38 resultados para governance of liberal democracy
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
The academic debate about the secession of a territory which is part of a liberal democracy state displays an initial contrast. On the one hand, practical secessionist movements usually legitimize their position using nationalist arguments linked to the principle of national self- determination. On the other hand, we find in academia few defenders of a normative principle of national self-determination. Philosophers, political scientists and jurists usually defend the status quo. And even when they do not defend it, most of them tend to leave the question of that question and secession unresolved or confused. Regarding this issue, liberal-democratic theories show a tendency to be “conservative” in relation to the political borders, regardless the historical and empirical processes of creation of current States. Probably, this feature is not far away to the fact that, since its beginning, political liberalism has not been a theory of the nation, but a theory of the state.
Resumo:
[spa] España no fue admitida en la Comunidad Económica Europea durante el régimen de Franco por razones políticas. Integrarse a la Comunidad Europea en enero de 1986 fue el último peldaño hacia la consolidación definitiva de la democracia en España y de la apertura de su economía.. Los resultados de los veinticinco años como miembro de la UE se han traducido en un impulso sin precedentes de modernización y progreso. España adoptó el “Acervo Comunitario” y recibió considerables beneficios de su integración a la Comunidad, eliminando barreras, siguiendo las políticas comunes, recibiendo fondos europeos y adoptando la moneda europea común. A partir de un nivel del 60% del promedio europeo de renta per capita en 1986, el nivel actual –incluso con la crisis que estalló en 2008- se sitúa en torno al 105 por ciento. Los últimos tres años han sido diferentes y difíciles como consecuencia de la severa crisis económica y financiera.En este contexto este trabajo analiza como los sucesivos gobiernos de España han organizado la gobernanza económica para adaptarla a los cambios cuantitativos y cualitativos que se han ido produciendo en la integración europea.
Resumo:
[spa] España no fue admitida en la Comunidad Económica Europea durante el régimen de Franco por razones políticas. Integrarse a la Comunidad Europea en enero de 1986 fue el último peldaño hacia la consolidación definitiva de la democracia en España y de la apertura de su economía.. Los resultados de los veinticinco años como miembro de la UE se han traducido en un impulso sin precedentes de modernización y progreso. España adoptó el “Acervo Comunitario” y recibió considerables beneficios de su integración a la Comunidad, eliminando barreras, siguiendo las políticas comunes, recibiendo fondos europeos y adoptando la moneda europea común. A partir de un nivel del 60% del promedio europeo de renta per capita en 1986, el nivel actual –incluso con la crisis que estalló en 2008- se sitúa en torno al 105 por ciento. Los últimos tres años han sido diferentes y difíciles como consecuencia de la severa crisis económica y financiera.En este contexto este trabajo analiza como los sucesivos gobiernos de España han organizado la gobernanza económica para adaptarla a los cambios cuantitativos y cualitativos que se han ido produciendo en la integración europea.
Resumo:
This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs arguments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimension of going from “contracts” to “hierarchies” has been ignored in the past and with it the so called “costs of ownership”. The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which participate Spanish firms, indicate that the cost of ownership may offset the benefits of hierarchical controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two.
Resumo:
The article investigates the private governance of financial markets by looking at the evolution of the regulatory debate on hedge funds in the US market. It starts from the premise that the privatization of regulation is always the result of a political decision and analyzes how this decision came about and was implemented in the case of hedge funds. The starting point is the failure of two initiatives on hedge funds that US regulators launched between 1999 an 2004, which the analysis explains by elaborating the concept of self-capture. Facing a trade off between the need to tackle publicly demonized issues and the difficulty of monitoring increasingly sophisticated and powerful private markets, regulators purposefully designed initiatives that were not meant to succeed, that is, they “self-captured” their own activity. By formulating initiatives that were inherently flawed, regulators saved their public role and at the same time paved the way for the privatization of hedge fund regulation. This explanation identifies a link between the failure of public initiatives and the success of private ones. It illustrates a specific case of formation of private authority in financial markets that points to a more general practice emerging in the regulation of finance.
Resumo:
Amb una història que data de la dècada de 1950, la EUREGIO és un de les més antigues euroregions a Europa. Es pot considerar com un cas exitós d'una regió transfronterera (CBR) en el sentit que s'ha establert fermament com una agència de fronteres dins del seu tram de la frontera holandesa-alemanya. L'EUREGIO també ha estat una de les protagonistes principals darrere de l'Associació de Regions Frontereres Europees (ARFE), que en les últimes dècades va actuar per difondre el model d'euroregió a tot el territori europeu. Aquest capítol té diversos objectius. En primer lloc, es presenta el cas de la EUREGIO i presenta evidència sobre la seva història, estructura orgànica i polítiques. En segon lloc, s'analitzen les condicions del context en què la EUREGIO ha sorgit i les estructures de govern que es van crear com a resultat. Es fa especial èmfasi en la posició i el paper de l'Euroregió en el context més ampli del marc de governança europea multinivell generat per la política de cohesió de la UE. El capítol conclou amb un intent d'avaluar l'èxit i l'impacte de la EUREGIO i una discussió dels reptes relacionats amb la doble funció de l'EUREGIO com a representant dels interessos de les autoritats locals i les agències de cohesió de la UE posada en pràctica de les polítiques.
Resumo:
For years a literature on the uses that political parties make of information andcommunication technologies (ICTs) has been developed. It is a rapidly increasing, rich,and interesting field in the forefront of the investigation in political science. Generally,these works start from the expectation that the ICTs have a regenerative potential forliberal democracies and for the political parties as well. In developed societies, politicalparties have experienced some transformations that have leaded them to an increasingdivorce with the public. This divorce is shown by the decay of party adscription andmembership, and also by the decay of the conventional political participation. In thetheoretical discussion this situation has been described as ¿the crisis of the democracy¿(Norris, 1999). According to the more radically oriented scholars this crisis reflects theincapacities of liberal democracies. In this sense, ICTs suppose a great opportunity tosurpass the representative institutions and to institutionalize new forms of directdemocracy. More moderate scholars have considered that ICTs offer the opportunity for¿renaissance¿ for representative institutions, as they can reinforce the bonds between thepublic and its representatives.
Resumo:
Federal Capitals often have special statutes. Compared with member states, they often enjoy a lower degree of self-government and a lesser share in the governing of the federation. Why do actors choose such devices, and how can they be justified in a liberal democracy? Surprisingly, the burgeoning literature on asymmetric federalism (to which our research group has contributed significantly) has overlooked this important feature of a de iure asymmetry, perhaps because political theory up to now has concentrated on cases of multicultural and plurinational federations. However, comparative literature is also rare. This paper is the first step to filling in this gap by comparing some federal capitals. The Federal District model (Washington) is compared to capitals organized as member-states (Berlin and Brussels), and capitals that are cities belonging to a single member state (Ottawa in Ontario). The different features of de iure asymmetry will thereby be highlighted. Some light will be shed on the possible motives, reasons and justifications for the choice of each respective status. The paper opens the door to further research on such status questions by analysing public and parliamentary debates, for example. It paves the way for more thorough research. Sicne the author has been awarded a grant by the Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, this research will be carried out soon.
Resumo:
In this article, I firstly offer a synthesis of a brief set of analytical elements of the theory of democracy and federalism established in the recent debate which identify a number of flaws in the normative and institutional bases of plurinational democracies. It is necessary to overcome these flaws in order to achieve a true political and constitutional recognition and accommodation of the national pluralism of this kind of liberal democracies (section 1). Secondly, we will focus on the Spanish case of the “Estado de las Autonomías” taking into account the recent reform of the Catalan constitutional law (Estatut d’autonomia 2006) (section 2). A final section makes a number of concluding remarks relating the previously highlighted elements of the theory of democracy and federalism with the analysis of the Catalan case (section 3).
Resumo:
Using historical data for all Swiss cantons from 1890 to 2000, we estimate the causal effect of direct democracy on government spending. The main innovation in this paper is that we use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity and instrumental variables to address the potential endogeneity of institutions. We find that the budget referendum and lower costs to launch a voter initiative are effective tools in reducing canton level spending. However, we find no evidence that the budget referendum results in more decentralized government or a larger local government. Our instrumental variable estimates suggest that a mandatory budget referendum reduces the size of canton spending between 13 and 19 percent. A 1 percent lower signature requirement for the initiative reduces canton spending by up to 2 percent.
Resumo:
Political actors use ICTs in a different manner and in different degrees when it comes to achieving a closer relationship between the public and politicians. Usually, political parties develop ICT strategies only for electoral campaigning and therefore restrain ICT usages to providing information and establishing a few channels of communication. By contrast, local governments make much more use of ICT tools for participatory and deliberative purposes. These differences in usages have not been well explained in the literature because of a lack of a comprehensive explanatory model. This chapter seeks to build the basis for this model, that is, to establish which factors affect and condition different political uses of ICTs and which principles underlie that behaviour. We consider that political actors are intentional and their behaviour is mediated by the political institutions and the socioeconomic context of the country. Also, though, the actor¿s own characteristics, such as the type and size of the organization or the model of e-democracy that the actor upholds, can have an influence in launching ICT initiatives for approaching the public.
Resumo:
Peer-reviewed
Resumo:
This paper examines the governance of Spanish Banks around two main issues. First, does a poor economic performance activate those governance interventions that favor the removal of executive directors and the merger of non-performing banks? And second, does the relationship between governance intervention and economic performance vary with the ownership form of the bank? Our results show that a bad performance does activate governance mechanisms in banks, although for the case of Savings Banks intervention is confined to a merger or acquisition. Nevertheless, the distinct ownership structure of Savings Banks does not fully protect non-performing banks from disappearing. Product-market competition compensates for those weak internal governance mechanisms that result from an ownership form which gives voice to several stakeholder groups.
Resumo:
One of the most notable characteristics of the change in governance of the past two decades has been the restructuring of the state, most notably the delegation of authority from politicians and ministries to technocrats and regulatory agencies. Our unique dataset on the extent of these reforms in seven sectors in 36 countries reveals the widespread diffusion of these reforms in recent decades. In 1986 there were only 23 agencies across these sectors and countries (less than one agency per country); by 2002 this number had increased more than seven-fold, to 169. On average these 36 countries each have more than four agencies in the seven sectors studied. Yet the widespread diffusion of these reforms is characterized by cross-regional and cross-sectoral variations. Our data reveal two major variations: first, reforms are more widespread in economic regulation that in social spheres; second, regulatory agencies in the social spheres are more widespread in Europe than in Latin America. Why these variations in the spread of the reforms? In this paper we present for the first time the regulatory gaps across regions and sectors and then move on to offer some explanations for these gaps in a way that sheds some light on the nature of these reforms and on their limits. Our explanatory framework combines diffusion and structural explanations and in doing so sheds new light on the global diffusion of public policy ideas.