MSISpIC: A Probabilistic Scan Matching Algorithm Using a Mechanical Scanned Imaging Sonar

This paper compares two well known scan matching algorithms: the MbICP and the pIC. As a result of the study, it is proposed the MSISpIC, a probabilistic scan matching algorithm for the localization of an Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV). The technique uses range scans gathered with a Mechanical Scanning Imaging Sonar (MSIS), and the robot displacement estimated through dead-reckoning with the help of a Doppler Velocity Log (DVL) and a Motion Reference Unit (MRU). The proposed method is an extension of the pIC algorithm. Its major contribution consists in: 1) using an EKF to estimate the local path traveled by the robot while grabbing the scan as well as its uncertainty and 2) proposing a method to group into a unique scan, with a convenient uncertainty model, all the data grabbed along the path described by the robot. The algorithm has been tested on an AUV guided along a 600m path within a marina environment with satisfactory results

Singling out individual inventors from patent data

An increasing number of studies have sprung up in recent years seeking to identify individual inventors from patent data. Different heuristics have been suggested to use their names and other information disclosed in patent documents in order to find out “who is who” in patents. This paper contributes to this literature by setting forth a methodology to identify them using patents applied to the European Patent Office (EPO hereafter). As in the large part of this literature, we basically follow a three-steps procedure: (1) the parsing stage, aimed at reducing the noise in the inventor’s name and other fields of the patent; (2) the matching stage, where name matching algorithms are used to group possible similar names; (3) the filtering stage, where additional information and different scoring schemes are used to filter out these potential same inventors. The paper includes some figures resulting of applying the algorithms to the set of European inventors applying to the EPO for a large period of time.

Reconstrucció 3D : comparativa d'algoritmes de correspondència

En aquest projecte s'analitzen dos algoritmes de correspondència entre imatges amb l'objectiu d'accelerar el procés de reconstrucció 3D mitjançant MVS. S'analitza tot el procés de reconstrucció i a partir d'un software existent es fa la comparació de l'algoritme SIFT i l'algoritme BRISK. A partir dels tests realitzats es conclou que el BRISK és més ràpid i millor per a una reconstrucció 3D.

Singling out individual inventors from patent data

An increasing number of studies in recent years have sought to identify individual inventors from patent data. A variety of heuristics have been proposed for using the names and other information disclosed in patent documents to establish who is who in patents. This paper contributes to this literature by describing a methodology for identifying inventors using patents applied to the European Patent Office, EPO hereafter. As in much of this literature, we basically follow a threestep procedure : 1- the parsing stage, aimed at reducing the noise in the inventor’s name and other fields of the patent; 2- the matching stage, where name matching algorithms are used to group similar names; and 3- the filtering stage, where additional information and various scoring schemes are used to filter out these similarlynamed inventors. The paper presents the results obtained by using the algorithms with the set of European inventors applying to the EPO over a long period of time.

Clustering algorithms for anti-money laundering using graph theory and social network analysis

HEMOLIA (a project under European community’s 7th framework programme) is a new generation Anti-Money Laundering (AML) intelligent multi-agent alert and investigation system which in addition to the traditional financial data makes extensive use of modern society’s huge telecom data source, thereby opening up a new dimension of capabilities to all Money Laundering fighters (FIUs, LEAs) and Financial Institutes (Banks, Insurance Companies, etc.). This Master-Thesis project is done at AIA, one of the partners for the HEMOLIA project in Barcelona. The objective of this thesis is to find the clusters in a network drawn by using the financial data. An extensive literature survey has been carried out and several standard algorithms related to networks have been studied and implemented. The clustering problem is a NP-hard problem and several algorithms like K-Means and Hierarchical clustering are being implemented for studying several problems relating to sociology, evolution, anthropology etc. However, these algorithms have certain drawbacks which make them very difficult to implement. The thesis suggests (a) a possible improvement to the K-Means algorithm, (b) a novel approach to the clustering problem using the Genetic Algorithms and (c) a new algorithm for finding the cluster of a node using the Genetic Algorithm.

Comparing Random-based and k-Anonymity-Based Algorithms for Graph Anonymization

Recently, several anonymization algorithms have appeared for privacy preservation on graphs. Some of them are based on random-ization techniques and on k-anonymity concepts. We can use both of them to obtain an anonymized graph with a given k-anonymity value. In this paper we compare algorithms based on both techniques in orderto obtain an anonymized graph with a desired k-anonymity value. We want to analyze the complexity of these methods to generate anonymized graphs and the quality of the resulting graphs.

Comparing Random-based and k-Anonymity-Based Algorithms for Graph Anonymization

Recently, several anonymization algorithms have appeared for privacy preservation on graphs. Some of them are based on random-ization techniques and on k-anonymity concepts. We can use both of them to obtain an anonymized graph with a given k-anonymity value. In this paper we compare algorithms based on both techniques in orderto obtain an anonymized graph with a desired k-anonymity value. We want to analyze the complexity of these methods to generate anonymized graphs and the quality of the resulting graphs.

A linear optimization technique for graph pebbling

Graph pebbling is a network model for studying whether or not a given supply of discrete pebbles can satisfy a given demand via pebbling moves. A pebbling move across an edge of a graph takes two pebbles from one endpoint and places one pebble at the other endpoint; the other pebble is lost in transit as a toll. It has been shown that deciding whether a supply can meet a demand on a graph is NP-complete. The pebbling number of a graph is the smallest t such that every supply of t pebbles can satisfy every demand of one pebble. Deciding if the pebbling number is at most k is NP 2 -complete. In this paper we develop a tool, called theWeight Function Lemma, for computing upper bounds and sometimes exact values for pebbling numbers with the assistance of linear optimization. With this tool we are able to calculate the pebbling numbers of much larger graphs than in previous algorithms, and much more quickly as well. We also obtain results for many families of graphs, in many cases by hand, with much simpler and remarkably shorter proofs than given in previously existing arguments (certificates typically of size at most the number of vertices times the maximum degree), especially for highly symmetric graphs. Here we apply theWeight Function Lemma to several specific graphs, including the Petersen, Lemke, 4th weak Bruhat, Lemke squared, and two random graphs, as well as to a number of infinite families of graphs, such as trees, cycles, graph powers of cycles, cubes, and some generalized Petersen and Coxeter graphs. This partly answers a question of Pachter, et al., by computing the pebbling exponent of cycles to within an asymptotically small range. It is conceivable that this method yields an approximation algorithm for graph pebbling.

Testing Cayley graph densities

We present a computer-assisted analysis of combinatorial properties of the Cayley graphs of certain finitely generated groups: Given a group with a finite set of generators, we study the density of the corresponding Cayley graph, that is, the least upper bound for the average vertex degree (= number of adjacent edges) of any finite subgraph. It is known that an m-generated group is amenable if and only if the density of the corresponding Cayley graph equals to 2m. We test amenable and non-amenable groups, and also groups for which amenability is unknown. In the latter class we focus on Richard Thompson’s group F.

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Median stable matching for college admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Procedurally fair and stable matching

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.