Wage structures and family economies in the Catalan textile industry in an age of nascent capitalism

This paper deals with changes in managerial practices in Catalonia in anage of nascent capitalism (1830-1925) and adaptive family strategies inorder to face the absence of state welfare. During the 19 t h Century andin the absence of recorded labor contracts, human resources of the firmwere organized by means of implicit contracts and informal labor markets.With the advent of scientific organization of labor, wage per hour workedbegan to be recorded. This is why in the 1920s the perfect competitionmodel applies to our case. On the other hand, in the same period, and inthe absence of state welfare, ideas stemming from cooperative game theoryapply to the pattern of household income formation. Kin related networkswere used to improve the living standards of the household. In thisparticular direction we also show that there was a demonstration effectby means of which migrant s living standards were higher than those ofnatives.

The credit ratings game

The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007-2008has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the conflicts of interestin the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit RatingsAgencies (CRAs) in which there are three possible sources of conflicts: 1) the CRA conflictof interest of understating credit risk to attract more business; 2) the ability of issuersto purchase only the most favorable ratings; and 3) the trusting nature of some investorclienteles who may take ratings at face value. We show that when combined, these give riseto three fundamental equilibrium distortions. First, competition among CRAs can reducemarket efficiency, as competition facilitates ratings shopping by issuers. Second, CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings in boom times, when there are more trusting investors, andwhen the risks of failure which could damage CRA reputation are lower. Third, the industrypractice of tranching of structured products distorts market efficiency as its role is to deceivetrusting investors. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring: i) upfront paymentsfor rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer), ii) mandatory disclosure ofany rating produced by CRAs, and iii) oversight of ratings methodology can substantiallymitigate ratings inflation and promote efficiency.

External sources of innovation and industry-university interaction:evidence from Spanish firms

This paper is about the firm innovation process and the cooperation of the innovative firms with other firms and public institutions. A special attention is paid to the cooperation with universities. We use the Technological Innovation Survey (TIS) from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Spain) in order to obtain data for 4,159 innovative firms. Our results show that firm's cooperation activities are closely linked to the characteristics of the industry and the firm as well as to the origin of public funds for R&D activities. Key words: Innovation, universities, Spanish economy. JEL code: O31, I20, L60

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

New business formation and employment growth: some evidence for the Spanish manufacturing industry

This paper explores the effects of new business formation on employment growth in Spanish manufacturing industries. New firms are believed to make an important contribution to economic growth but the extent of this contribution is unclear. We consider time lags of new firm formation as explanatory variables of employment change and identify how long the effect of new firm entries on employment lasts. Our main results show that the effects of new business formation are positive in the short term, negative in the medium term and positive in the long term, thus confirming the existence of indirect supply-side effects found in similar studies for other countries. Key words: regional growth, firm entry, time lags and Spanish economy. JEL classifications: L00, L60, R11, R12

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

Transferring QTL technology to the pig breeding industry (PigQTech) - a demonstration project

The aim of the project has been to demonstrate how the farm animal breeding industry can utilise gene mapping technology to accelerate genetic improvement. Previous theoretical studies had suggested that the use of marker assisted selection could potentially increase the annual improvement for quantitative traits like backfat with about 10% and for more difficult traits such as meat quality and reproduction by as much as 40-60% compared with existing technology. The work has comprised two major tasks: 1. Commercially relevant populations have been screened for segregation at QTLs identified in experimental populations. The aim has been to establish optimal strategies for QTL detection in commercial pig populations and the extent to which QTLs explaining major phenotypic differences between divergent lines used in experimental studies also explain quantitative variation within commercial lines. The results are important for specifying future strategies for finding economically valuable QTLs. 2. Marker assisted backcrossing has been used to demonstrate how a QTL allele can be introgressed from one breed to another. The work has focused on the major fatness QTL on pig chromosome 4 previously identified in a wild pig/Large White intercross. The end result was not designed to be a commercially viable product in its own right, but the process has validated a number of points of major importance for the exploitation of QTLs in livestock.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Desenvolupament d'un videojoc en 3D

La industria de los videojuegos crece exponencialmente y está ya superando a otras industrias punteras del ocio. En este proyecto, nos hemos planteado la realización de un videojuego con visualización en el espacio real 3D. Para la realización del videojuego se ha usado el siguiente software: Blender para diseñar los modelos 3D, C++ como lenguaje de programación para desarrollar el código y un conjunto de librerías básicas para desarrollar un videojuego llamadas Ogre3d (Motor Gráfico). La lógica del movimiento 3D y los choques entre las partículas del juego ha sido diseñada enteramente en este proyecto acorde con las necesidades del videojuego, y de forma compatible a los ficheros de Blender y a las librerías OGRE3D.

Which firms want PhDs? The effect of the university-industry relationship on the PhD labour market

PhD graduates hold the highest education degree, are trained to conduct research and can be considered a key element in the creation, commercialization and diffusion of innovations. The impact of PhDs on innovation and economic development takes place through several channels such as the accumulation of scientific capital stock, the enhancement of technology transfers and the promotion of cooperation relationships in innovation processes. Although the placement of PhDs in industry provides a very important mechanism for transmitting knowledge from universities to firms, information about the characteristics of the firms that employ PhDs is very scarce. The goal of this paper is to improve understanding of the determinants of the demand for PhDs in the private sector. Three main potential determinants of the demand for PhDs are considered: cooperation between firms and universities, R&D activities of firms and several characteristics of firms, size, sector, productivity and age. The results from the econometric analysis show that cooperation between firms and universities encourages firms to recruit PhDs and point to the existence of accumulative effects in the hiring of PhD graduates.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Industrial district effects and innovation in the Tuscan shipbuilding industry

The aim of the present work is to investigate innovative processes within a geographical cluster, and thus contribute to the debate on the effects of industrial clusters on innovation capacity. In particular, we would like to ascertain whether the advantages of industrial districts in promoting innovation, as already revealed by literature (diffusion of knowledge, social capital and trust, efficient networking), are also keys to success in the Tuscan shipbuilding industry of pleasure and sporting boats. First, we verify the existence of clusters of shipbuilding in Tuscany, using a specific methodology. Next, in the identified clusters, we analyse three innovative networks financed in a policy to support innovation, and examine whether the typical features of a cluster for promoting innovation are at work, using a questionnaire administered to 71 actors. Finally, we develop a performance analysis of the cluster firms and ascertain whether their different behaviours also lead to different performances. The analysis results show that our case records effects of industrial clustering on innovation capacity, such as the important role given to trust and social capital, the significant worth put in interfirm relations and in each partner’s specific competencies, or even the distinctive performance of firms belonging to a cluster.