29 resultados para game studies
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
This note reviews the political-scientific literature on European competition policy (ECP) in the 2000s. Based on a data set extracted from four well-known journals, and using an upfront methodology and explicit criteria, it analyzes the literature both quantitatively and qualitatively. On the quantitative side, it shows that, although a few sub-policy areas are still neglected, ECP is not the under-researched policy it used to be. On the qualitative side, the literature has greatly improved since the 1990s: Almost all articles now present a clear research question, and most advance specific theoretical claims/hypotheses. Yet, improvements can be made on research design, statistical testing, and, above all, state-of-the-art theorizing (e.g. in the game-theoretical treatment of delegation problems). Indeed, it is paradoxical that ECP specialists do not pay more attention to theoretical questions which are so central to the actual policy area they study.
Resumo:
I describe the customer valuations game, a simple intuitive game that can serve as a foundation for teaching revenue management. The game requires little or no preparation, props or software, takes around two hours (and hence can be finished in one session), and illustrates the formation of classical (airline and hotel) revenue management mechanisms such as advanced purchase discounts, booking limits and fixed multiple prices. I normally use the game as a base to introduce RM and to develop RM forecasting and optimization concepts off it. The game is particularly suited for non-technical audiences.
Resumo:
We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.
Resumo:
This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.
Resumo:
The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.
Resumo:
This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game
Resumo:
Export activities are a major source of economic growth and are considered important both at the national level and for individual businesses. Moreover, in the case of SMEs, they gain particular relevance, exporting being the most common foreign market entry mode for these firms. The decision maker’s role in the export activity is crucial, particularly in the case of SMEs. However, the extant literature on internationalization is characterized by a lack of consensus among scholars as to what constitutes the managerial factor in determining exporting. Therefore, this study focuses on the following issue: Which are the decision maker’s characteristics and perceptions that may influence the export behaviour of Catalan SMEs? To address this question a multiple case study method is applied across four Catalan exporting SMEs. The methodology chosen for analysing the empirical data is relying on the proposition testing approach while the investigation is conducted including both within and cross-case analysis. The findings show that high educational level, language skills, high risk tolerance, innovativeness as well as strongly perceived export stimuli as compared to low and easy to overcome export barriers positively influence the export involvement and development of SMEs. The study provides further insights into the research topic by jointly studying managerial characteristics and perceptions. Additionally, the majority of research on exporting topics has been carried out in the USA, so there is a clear need of investigation in the field in other countries, moreover in Spain where the exporting activities have not been as widely studied.
Resumo:
In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.
Resumo:
The appeal to ideas as causal variables and/or constitutive features of political processes increasingly characterises political analysis. Yet, perhaps because of the pace of this ideational intrusion, too often ideas have simply been grafted onto pre-existing explanatory theories at precisely the point at which they seem to get into difficulties, with little or no consideration either of the status of such ideational variables or of the character or consistency of the resulting theoretical hybrid. This is particularly problematic for ideas are far from innocent variables – and can rarely, if ever, be incorporated seamlessly within existing explanatory and/or constitutive theories without ontological and epistemological consequence. We contend that this tendency along with the limitations of the prevailing Humean conception of causality, and associated epistemological polemic between causal and constitutive logics, continue to plague almost all of the literature that strives to accord an explanatory role to ideas. In trying to move beyond the current vogue for epistemological polemic, we argue that the incommensurability thesis between causal and constitutive logics is only credible in the context of a narrow, Humean, conception of causation. If we reject this in favour of a more inclusive (and ontologically realist) understanding then it is perfectly possible to chart the causal significance of constitutive processes and reconstrue the explanatory role of ideas as causally constitutive.
Resumo:
We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.
Resumo:
This paper surveys recent evidence on the determinants of (national and/or foreign) industrial location. We find that the basic analytical framework has remained essentially unaltered since the early contributions of the early 1980's while, in contrast, there have been significant advances in the quality of the data and, to a lesser extent, the econometric modelling. We also identify certain determinants (neoclassical and institutional factors) that tend to provide largely consistent results across the reviewed studies. In light of this evidence, we finally suggest future lines of research.
Resumo:
Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada al departament de Women’s Studies de la Universitat de Wisconsin, Estats Units, entre agost i novembre del 2007. Aquesta recerca està directament relacionada amb el desenvolupament d’una tesi doctoral sobre la socialització de les dones víctimes de violència de gènere. En el transcurs d’aquesta estada es van analitzar investigacions de qualitat científica sobre socialització de les dones víctimes de violència de gènere realitzades als Estats Units; es va participar en jornades, seminaris i conferències sobre violència de gènere; i es van recollir recursos i mesures, proposats per diferents moviments socials, per atendre a les víctimes i prevenir la violència de gènere. Entre els resultats obtinguts de la recerca cal destacar que les investigacions més recents sobre violència de gènere coincideixen en afirmar que es tracta d’una problemàtica vinculada als nostres aprenentatges socials. Trobem un gran nombre de recerques que han treballat sobre les causes per les quals les dones romanen en relacions de violència o reincideixen. Generalment aquestes son causes estructurals (factors econòmics, fills o filles en comú, falta de recolzament social, etc.), o bé emocionals (el fet d’estar enamorades). Aquestes recerques mostren un buit, el qual serà treballat en una tesi doctoral, un cop superades les barreres estructurals quins son els motius que dificulten la finalització de la relació de violència? Quins aspectes hem de treballar per trencar els vincles afectius i l’enamorament?
Resumo:
Report for the scientific sojourn carried out at the Institut de Biologia Molecular de Barcelona of the CSIC –state agency – from april until september 2007. Topoisomerase I is an essential nuclear enzyme that modulates the topological status of DNA, facilitating DNA helix unwinding during replication and transcription. We have prepared the oligonucleotide-peptide conjugate Ac-NLeu-Asn-Tyr(p-3’TTCAGAAGC5’)-LeuC-CONH-(CH2)6-OH as model compound for NMR studies of the Topoisomerase I- DNA complex. Special attention was made on the synthetic aspects for the preparation of this challenging compound especially solid supports and protecting groups. The desired peptide was obtained although we did not achieve the amount of the conjugate needed for NMR studies. Most probably the low yield is due to the intrinsic sensitive to hydrolysis of the phosphate bond between oligonucleotide and tyrosine. We have started the synthesis and the structural characterization of oligonucleotides carrying intercalating compounds. At the present state we have obtained model duplex and quadruplex sequences modified with acridine and NMR studies are underway. In addition to this project we have successfully resolved the structure of a fusion peptide derived from hepatitis C virus envelope synthesized by the group of Dr. Haro and we have synthesized and started the characterization of a modified G-quadruplex.
Resumo:
An abundant scientific literature about climate change economics points out that the future participation of developing countries in international environmental policies will depend on their amount of pay offs inside and outside specific agreements. These studies are aimed at analyzing coalitions stability typically through a game theoretical approach. Though these contributions represent a corner stone in the research field investigating future plausible international coalitions and the reasons behind the difficulties incurred over time to implement emissions stabilizing actions, they cannot disentangle satisfactorily the role that equality play in inducing poor regions to tackle global warming. If we focus on the Stern Review findings stressing that climate change will generate heavy damages and policy actions will be costly in a finite time horizon, we understand why there is a great incentive to free ride in order to exploit benefits from emissions reduction efforts of others. The reluctance of poor countries in joining international agreements is mainly supported by historical responsibility of rich regions in generating atmospheric carbon concentration, whereas rich countries claim that emissions stabilizing policies will be effective only when developing countries will join them.Scholars recently outline that a perceived fairness in the distribution of emissions would facilitate a wide spread participation in international agreements. In this paper we overview the literature about distributional aspects of emissions by focusing on those contributions investigating past trends of emissions distribution through empirical data and future trajectories through simulations obtained by integrated assessment models. We will explain methodologies used to elaborate data and the link between real data and those coming from simulations. Results from this strand of research will be interpreted in order to discuss future negotiations for post Kyoto agreements that will be the focus of the next. Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen at the end of 2009. A particular attention will be devoted to the role that technological change will play in affecting the distribution of emissions over time and to how spillovers and experience diffusion could influence equality issues and future outcomes of policy negotiations.
Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information
Resumo:
The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.