions

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the "type" of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the definition of new ones. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function. JEL Classification: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances).

Estimació de les emissions de metà generades per fermentació entèrica a la ramaderia bovina a Catalunya, com a font de gasos d'efecte hivernacle (GEH)

L’emissió de GEH generats per processos relacionats amb l’activitat antropogènica ha provocat que la temperatura mitjana de la Terra augmenti, originant el que es coneix com escalfament global. Les possibles conseqüències negatives per al conjunt de la biosfera han portat a l’adopció d’acords internacionals que obliguen als diferents Estats a realitzar Inventaris Nacionals d’Emissions a l’Atmosfera. El CH4, que és exhalat o eructat com a resultat del procés de fermentació entèrica dels remugants, genera un impacte que ha de ser quantificat en els diferents inventaris. En aquest projecte s’ha realitzat l’estimació del CH4 generat per la fermentació entèrica dels bovins a Catalunya. Per aquest objectiu s’han utilitat les equacions explicitades a les directrius del Panel Intergovernamental sobre el Canvi Climàtic (IPCC), així com l’equació de Cambra, L. et al. (2008) per a la determinació del factor de conversió Ym. El resultat final rebaixa les quantitats inventariades tant per l’administració catalana com per l’espanyola.

Venezuelan economic laboratory. The Case of the altruistic economy of Felipe Pérez Martí

Felipe Pérez Martí, who was the Venezuelan Minister of Planning and Development in the government of Hugo Chávez, proposes an economic model that he calls the altruistic economy or fourth way, which leads cooperative game theory to its logical extremes postulating a pure communism. Here we sustain that, first, it is impossible in the model of Pérez Martí to marginally allocate non-primary goods to those most in need or who most value them, facing a problem of defective economic calculation, and second, in order to achieve equality, he would have to replace his atomic local planners by a central planner, who would be unable to overcome the problem of imperfect and and incomplete information.