Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

Sharing the surplus: a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

Caracterización y distribución de la fauna íctica en la subcuenca del río Quiroz, Ayabaca (Perú)

En el present treball es determinen les espècies de peixos de la subconca del riu Quiroz i es coneix la distribució d’aquestes espècies a la subconca segons la influència de l’altitut i la interacció de les activitats humanes en els cossos d’aigua. Així mateix, s’analitza la qualitat de l’aigua de la conca. Es van capturar 258 individus de 13 taxons diferents i corresponents a 7 famílies en 20 punts distribuïts per tota la subconca mitjançant xarxes passives (gànguils i gamber), actives (rall) i ham. La major abundància i riquesa d’espècies es dona a les parts baixes de la subconca la qual rep majors aportacions de nutrients d’aigües amunt i on les temperatures són més altes. La qualitat de l’aigua estimada mitjançant les concentracions de paràmetres analitzats mostren un risc d’epidèmies degut a les altes concentracions de coliformes associades a l’abocament d’aigües servides directament als cossos d’aigua.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

Investor protection and income inequality: risk sharing vs risk taking

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, entrepreneurial risk taking and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more firms to undertake risky projects. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, investor protection raises income inequality to the extent that it fosters risk taking, while it reduces it for a given level of risk taking. Empirical evidence from a panel of forty-five countries spanning the period 1976-2000 supports the predictions of the model.

Estudi de la flora i la fauna d'una zona agroforestal del sud d'Osona

L’objectiu general de l’estudi és tenir un coneixement de les espècies de flora i fauna presents en una àrea agroforestal situada al sud de la comarca d’Osona. A nivell específic, s’ha laborat un llistat de les espècies de flora i fauna presents tan exhaustiu com ha estat possible, s’han caracteritzat les comunitats vegetals presents, s’ha avaluat la població d’algunes espècies de vertebrats presents, s’han identificat els punts d’interès per a la conservació de certes espècies i, finalment, s’han establert prioritats de conservació dins l’àrea d’estudi.

Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment.

Fauna silvestre del Parc del Garraf. Afectacions al sector primari

El Parc del Garraf (PG) ha estat tradicionalment una important zona agrícola, encara que actualment és molt reduïda (representa el 3% del total de la superfície del parc) i està repartida entre unes poques masies. Aquesta activitat humana conviu amb la fauna silvestre de la zona, que en alimentar-se parcialment dels cultius (cereal, vinya, oliveres, arbres fruiters i hortalisses), hi causa diversos impactes. És el cas de diverses aus, com ara la garsa (Pica Pica) i el pardal (Passer domesticus), i també d’alguns mamífers com el porc senglar (Sus scrofa). Hem observat que l’impacte produït per les aus i el porc senglar (Sus scrofa) és molt petit, el que pot ser degut a dos motius principals: possiblement per una elevada producció de fruits salvatges, esdevenint aquest aliment suficient per a les aus; i la baixa densitat poblacional de porc senglar (Sus scrofa) al parc. Els impactes observats presenten una alta variabilitat i depenen de l’època de l’any en que ens trobem. Per tant, cal fer-ne un seguiment més acurat on s’impliquin administració i pagesos per a millorar el coneixement de l’impacte de la fauna salvatge.

La fauna daliniana : una aproximació al seu significat

Tracta d'aproximar-nos al significat que Dalí va donar a tota la fauna que surt a la seva obra artística. Intentar esbrinar quina època pictòrica va influir més en la fauna daliniana. Aquesta aproximació s'ha fet mitjançant l'estudi de l'obra escrita i l'obra pictòrica de Dalí.

How to foster sharing of educational resources?

The future of OER is highly dependent on the future of education in general. A future that will be determined by major changes in society that demand more people with a higher education and life long learning. Each vision for the long term future needs to take the qualitative and quantitative demands into account. Backcasting from a vision we arrive at useful steps to take, some of which we managed to start up in the form of pilots as part of the European research project Share.TEC.

TwHistory : Sharing History Using Twitter

In light of the fact that several studies indicate that students can benefit from deeper understandings of the processes by which historical accounts are constructed, history educators have increasingly been focused on finding ways to teach students how to read and reason about events in the same manner as professional historians (Wineburg, 2001; Spoehr & Spoehr, 1994; Hynd, Holschuh, & Hubbard, 2004; Wiley & Voss, 1996). One possible resource for supporting this development may come out of emerging web-based technologies. New technologies and increased access to historical records and artifacts posted the Internet may be precisely the tools that can help students (Bass, Rosenzweig, & Mason, 1999). Given the right context, we believe it is possible to combine such resources and tools to create an environment for students that could strengthen their abilities to read and reason about historical events. Moreover, we believe that social media, specifically, microblogging (Nardi, Schiano, Gumbrecht, & Swartz, 2004) could play a key role.

Aproximació a la fauna malacològica de l'estany de Banyoles mitjançant l'anàlisi de les restes retingudes pel sediment

Es dóna un llistat de les espècies de mol·luscs presents a les mostres de dragatges efectuats a l'Estany de Banyoles durant el mes de juliol de 1985. Es constata que, excepte per al bivalve Pisidium casertanum, la resta de mol.luscs (tots gasteròpodes) dels que només es va trobar la closca, corresponen a exemplars de la fauna malacològica de les ribes de l'estany o de les rieres que hi aboquen, que haurien estat transportats passivament fins on varen ser trobats

La Connectivitat biològica entre el massís de l' Albera i el massís de les Salines: una aproximació des de la fauna vertebrada

Aquest projecte pretén estudiar la falta de connectivitat biològica entre la serra de l' Albera i el massís de les Salines (Pirineu empordanès)