EEG windowed statistical wavelet scoring for evaluation and discrimination of muscular artifacts

EEG recordings are usually corrupted by spurious extra-cerebral artifacts, which should be rejected or cleaned up by the practitioner. Since manual screening of human EEGs is inherently error prone and might induce experimental bias, automatic artifact detection is an issue of importance. Automatic artifact detection is the best guarantee for objective and clean results. We present a new approach, based on the time–frequency shape of muscular artifacts, to achieve reliable and automatic scoring. The impact of muscular activity on the signal can be evaluated using this methodology by placing emphasis on the analysis of EEG activity. The method is used to discriminate evoked potentials from several types of recorded muscular artifacts—with a sensitivity of 98.8% and a specificity of 92.2%. Automatic cleaning ofEEGdata are then successfully realized using this method, combined with independent component analysis. The outcome of the automatic cleaning is then compared with the Slepian multitaper spectrum based technique introduced by Delorme et al (2007 Neuroimage 34 1443–9).

Ambiguity seeking as a result of the status quo bias

Several factors affect attitudes toward ambiguity. What happens, however, when peopleare asked to exchange an ambiguous alternative in their possession for an unambiguousone? We present three experiments in which individuals preferred to retain the former.This status quo bias emerged both within- and between-subjects, with and withoutincentives, with different outcome distributions, and with endowments determined byboth the experimenter and the participants themselves. Findings emphasize the need toaccount for the frames of reference under which evaluations of probabilistic informationtake place as well as modifications that should be incorporated into descriptive modelsof decision making.

Measuring risk aversion with lists: A new bias

Various experimental procedures aimed at measuring individual risk aversion involve alist of pairs of alternative prospects. We first study the widely used method by Holt andLaury (2002), for which we find that the removal of some items from the lists yields asystematic decrease in risk aversion. This bias is quite distinct from other confoundsthat have been previously observed in the use of the Holt and Laury method. It may berelated to empirical phenomena and theoretical developments where better prospectsincrease risk aversion. Nevertheless, we have also found that the more recent elicitationmethod due to Abdellaoui et al. (2011), also based on lists, does not display anystatistically significant bias when the corresponding items of the list are removed. Ourresults suggest that methods other than the popular Holt and Laury one may bepreferable for the measurement of risk aversion.

Risk aversion and embedding bias

In Selten (1967) ?Strategy Method,? the second mover in the game submits a complete strategy. This basic idea has been exported to nonstrategic experiments, where a participant reports a complete list of contingent decisions, one for each situation or state in a given sequence, out of which one and only one state, randomly selected, will be implemented.In general, the method raises the following concern. If S0 and S1 are two differentsequences of states, and state s is in both S0 and S1, would the participant make the same decision in state s when confronted with S0 as when confronted with S1? If not, the experimental results are suspect of suffering from an ?embedding bias.?We check for embedding biases in elicitation methods of Charles Holt and Susan Laury(Laury and Holt, 2000, and Holt and Laury, 2002), and of the present authors (Bosch-Dom?nech and Silvestre, 1999, 2002, 2006a, b) by appropriately chosen replications of the original experiments. We find no evidence of embedding bias in our work. But in Holt and Laury?s method participants tend to switch earlier to the riskier option when later pairs of lotteries are eliminated from the sequence, suggesting the presence of some embedding bias.

Collusion in growing and shrinking markets: empirical evidence from experimental duopolies

We study collusive behaviour in experimental duopolies that compete in prices under dynamic demand conditions. In one treatment the demand grows at a constant rate. In the other treatment the demand declines at another constant rate. The rates are chosen so that the evolution of the demand in one case is just the reverse in time than the one for the other case. We use a box-design demand function so that there are no issues of finding and co-ordinating on the collusive price. Contrary to game-theoretic reasoning, our results show that collusion is significantly larger when the demand shrinks than when it grows. We conjecture that the prospect of rapidly declining profit opportunities exerts a disciplining effect on firms that facilitates collusion and discourages deviation.

Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism

Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) and Veszteg (2004) propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results to test the practical tractability and effectiveness of the multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory: it provided the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to the theoretical bidding behavior.

A change would do you good . . . An experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically converges to an inefficient outcome with employees failing to coordinate at high effort levels. The experimental design then explores the effects of varying the financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. We find that an increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but, surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subj

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation.

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms effectively behave in this way. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) propose a game with a specific sequence of moves and partially-recoverable capacity costs in which forward induction provides a theoretical rationalization for firm behavior in the field. We conduct an experiment with a game inspired by their work. In our data the incumbent tends to keep the market, in contrast to what the forward induction argument of Bagwell and Ramey would suggest. The results indicate that players perceive that the first mover has an advantage without having to pre-commit capacity. In our game, evolution and learning do not drive out this perception. We back these claims with data analysis, a theoretical framework for dynamics, and simulation results.

Can genetic algorithms explain experimental anomalies? An application to common property resources

It is common to find in experimental data persistent oscillations in the aggregate outcomes and high levels of heterogeneity in individual behavior. Furthermore, it is not unusual to find significant deviations from aggregate Nash equilibrium predictions. In this paper, we employ an evolutionary model with boundedly rational agents to explain these findings. We use data from common property resource experiments (Casari and Plott, 2003). Instead of positing individual-specific utility functions, we model decision makers as selfish and identical. Agent interaction is simulated using an individual learning genetic algorithm, where agents have constraints in their working memory, a limited ability to maximize, and experiment with new strategies. We show that the model replicates most of the patterns that can be found in common property resource experiments.

The effect of candidate quality on electoral equilibrium: an experimental study

When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments, and find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they canbe explained by quantal response equilibrium.

Do market conditions affect gift exchange? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand

We study whether people's behavior in unbalanced gift exchange markets with repeated interaction are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets, which vary only with respect to whether first or second movers are on the long side of the market. The direction of market imbalance could influence subjects' behavior, as second movers (workers) might react differently to favorable actions by first movers (firms) in the two cases. While our data show strong deviations from the standard game-theoretic prediction, we find mainly secondary treatment effects. Wage offers are not higher when there is an excess supply of firms, and workers do not respond more favorably to a given wage when there is an excess supply of labor. The state of competition does not appear to have strong effects in our data. We also present data from single-period sessions that show substantial gift exchange even without repeated interactions.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

El Taller de traducción como metodología didáctica experimental en un marco epistemológico socioconstructivista y humanista

Aquest treball de recerca presenta les diferents fases d’un experiment pilot que vaig projectar i realitzar dins l’àmbit de l’ensenyament de la traducció a un context universitari. L’experiment va consistir en l’aplicació i observació d’una metodologia didàctica innovadora, amb una base epistemològica socioconstructivista i humanista, i en l’avaluació dels resultats obtinguts. Per l’experiment pilot vaig seleccionar com a marc teòric el model socioconstructivista del procés d’ensenyament i aprenentatge proposat per Williams i Burden (1997), que integra instàncies constructivistes, interaccionistes i humanistes. En aquest àmbit vaig elaborar una metodologia didàctica innovadora, el “Taller de Traducció”, modelat sobre el Constructivist Workshop proposat per Don Kiraly (2000: 62-64) al qual vaig aportar algunes modificacions per adequar-lo al context diferent d’ensenyament. El disseny experimental basat en la utilització d’un grup experimental i d’un de control, preveu el recurs a instruments de recollida de dades qualitatives i quantitatives. Les hipòtesis elaborades prospecten l’aparició de determinats efectes com a conseqüència de l’aplicació del tractament experimental (autonomia, motivació i presa de consciència) i, al mateix temps es basen en la pressuposició, sustentat sobre la literatura consultada, que els efectes prospectats milloren el procés d’ensenyament i aprenentatge. Per tant, vaig intentar, per una banda, verificar l’eficàcia del tractament relacionada amb l’aparició dels efectes prospectats i, per una altra, mesurar l’incidència d’aquests efectes sobre el procés d’ensenyament i aprenentatge. A més, vaig dur a terme l’observació i avaluació de la metodologia aplicada respecte la coherència amb les bases epistemològiques socioconstructivistes i a la funcionalitat dins el context universitari on es va aplicar. Totes les dades recollides confirmen la coherència i la funcionalitat de la metodologia aplicada, tant pel que fa a l’eficàcia relacionada amb l’aparició dels efectes prospectats a les hipòtesis elaborades i a la seva incidència sobre la millora del procés d’ensenyament i aprenentatge, tot i que es van detectar algunes fallides a l’experiment pilot que se solucionaran a l’experiment definitiu. Els resultats positius de l’experiment pilot han estat confirmades també per les dades d’altres dos experiments realitzats posteriorment amb altres grups d’estudiants de la mateixa assignatura. Tots els resultats recollits es faran servir per projectar l’experiment definitiu, aportant-hi les modificacions necessàries per eliminar les fallides evidenciades durant la fase d’aplicació de l’experiment pilot i de les seves extensions i seguiments, i serviran com a base per a la meva tesi doctoral a la qual voldria arribar a formular una proposta socioconstrucitivista i humanista integradora per a l’ensenyament de la traducció.

Political autonomy and independence: theory and experimental evidence

We study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favourable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a voting process that can lead to different degrees of autonomy. If this process fails then both regions engage in a costly political conflict which can only lead to the maintenance of the initial subordination of the region in question or to its complete independence. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium the voting process always leads to an intermediate arrangement acceptable for both parts. Hence, the costly political struggle never occurs. In contrast, in our experiments we observe a large amount of fighting involving high material losses, even in a case in which the possibilities for an arrangement without conflict are very salient. In our experimental environment intermediate solutions are feasible and stable, but purely emotional elements prevent them from being reached.

Personal relations and their effect on behavior in an organizational setting: an experimental study

We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.